Tag Archives: Law
Republic Act 9003: adaptation and implementation in the Municipality of Carmen
Index Law Library Ateneo de Davao
Human Rights and Gender Equality
The millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with various concerns that include Human Rights and Gender Equality, envision a world where people are able to enjoy their human rights and equally regardless of race, sex, age, creed and background. Access to justice is an important concern of the MDGs. Governments of 189 countries all over the world have committed to ending gender based injustices by its target date of 2015. For women and children victims of violence all over the world, “Justice and Healing” is still elusive dream.
In the Philippines, the Philippine Commision on Women (PCW) is completing a program called ” Women’s Empowerment and Development Towards Gender Equality” (WEDGE). PCW asked me review Chapter 2 of the WEDGE Plan pertaining to “Protection and Access to Justice of women in especially “difficult circumstance”. The chapter addresses protection and access to justice of women who are vulnerable to and are victims of gender based violence, trafficking and prostitution; and women in general who should enjoy equal protection and just treatment under the law and by the legal and justice systems.
Fullfilling Mindanao’s Promise
First let me congratulate the graduates of the Ateneo de Davao University College of Law and Graduate Schools.. I know that it was a lot of hard work to get your degrees. I went to law school myself and to graduate school for a number of degrees (two of which I finished and one, my philosophy masters, well, I will forever be an MA Philosophy Cand.) For many of you, it must feel good to take away that purgatory-like designation – Cand.
To the PhD graduates – there are 16 of you today – I specially congratulate you. Mine from Yale was easy as a JSD does not require course work and it took me only 3 years to finish that law doctorate. But my wife, who is on the final stretch of her dissertation work for a Pastoral Counseling doctorate from Loyola University in Baltimore, is now on her 12th year of being an MS/PhD student. I know what it took for you to get here. I congratulate you for your discipline and your commitment.
Arbitration: A Preferred Mode in Dispute Resolution in International Commercial Transactions
A Time for Reckoning for the Bangsamoro Struggle
Can we reverse the legitimacy deficit of an imported state by recognizing its renewed claim for legitimacy grounded on its role today as provider of security on its territory? Conventional diplomatic technique proves inept where nonstate actors carry out partly the security function or contest the right of the state to uphold and keep it. How did the Bangsamoro come to play, albeit partly, a security function within what is claimed to be Philippine territory?
To recognize diversity in the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Philippine Facilitation Project is to draw a political matrix of diversities, wherein you rediscover that the Moros are still here to endure. The spirit of past and current generations is bound to the Moro homeland that was once a partner in covenant with the United States of America. In America’s dealings with the unincorporated territory of the Philippine Islands, the Moro Question constituted a major factor for Filipino full independence. This Question remains to be of interest today because it still puzzles political identity that attracts loyalties in domestic politics and in the articulations of spatiotemporal relations.
I take this liberty to articulate what we, the Bangsamoro people today, assert as a temporal depth embedded in territorial continuum between our present societies and our territorial ancestors. There is certainly nothing pre-modern in the recognition of kinships between current members of the nation and the members of those earlier societies that framed the context of homeland, ancestral domain, and territory as they relate the nation-a-forming to history. This introductory paper sketches certain nonlegal factors that engross our energies as stakeholders in mainland Mindanao and the Island Provinces of Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu to focus on a twenty-first century solution to the Bangsamoro problem.
Yet it is a continuing educative process to stress the centrality of legal issues and empirical consideration. Quite a few commentators are likely to take our positions as classroom thoughts; yet many more will believe what is right in shaping public opinions and reactions. Serious grievances are still reckoned in the present reality on matters of governance (and issues dating as far back as when the Americans first encountered the Moros at turn of the last century). America imposed on the Moros a unitary state structure—exhibiting a condition of colonizibility—running in cycles of abolition of successive government agencies dealing with Muslim affairs. Originally conceived in rigidity of a policy of benevolent assimilation, it is in fact, a euphemistic language for democracy’s referent: Civilizing ends.
In the first place, fundamental institutions of political life (nation, state, government, citizenship) are justificatory concepts. A democratic conception of citizenship contributes to the sense of the nation as a political community. Related to this is the discovery of discourses (in writings, petitions, declaration of Moro leaders) contesting several assumptions where the foundation of earned sovereign authority resides. In doing so, the US discursive erasure of a unique Muslim polity signified in a historic Bangsamoro sovereign space was at odds with transforming nondemocratic states, but only for an interim period. Current USIP forum on Islam and democracy focuses on what is here and now But there is very little guidance about constitutional crisis where, for instance, the logic of representation breaks down and there arises a question of legitimacy. Most are lost perhaps on abstract idioms surrounding the conceptual ambiguity in clarifying international relations and the intertextual journey involved in analysis.
Understanding the causal sequence
There is much to recommend about the Philippines being a case of shuttered democracy — to use a catch phrase; and so it is. This trajectory of the republic complicates the understanding of the Filipino nation in history to stabilize the meaning of a republican state. There is nonetheless a historically unique appeal to USIP explanatory argument about the true amity and commerce between America and the Moros of the Sulu archipelago, Mindanao, and its adjacent islands including Palawan.
Dr. Jacob G. Schurman, Chairman of the First Philippine Commission, was the first American official to land in Sulu at the turn of the last century. Addressing the Yale Phi Beta Kappa Society once back in America, he proposed a scheme of governance adapted to “the southern tier of islands” resembling that one put in operation in the Malay peninsula. One can understand American intervention as a policy tool in organizing earned sovereignty. Schurman’s very own words is a good quote:
“Any one who has studied the wonderful history of the Malay archipelago will find his promise fulfilled. We can make agreements with the chieftains of the southern tier, by which we shall take charge of the custom houses, and they will accept advisors who will bring to bear upon them not the power of the sword, but the American sense of justice, the American sense of government, and capacity for ushering in prosperity.”
This entails looking back in search for democratic closure to the ambiguity that so much characterized later American reductive policy of regime change via domination/intervention dichotomy—without Moro plebiscitary consent—bearing upon their distinct domestic community. As to political correctness, the Bangsamoro people claim supremacy over the veto power of settlers in Mindanao that spawn a land grab politics of domination to spin further Moro peripheral status in their own homeland.
As USIP Executive Director Eugene Martin has often explained, our American-Moro relations started on two fronts: “One with the War Department and the other with the Peace Department.” To date, the USIP still faces an unfinished agenda that has become a conceptual point of reference. This is so because the causal sequence projected in official lines of Washington thinking reminds us at once that America is here again in Moro homeland in the aftermath of the war on terror. For who decides to associate jihad with terrorist bond? Of course, your mandate is at once clear: To help expedite the peace process in Mindanao. Arguing this, we know how peace matters:
1. Consider how recent media reports on USIP workshops on the Mindanao peace process that provide both educative and corrective learning curves for the media, military, and national police.
Almost all media story is about conflict. Thus contemporaneous temptations to report America’s involvement solely in terms of security interest that step up military actions against a radicalized Muslim group feeds on the lack of solid information and profiling, if not faulty intelligence. Prejudice and bias substitute for the absence of sufficient background materials to the Manila-centric media reporting of the Mindanao conflict. This brings about a cycle of political violence formulated in the military idiom of pacification complex that, in turn, is tied to defense spending devoid of institution building for a just peace. Meanwhile the technology of political control continues to erode humanitarian law and basic human rights.
2. Consider next continuing efforts to bring different USI 13 experts together that can yield a reasoned exercise of the virtue of civility in government peace talks plus lessons learned in conflict resolutions.
All deliberate negotiation has a framework. It is commendable that USIP’s initial facilitation program runs parallel to the ongoing formal peace negotiation between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Philippines (GRP). By other means, the USIP has provided access to both Peace Panels and their Technical Working Groups (TWG) in preparing for research—as we call for new formulas to solve the problem of Bangsamoro people via negotiated political settlement of the Mindanao conflict. Demonstrably, the positions we describe here are predicated on an expectation that flexibility of parties to the ongoing peace process can lead by itself to a just and lasting negotiated comprehensive political solution.
3. Consider then how the interventionist component of USIP program elsewhere intersects between the complexity and the compatibility of Islam and democracy, which diverts the conflict to the outside.
Archaic limits on sovereignty do not accord with recent events in the interstices of democracy. Mindanao is linked as a frontier combining foreign policy rhetoric with justification for global antiterrorism measures to apply state coercive diplomacy. State practice of security creates identity by otherness and enmity. Warmongering faculty of the Presidency and Cabinet opens up the old antagonisms that put into precarious condition the Christian Filipino capability to govern the Bangsamoro people. But they cannot admit to harboring Islamophobia. With the continuing significance of Islam as a factor in such circumstances, the task of making this world endure for democracy becomes complicated, unless complemented by traditional alternative dispute resolution.
4. Consider finally a new doctrine for USIP to help shape the practice of ad hoc intervention at certain diplomatic stage to determine the permanent status of the Bangsamoro territory not as a legal question but as a political solution.
Current political trusteeship is a pragmatic template traced to the mandate system. From being a United States unincorporated territory, the evolution of the Philippine Islands under American political tutelage into a postcolonial transition Commonwealth was designed to determine Filipino future status. Thus defined, the Wilsonian telos of political development is institutionalized democracy. If we follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, Moros were de facto characterized by treaty-based rights and not by status as minority sector or by any class affiliation. From this point on, whatever is uncertain about the Moro’s prior claims now remains a stimulus likely to create de hure prospects for current transitional mechanisms to approach sovereignty-based conflict resolutions.
5. Consider at last a need to achieve the “Peace Department” role for USIP to mobilize international support even from a skeptical start to a high degree of outside proactive peacemaking initiatives translated into legitimacy.
Balancing between self-determination and sovereignty is the optimal method of ending conflicts. It is a hallmark of both international and internal legitimacy. It may well be that a coherent system of ad hoc intervention lurks around internal legitimacy for associative arrangements representing the premise of political stewardship in the preparation for the referendum that must decide the Bangsmoro permanent status. The South Sudan formula illustrates this Unity-with-Option modality as a result of workable arrangement under the Machakos Protocol. Its dominant considerations match those modern prescriptions for successful political trusteeship.
The specificity with which to exercise that Option of the Bangsamoro people, at least in part, is a legal in part, is a legal concept. At the end point of the political process, the case for Mindanao exhibits overlapping criteria for international and internal legitimacy; not only in terms of prior Protocol between European nations, but also at the level of signification resulting from its claimed territoriality. This is, in international context, the Sulu dynastic state was status quo ante assured special status as a protectorate by treaty; whereas, the Magindanaw dynastic state was a proto-state model of bounded territorial community of custom (suzerainty) and law with an interpretative overlay from customary international norms. Given the actuality transformed into the political culture that was consolidating into polity-centered versions of rulership.
Quests for convergence of the nonlegal factors facilitate understanding of the MILF-GRP peace Talks and the negotiation frameworks for future configurations in Mindanao. Subjection/integration, assimilation/aspiration, autonomy, and association: Such are the old grids to govern colonies. By this, political arguments for the Philippine Commonwealth cast the Moro polity/society as the problematic actor. For all its truncated evolution, there was a period of deep agitation in that this Government found itself face to face with the separatist Moro leaders and movements. The status quo in Mindanao has remained unacceptable and the unabetted armed conflict could be described as a stalemate for a number of good reasons. It just might be that new directions suitably related to the natural political patterns and social forces in Mindanao could channel less than formalistic (e.g., American style) models of democracy.
Materials generated from workshops, focus group discussions, and for a, writeups and analyses, such as those of peace researchers of USIP, have contributed to the understanding of the peace process. Advocacies have become added features of transparency about the progress of MILF-GRP peace negotiation. Understanding being always partial, we have become another casual sequence in the Government of Japan’s decision to dispatch a development expert to the International Monitoring Team (IMT), along with the Japanese new initiatives in regard to the Mindanao Peace Process. The Malaysian-led IMT — including Brunei and Libya — have performed the ceasefire monitoring task since July 2003, whereas the Japanese development expert can now begin to play a lead role in socioecomic monitoring.
Confronting reality in Mindanao
The centrality of the Bangsamoro homeland is intertwined with Bangsamoro identity as well as communal relationship to the land, the sea or lake, and the rest of the surrounding ancestral domains. With political ideology, asabiya or group pride may signify formally entering the world’s political life no longer via the backdoor, so to speak. It is this core value of holding on to their homeland that territorial claim is seen as central to the MILF diplomatic move for a negotiated political settlement.
Entrenching political structures and institutions
In sum, all outstanding commitments emanating from proper agreements are entrenching commitments to the incremental common denominator of permanent status. A time for reckoning commitment is upon us at this phase, as we take stock and more forward in the task of politics and diplomatic initiatives focused on self-determination. From 1997 to 2006, the GRP and MILF signed sixty-three agreements on various issues and concerns. Through the Government of Malaysia’s facilitation, the MILF-GRP Peace Panels have reached twenty-five Consensus Points weaving together all four strands of Ancestral Domain: conceptual foundation, territory, governance, and resources. Negotiations to resolve sovereignty-based conflict are unlikely to succeed without third party mediations where the centrality of the state as an important player in international relations is challenged. Third party mediation that prods the parties towards peace confidence building has impelled minimal transparency. Joint advocacies at this diplomatic state that promote popular confidence and leadership capacity for aggregating interests have entered another level of awareness. Typically, transparency here is aimed to reduce the domestic level of public confusion that comes with change. In summation, I have presented the salient points:
1. Clearly define what the struggle is about.
The Bangsamoro struggle does not make the Filipino people at large the real enemy. Nevertheless, on a nationalist level, the historicity of ethnic assertions is irrelevant. What is our perception of the condition of colonizibility in Mindanao? With its colony of migrants/settlers, the Central Government acts as a de-nationalizing authority, stripping off and denying Moros their Bangsamoro identity. Fundamentally, it is their birthright to secure their identity and posterity. To entrench the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space, with freedom of choice for indigenous peoples, does shape identity. Without a governing base, the issue of indigenous claims is stillborn and simply belongs to the sphere of ancestral vernacularism.
The Bangsamoro people’s struggle emanates from their identity claims and collective interests. This results from the movement for recognition of core ethnies and the role that mass mobilization by the intelligentsia plays in our people’s struggle. The Bangsamoro vertical variant includes ethnies stranded between tradition and modernity who seek to resolve their own identity crises by reasserting the history and culture of their community. Divergent experience of the hispanized population does much to explain that Filipino nationality mingled with the creole elites who sought a separate collective destiny. The rest of the nation was transformed from vertical patterns of ethnies led by the intelligentsia who leapt over colonization to rediscover their ethnic heritage. Once we focus on the asymmetrical degree of interdependence, the question of vexed citizenship related to ancestral domain issues becomes relevant.
Coercion in the service of political objectives is a limited means because it does not truly relocate final authority to end in closure of grievances. Most importantly, any military adventurism is also political. Armed struggle is an extension of the means to redress serious and legitimate grievances; MILF military actions are not aimed at the country as a whole. Devolved function extending a type of internal security arrangement whereby the Bangsamoro juridical entity (BJE) is able to apply its own policies within the broad constraints of a basic law, and still be able to exercise its authority and prerogative within its jurisdiction, can take a range of forms.
2. Firmly proffer a new modality to end conflicts.
Modality to accord an organically functioning BJ E with entrenched rights to exercise sovereign authority shared with the central authority is a step agreed to establish a system of life and governance suitable and acceptable to the Bangsamoro people. There is consensus on this point. Convening of constitutional framers tasked to write the basic law of the BJE, the modalities of which is to be contained in the comprehensive compact, is a logical step; but the content will emerge only from final status negotiation. Until restored to the Bangsamoro people, conflict-affected areas (CAAs) are undeniable reminders of unjust displacement and dispossession. But where restoration is no long possible, Government must take measures for adequate reparation. There is consensus on this, too. As a conceptual referent, CAAs are factored into development work and human security in Mindanao related to the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). Consensus is now arrived at to enter provisional arrangements to establish constructive structures and associative relationships that realign the core areas of autonomy, expanding it for this purpose, to resolve outstanding claims over the CA As. The purpose is to delimit and delineate the territorial boundary lines marking the new zone of separation. Reasonably sustaining wealth creation is a function of ownership/ control of all natural wealth and resources of whatever kind which, under the jurisdiction of the BJE, can be subjects of sharing through economic cooperation agreement or arrangement. This is correlative to transfer of power provisions on financial control and revenue collection and the authority to create its own tax base, rates, and customs duties.
3. Clearly define criteria for transfer power provisions.
Associative arrangements to be embodied in a comprehensive compact establish the structure of governance with defined executive, legislative, and judicial powers and functions. Entrenchment empowers BJE to legislate and administer revenue-generating measures through taxation, public borrowings (foreign and domestic), licensing, and income from government investment. The consensus is arrived at without details.
Besides taxing powers, authority granted to BJE includes financial control for governmental accounting and auditing systems and standards suitable to BJE. Transfer of powers also provides for budgeting and allocation of funds for governmental functions, development, and public services. Effectiveness in delivery of basic government services to create an economic environment of prosperity is a concrete means to attain legitimacy. There is a consensus on this point.
Typical areas maintained for institution building are civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system, and correctional institutions all necessary for developing a progressive Bangsamoro society. Judicial review mechanisms can exist in separations institutions to leave room for Shariah-based courts and banking system.
4. Closely navigate with a timeframe for transition process.
The transitory provision for establishing institution simultaneous with the transfer of governance to the BJE—prior to the determination of the final political status—is the mechanism for entrenchment. The transition period has the defined function to the framework agreements. The transition period officially ends with the proclamation of the referendum results from an electoral exercise internationally monitored by a third party. There is consensus on this procedural step.
By joint understanding, the term entrenchment means, for the purposes of giving effect to the transitory provision, the creation of a process of institution building to exercise shared sovereign authority over territory and defined functions of associative character prior to the determination of final status.
In order to reach the appropriate transitional mechanisms and other modalities for governance, the procedural steps include options, transitory process, sequence, and time periods ended by the referendum results. There has to be popular consultation leading to a referendum as the mode to determine the future political status of the Bangsamoro people. The mechanism is to be embodied in the comprehensive -compact, and it is conducted at the end of the transition process.
A multinational third party is envisioned to monitor the actual implementation of the comprehensive compact and to supervise the review of the transitory mechanism to introduce and support changes. This will provide continuity for the IMT now in place in Mindanao. There is consensus on this unarmed and consensual type of preventive peacekeeping model.
Defining structures and triggers for devolution
The optimal method for legitimacy bid under the republican state and the international community implicates each other as opposing domains of political reality that corresponds to the dual face of sovereignty. Thus, preparation of the domestic population for self-government was conveyed to all Mandates. That mandate earned sovereignty that, as such, will survive and vest legitimacy upon the new state. The mandatory control of Mindanao seemed relative only to status issues that have developed between a regional entity without autonomy and the nation-state in question. But manipulative corruptions in Manila have adverse distributional effects due to blurring of levels of analysis of the Bangsamoro problem. It is for this reason that the MNLF modality of power sharing combined with autonomy has lost credibility. Regionalism provides only autonomy: Without forms of power sharing, it is less integrative and somewhat federative. It may at best have a quasi-constitutional ground. In contrast, the MILF envisions the BJE to be entrenched in a comprehensive compact right from the start.
My advocacy to establish foundational criteria reconfigured in diplomatic practices is articulated to bring about an ingenuous solution. Foreign policy and domestic politics have become difficult to disentangle because of the transocial relations of the Muslim community. The Mindanao conflict needs a closure, but what it cannot foreclose is the democratic right of the Bangsamoro people to determine their future political status ending in referendum results. Conversely, the closure of the conflict should and must end eventually in popular consultation process provided for by international law.
1. Organic bonds within the community.
The involvement of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in the MILF-GRP Peace Process implies the OIC’s formal recognition of the MILF’s claim to representation of the Muslim South of the Philippines. It is tolerable to ask if there is a real stable identity to the Bangsamoro people; for this identity is not repressed or concealed. Because it can be decided as to who is included and who is excluded or given a choice, the MILF-GRP Peace Panels adopted identity as an animating principle behind consensus points on governance strand of the Ancestral Domain agenda. This acknowledgement corresponds to the criterion of organic bonds within the community claiming it, relating to common historical, cultural, religious, or ethnic ties.
MILF outlook and assertiveness advance ethos of sharing autochthonous claims or grievances to assert conceptual precendents. But as a party to the negotiation, its peace panel puts forward cogent arguments, it listens inasmuch as it accepts demonstrably reasonable outcome.
It is clear how well the coordination is working. The BDA has actively cooperated with the World Bank-Multidonor Joint Needs Assessments (WB-JNA). Giving prority to the economic sector is now boosted with the formal decision of a Japanese agency to join the IMT in a nonmilitary capacity with the military and armed forces via the Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), the MNLF leadership has answered to calls of removing threats to communities and building confidence to lend legitimacy to the peace process.
2. Develop understanding of legitimacy.
When it comes to the plea for republicanism, democracy, and minority rights, modernity marks the conception, of citizenship among diverse societies via concrete participation. Mandated benchmarks are both necessary and essential for preparatory work on final status negotiations. International law provides various criteria for exercising attributes of sovereignty over a territory even for only an interim period. If a community desires statehood, as some commentators point out, the idea of a pre existing unity may be avoided in nationalist ideology precisely via the social construction of the single most important critetrion of nationality, i.e., shared national grievance.
There lies the crux of the age-old Moro problem that is embarrassing the Philippine state, whose own identity is the historical product of a communal wish to enjoy a sovereign status on the basis of an assertion of constitutional independence. Just as this vision of Filipino nationalism problematizes social relations linked to its colonial legacy, it also produces form during armed conflict with the military. Security is tied to the nationalist identity, but not until people., rather than citizens, are the primary subjects of security can a comprehensive peace compact be achieved.
This key point is, in turn, linked to specific cultural pretensions of the interest of its demos, embedded in the protocols or exclusionary practices signifies as nation-a-forming (domestic citizenry) and popular sovereignty (plebiscitary consent). What reinforces distinction between people and citizenry is statist identity that constructs citizenship as synonymous with loyalty to eliminate all of that which is foreign. Underscoring protection against outside military threats delegitimizes all claims to authority of the sort made in behalf of territories and peoples with non-western cultural traditions.
Does it matter today that the incorporation of Moro territories into the Philippines has not been about modernizing efforts through benevolent assimilation? Nor has it come at the price of tutelage of truncated promise of institutional reforms? A compromised sovereignty emerged out of the balances of foreign interest in the writing of Treaties and Protocols relating to Sulu, Palawan, Mindanao, and its adjacent islands. There was no way for the Moro polities to embed the stategic values of their territory into the Western Great Power games. Practicalities of a new era demand asymmetrical modality for the Bangsamoro people to determine the nature of their own belonging with impulses for non-centralization.
3. Reconcile authority with self-determination principles.
There are principles of self-determination and human rights international instruments involved in the MILF-GRP framework documents. Human security concerns are written into the Implementing Guidelines of Security and Rehabilitation Aspects of the MILF GRP. Adherence to Protocols 2 and 3 for the protection of combatants and noncombatants and the role of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in the year of 2000 figured out. IMT overlaps the internal/external margins as it performs its function.
Yet it behooves now on the part of the Philippine Republic to do better — to boldly tackle the fault lines at the borders with its own just sense of duty and fairness — where the US failed in the American sense of justice, sense of government, and sense of capacity to usher in prosperity. But can America still rectify it? By voluntarily agreeing to a bilateral territorial consent to demarcate Bangsamoro territory, the Government of the Philippines could show its flexibility and, if the population desires to form a BJE in associative ties with the republic, should establish legitimate core requirements thereof.
Should the MILF-GRP successfully negotiate a political settlement of the Mindanao conflict, it can establish subjective legitimacy to the BJE via comprehensive compact with the central juridical authority. By the practices of earned sovereignty, MILF precisely proffers incremental gains of past agreements—treaty-based rights and criteria of subjective legitimacy presently entrenched for institution building. The right of the Bangsamoro people to determine their future political status, with option defined in transition mechanisms, sequences, and time periods ending in the referendum results, is based on popular process as source of claim to statehood.
Ideation of quest for homeland
Shared beliefs in freedom and aspirations for self-determination are powerful abstractions. Given the temporal depth of claims/ conflicts, we do not take for granted the western duality of freedom and the necessity of war. Rather, it is the promise of just peace, more than the exploitation of antagonism, that anticipates progress in the political world. Formidable hardships are faced when arguments arc made to support claims concerning the gradual emergence of the idea of sovereign will on what is required.
A good start is the word combination “homeland” that conveys a bounded yet extensive territory. The recourse to the idioms “motherland” or “founding fathers” embodies that ideation of who has sovereignty. Apart from the rightness or wrongness of this historical claim of what we have as a foundational status are configured mixtures of partly actualized historical order or similar undefined entities. Sovereign will signifies the start of political struggle, not the site of the foundational entity; thus, the transitory process has the defined function to stabilize earned sovereignty so provisional statehood or conditional sovereign authority can be signified on ground. Still it recurs—arguably in various forms at diverse spatial and temporal locales—as protocols become established for governing relationships. Because our modern conception of sovereignty has space as the most important dimension, so space and territory are always tied up together. We advocate, however, that it is plausible to conceive of a deterritorialized spatial solution as conditional. Portraying this deferment of domestic community’s essential project for rational national unity opens critical space for rearticulating the modern political organizing principle of sovereign statehood.
Writing in this manner, my purpose is merely to trace the changing functions of sovereign will and to defer its understanding in favor of genuine or serious questions of enmity and amity played out in diplomatic circles. As it is, for the Bangsamoro people’s struggle, when policy becomes foreign, what is alien to the nation state? Much has been made of the novelty of the Philippine setting in regard to negotiating the gradual transference to sovereign statehood with reversion of alien sovereignty implicating both military basing and parity rights. It still generates controversies—as in the case of the Balikatan exercises’ in Basilan, Cotabato, and Sulu—that puzzle the peasantry.
As our communities become identifiably distinct from the real government, what we end up with is a disjunctive sign of sovereign (political) authority relative to arrangement of associative ties and tiers for internal legitimacy. Unsettled are questions of what the range of authority of a domestic community might be in practice. So far, no standards derived from global autonomy arrangements are aggregated into a single international covenant. Nevertheless, a range of intermediate statuses associated with provisional statehood via earned or phased recognition is evolving. By this route, we confront earned sovereignty as a constitutive principle. It is viable in bringing closure to the Mindanao conflict that is currently so tangled with interactive dynamics of a territorial state and nonstate practices that contest the foundations of sovereign authority.
I hope to redirect analysis and scholarship to look at our new approach to sovereignty-based conflict settlement: To view its modality not as an erosion of a territorially bounded entity, but an indication that statecraft is not primarily about relations between the sovereign state, but also relative to the governance of its component units. To document how that entity is in the process of emerging or changing in its capabilities for full juridical autonomy on the international scene, we examine the plausible transformation of its constitutive elements.
Interrogating the Philippine State
It is erroneous to confuse legitimacy with justice. Interrogating the Philippine state makes possible inquiring into the justness of the original position pertaining to the stately foundation of authority. The struggles to establish and displace the sovereign foundations of the monarchical order follow the evolution of the shift of the locus of sovereign authority from the ruler to the people represented at the Malolos Congress. Who is or was represented? Too easily is it taken for granted that those represented equated the nation.
Competing perceptions of history and current reality would likely undermine the MILF-GRP Peace Talks without skillful facilitation that allows all options to be on the table. I take the position that prior to the American intervention, location of sovereign authority was the Spanish monarch from whom all powers originated governing the Philippine Islands as a colonial possession. It was just that the foundational authority figure for the most part of Mindanao (except the northern portion) and its adjacent islands and the Sulu archipelago, including Palawan, were the rulers of the dynastic realms of Magindanaw, Sulu, and Ranaw.
Success in pursuing self-determination requires peace researchers political sophistication in drawing from the unique features of local political experience. Thinking through the mixtures of colonial policy tools and goals, we must cut deeper into the abstract idiom that underlies current political ideas and structures. My principal concern is to offer something emancipatory beyond an explanatory account of the Philippine state.
Context of integration under subjection
First, justification for control of territory by Spanish conquest and American colonization defined the understanding about the workings of power to exploit resources. The notion of temporary rule for the benefit of the people projected the idea that to be sovereign is to be fully developed upon subjection. To what end? The integration model is only a limiting case of the general theory. The conclusion that the Moros were in some sense uncivilized and thus seem to have no locatable sovereign is itself contested. In practical reality, America disregarded the Moro political aspiration when it established itself as the occupying protectorate. A priori arguments prevailed that Moroism exists in Mindanao and its adjacent islands, constituting another power on land founded on interdiction and law. On its logic are tangled public confidence, practical indicia concerning the dual context of political violence, protracting armed struggle in the service of political objectives, authority figures, and the rise of extremist groups at the border areas.
Why are there separate states? Is it the case then that they represent the distribution of the world into nations? Or is it just that brutal and arbitrary means characterize how the state has been constituted? Shift in the basis for the locus of power and authority now makes it possible to deconstruct that foundation of the political system that organizes law enforcement.”) What the late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim appealed, in a letter in 2003 to US President George W. Bush, is about rectifying a historical error in US policy of incorporating the Moro polity into the Philippine polity. This recourse to a friendly Great Power is, for the MILF, to signify the legal framework and peaceful means of good offices. The reply of Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelley to Salamat is clear about the US recognizing that the Muslims of the Southern Philippines “have serious, legitimate grievances.” The US will not mediate nor will it participate in the negotiations directly; yet it stands ready to support, both politically and financially, a both-if We peace process between GRP and MILF. Kelley assured that the US “will not seek to supplant Kuala Lumpur.” Indeed, the US seeks to work with the Malaysians for a successful peace settlement. In fact, the State Department has tasked the USIP instead “to further” the peace process.
Our inquiry into the limit of the political world harks back to the theory and practice of proto-sovereignty when the problem of piracy was confronted systematically because it represented a test case of the extent of sovereign authority and autonomy. To us, in modernity, outlawry is a public declaration: Thus, to account for the reconceptualization of negative, reactive, and immanent power of civil interdiction operatively substituting for police power in hot pursuit by ad hoc joint action group against criminal syndicates is to reconsider the sovereignty/intervention boundary. On a positive note, the track of MILF-GRP Peace Talks promises to be the linchpin of the broader Mindanao peace process: The legitimate fight in defense against terrorism. Taking these pointers together may reflect public willingness to accept questionable features of political control for satisfying needs, albeit it often blurs the difference between domination and liberation.
Aspirational context of assimilation
Second, even as American benevolent assimilation offered the dependent peoples a prolongation of the parent state, it was aspirational for the metropolis and elite Filipinos. If a republican state warranted popular sovereignty characterized by the making of majority/minority, the appeal to equality and inalienable rights are ultimately traced to American tradition and Hispanic Catholic heritage. Via political aspirations, worldviews, value claims, transformations, and so on, the stepwise interventions take place to organize equivalent liberal capitalist democracy. This project of universalizing the liberal movement from below neglects its troubled relationship to time dimension.
Thus, invasion discourses on manifest destiny of the American people to establish the boundaries of the nation from the Atlantic to the Pacific pointed to who are the people in the Philippines. To obscure manifold differences, the international had to be assimilated and turned into a domestic entity in order to guarantee legitimacy, with the people as the referent. Controversy has raged on, as in episodic events, because self-evident truths are negated in recent sovereign remedies for complicity to questions of legitimacy.”
The compelling effect of this story opens up how Mindanao had a predominantly Muslim population whose serious grievances and frustrations with the status quo boiled up in 1968, culminating in the Muslim Independence Manifesto (MIM). Continued loss of Muslim superiority and dominance in Mindanao is a critical factor to the pursuits of occupation dependent upon the generative power of the earth, the control of land area, and the use of resources. Continuity of demands clustered around agenda for MILF-GRP negotiation resonates with modern criteria to garner consensus’ inclusive of the indigenous people.
Context of crisis in autonomy
The autonomy envisaged in the MNLF-GRP Final Peace Agreement of 1996 has come half a century after the inauguration of Philippine independence in 1946.13 Arguing for an emancipatory framework of political space, it poses helpful dichotomies for the Moros as distinct, separate politics.
And it has conditioned, too, the limit of ideological silence pertaining to the abstract entity of representation of the Philippine body politic in its foundational status. The natural logic of episodic events of EDSA 1 and EDSA 2 reinforces the power of the basic argument of the article: the full autonomy of the juridical entity is in crisis.
1. The formative union of state and nation.
Now we can presuppose that the return of the body politic—union of state and nation—as the metaphor of full juridical autonomy creates a mutually reifying effect on the more abstract and transcendent concept of territorial status. A nd so, I suggest that understanding the republican state to give impetus to the geographical orientation of political control inhibits reorganizing reality of demos actors’ plea for revolution at the capital region. This underlines all the more that the regularity of election is the essence of republicanism.
As borne out during the term of Fidel V. Ramos, progress in the NINLF-GRP negotiated settlement required a re-evaluation of parameter problems and international monitoring mechanisms. From its incipience, this process was eroded by internal political dynamics and troublesome unilateral interpretative constitutional process for obtaining plebiscitary consent. There is thus, on one spectrum, a challenge to the Macapagal-Arroyo presidency to configure by any conceivable good faith the application of the standards implementation phases through the remainder of her term. On the other spectrum, the MILT-GRP negotiation issues deserve a mixture of lessons learned as grid of peace process. Central authority can very easily eliminate the condition of colonizibility via earned sovereignty formulation, according to the set of hallmarks for permanent and final status negotiation.
2. The contested claims for authority and freedom.
Martial rule during the 1970s was an alibi governance structure acting to preserve the sovereign foundation of the republic , thereby saving it from dismemberment. The protection of interest is not a theory: Its analysis turns on a political acumen to deal with concrete problems. Justifications to use state coercive power have taken in the name of authority. For Marcos, a theory of revolution from the center was necessary to arrest the fragmentation of practical political authority. Authority is what official claims invoked when the Jabidda plot and massacres of Moros in genocidal proportions occurred and Muslim dominated provinces were gerrymandered. The worsening armed conflict in Mindanao from 1972 onward invited OIC member countries to intervene. And the subsequent 2000 wars of presidential ambitions demonstrated how bad governance and political violence result in an unstable status quo. Government effectiveness is a core tenet in international and internal legitimacy, which precisely deals with power and leadership.
Considerations of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement by now are intertwined with the 1973 Constitution, 1986 Freedom Constitution, and the 1987 Constitution. Parameter difficulties must be broadly settled to negotiate the crucial concepts: Autonomy, independence, and freedom. How can claims to the final status of the Bangasamoro people be determined by an open political culture that shifts with the assumption of a single logic to account for them? a popularly elected government is not enough to recast the distinction between two key concepts: Government and people. It is not sufficient because the Constitution is too narrow a framework to negotiate the Mindanao conflict and the problem of the Bangsamoro people. Neither is it genuine enough to invoke the limitedness of the constitutional process. In this context, the autonomous regions covered by autonomy-specific provisions of the 1987 Constitution do not encompass self-determination in regard to the associative claims of authority, self-rule, and freedom.
Emerging context of association
The concept of territorality is hardly investigated in international relations. Even changes in the European Union and global economy move beyond state sovereignty and territoriality towards overlapping authorities and non-territorial offshore markets. It the first place, international relations theory is not adept at problematizing the discontinuity in the state system to yield to instances of configuring political space. There is no search for entities substitutable for the state; what takes place is the unbundling of territoriality.
Yet, from another angle, the practice of ad hoc intervention does short shrift the doctrine of free state association. For political effect, association allows a degree of self-governance with delegation of power. Post-colonial transition type is practically replaced by intervention for political trusteeship or earned sovereignty approach following the official end of UN trusteeship system. Given this reality, however conditional or grudgingly ceded, a portion of the juridical autonomy of the parent state produces particular competencies. Meantime, trying to sort out why former colonial states vary points our analysis back to their different foundations of sovereign authority. Very few states have actually possessed full juridical autonomy — the Philippines among others — and thus might be characterized as quasi-sovereign states. And while no stable “domestic community within clear, fixed boundaries” can be located, it has become analogous in historical event to speak of failed states.
1. The argument for foundational status.
Treating seriously Philippines sovereignty as a question already settled poses a challenge to reconstruct of deconstruct its foundational status. Take the notion of sovereign voice of authority: Philippine quasi-sovereign state status permitted it to be a founding member of the United nations (UN) now enjoying a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council. Within the state system, its membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) denoted sovereign statehood. In addition to this spatial dimension, the Philippine entity’s full juridical autonomy and political identity can be inferred from diplomatic practice in current global political life.
Having attained some measure of legitimacy, how does the OIC observer status of Bangsamoro represented by MNLF implicate the intersections of politicized discourses between GRP and the intervening states? By this means of state behavior, the OIC resolutions discursively convey to GRP the concerns over the situation in Mindanao and Sulu; even if changes in the conduct of the state occur, we can detect the transitory character of the nexus of relationships of entities. More importantly, the OIC member states act as the legitimate interpretative community regarding Muslims in the South Philippines. Arguably, legitimacy should not be confused with justice. Although it means no more than agreeing to seek working arrangements via the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy, it implies tacit acceptance of international modes and standards of procedural steps in peace negotiation.
As for the MILF-GRP Peace Talks, the Government of Malaysia as facilitator allows the parties to work out the terms of reference as a necessary part of the framework. The exploratory talks break the structure of discussions into components of negotiation for the acceptance part and serves more for the negotiation of obstacles while tackling the substantive issues. The content part is more concerned with results rather than methods. The primary requirements of the procedure are confidentiality and informality. Owing to the political sensitivity of the facilitation as a process, the parties and the facilitator are often reluctant to place on record, except in fairly general terms, all the details and nuances of the procedural steps they went through. It should be noted that this largely explains the fact that even post factum the Secretariat-Facilitator, the GRP, and the MNLF have limited the access of the press.
2. The argument for conceptual adjustment.
Why negotiate and who are represented? It is a mistake to say that the theory of nationality is a retrograde step in history. This nationalist myth represents a break with the past, even as it casts it. Filipino nationalism aims at unification, but lacks the criterion of sharing grievances with the Bangsamoro people. Constitutive unity, when self-determination becomes associated with popular sovereignty, is attached to supposed nationhood; and what we call majority has the tendencies for discriminatory bias. Pressure from this question creates an urge in separatist movements specifically tested on autonomy precedents attuned to the nuanced minority rights standards of equal protection of law, just like in mature nation-states where distinct national groups live under the same democracy. More to the point, homogenizing notions of democratic citizenship illustrate the need to revise some of the unitary statist sovereign entity assumptions in public and constitutional spheres of equality of all peoples.
Concerning the facts about the formation of a monist polity into single-nation Filipino state, this Catholic country’s unitary purpose invites abuse of authority and oppressive rule, despite certain claims of tolerance for diversity. The interest of the Bangsamoro people will only be part of it, but they will never be in it because they are not of it. Some of the secular ideological constructs basic to the aspiration toward Filipino nationalism itself would rather treat Moros as minorities, in the context of tribe or sector. In fact, as self-determined communities, they are not effectively governed, thereby rendering the nationalist ideals remote. Who does this republic satisfy when it tries to produce a general plenty and wealth-acquisition via rent-seeking capital center where the power of the regional institutions is largely marginal? How to make sense of the status of the political economy so dependent on division of labor forces generative of overall wealth overseas—a situation that further suggests the ambiguities surrounding the sovereignty dilemma? To say of this phenomenon that it is retrogression to quasi-state status is not to say that it is a social capital formation for institution-building purposes.
3. The substantial argument.
Not only do present generations assert Bangsamoro identity as a birthright, but increasingly assert also the demands of current self-understanding of territorial relation in Mindanao as a homeland. There are legal grounds and joint advocacies as to reverence for the land of their forefathers, as to their attachments to ancestral domain, as well as to ancestry of those who arc perceived to have put elements of self-governance into the hind, thereby making it a territory. When we talk about a nation becoming a state from the vantage point of the duality of sovereignty—as a principle organizing our political reality and the understandings of it—it implies that politics needs a domestic arena with order, freedom, and authority. When the Bangsamoro people assert nationhood, we are not necessarily led back to the sovereign state: for a quasi-state is a susceptible recipient of intervention in various forms.
Associative ties and tiers entrenched in spatial dimension perceived to be a geographically contained structure of de ficto asymmetries—cultural, historical, geographic area, and so on—have greater potential for including national pluralism in a compact with which this type of asymmetrical agreement is constituted. To avoid an identity-based fragmentation of the political space, our common grasp of what is consent of the governed must encourage social trust attributes in the totality of relationships that underpin the contractualist rationale for empirical entities. Translated into the context of municipal trust law, it promises a more secured future for the Bangsamoro people. Substantively, when state apparatus hierarchy is reversed by the transition process—leading from the status quo in sequences and time periods—with the defined function of entrenching Bangsamoro rights, the BJE is thus configured by the institutional status arrangement into the political actor attributes.
What types of alternative measure can the central government promote as social trust that, for reasons of equity and social justice, will enable the Bangsamoro people to calculate their capacity to realize their principal interests within and outside the Philippine republic? To be clear, it is a social quality or authority shared. This is not pure academic discourse about construction of new labels, but it is a process of agenda-setting.
One paradoxical measure is to provide in the fundamental charter a clause permitting secession under qualified conditions as to the frequency of consultative referendums and to the majorities required in order to exercise the option to secede.” Contrariwise, this constitutional clause may impel the motivations of the members and of the majority group who are aware of the right of the region to opt for autonomous existence on the international state system.
4. The institutionalist argument.
The neo-institutionalist argument disarms the distrusts for collective rights that could bring authoritarian risk out of institutional mechanisms of demos: It is aware of the historical process that is full of wars, conquests, annexations, exterminations, or marginalization of whole peoples. But the actors have a way of taking revenge on the system.
Historicity grants the actor a more central place.I8Revolution signifies pure negativity, hence extra-constitutional, until Americans reinvented a “negarchy” opposite the “monarchy” matrix type. For all that, what is the un-thought of foundation between the Westphalian orthodoxy (1648) and the Philadelphian negarchy (1776) models? What do we make of the Java-NIalaccan negri or state system within the constellation of the sultanates simultaneous with the genesis of an international system? At the dawn of the state system in 1644, the Spanish colonial state attributed by treaty-right to Sultan Kudarat sovereign authority of the Magindanaw dynastic state. My point here is that the paradigm of rulership limits an understanding of the conceptual antecedents of sovereign authority in modernity.
In sum, the time dimension is underlined, indicating variant forms of sovereignty in historical periods seen as imposed negation of self-understandings opposite each other. That, in fact, does unravel the justness of the original position between the Bangsamoro people and the rest of the Filipino people. Making actual events more mythical adds on making myths more historical in our memories to help both nations understand themselves and to constitute identity. This way forward in our quest for genealogy of sovereign authority is both organized and historicized: In body social via rearrangement of identity and differences. It establishes sovereign authority as a principle of difference. Its origination is organically linked to the state as verified hierarchy and the nation as imagined community.
Interrogating the Philippine hierarchy-state as a whole entity therefore requires thinking out of the box, the kind that is capable of assimilating and associating political and social differences into one form or another and weaving them together as an array of arrangements and ties that acquire a new dimension: What is outside of the imported state is ideology; what is inside is foundation held under the sway of public opinion.
So much for the un-thought foundation of the state system. What happens now to the stress on nationalism arising from secessionist tendencies?
Given that the state has near absolute discretion to confront self determination movements, it does not tell where to go from here. However, ambiguity does not imply cluelessness. When we work out sovereign statecraft in terms of shared sovereign authority relations, we can unpack what links the state and the contested nationhood. Sovereign will, when juxtaposed to the principle of maslaha or general interest, uncovers the bundle of political-constitutional solutions coupled with final status negotiation.
Carp And Its Implications for Labor Relations and Employment Opportunities
Introduction
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657 (more popularly known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARP) was promulgated with a ten-year period of implementation, The law recognizes all workers and tenants as beneficiaries of the program provided they are landless and willing to till the soil. It also provides for the delivery of support services to the beneficiaries of the program. Farm schemes, such as production and profit-sharing before the final land transfer so as to ensure the tenurial security of farmers and farm workers, are also stipulated.
As the law approaches its final stage of implementation, new employment arrangements, such as contract growing, individual farms, cooperative farming, joint agribusiness ventures and other management practices, have emerged. Large plantations which previously employed sizable work forces, have been subdivided. In theory, these parcels of land will be managed by individual landowners, most of whom used to be employees of the plantations and are now treated as non-traditional farm workers.
Such changes in the employment structures have affected areas such as organization, bargaining and worker’s protection, particularly in corporate farms. While the empowering vision of land reform is recognized, the new arrangements have had the immediate effect of decreasing workers’ incomes and redefining organizational options. There are as yet no clear policies, programs or laws covering these arrangements. Neither has the scope or full implication of the program on employment and labor relations in general been fully evaluated.
This study aimed to determine the labor and employment implications of the full implementation of the CARP. It is focused on the description of the labor relations and employment implications of the full implementation of the CARP in the corporate farms. Therefore, the present undertaking covers all the cooperatives in the banana, asparagus and pineapple plantations in Southern Mindanao. It is interesting to note that since the signing into law of the CARP in 1988, the majority of the cooperatives have not received the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), thus reducing the number of cooperatives covered.
One of the innovations contained in the 1987 Constitution is the adoption of the CARP which involves the redistribution of all agricultural lands. The Constitution provides that “the State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform” (Art. II, Sec. 21).
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm-workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm-workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits, as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing (Art. XIII, Sec. 4).
The framers of the 1987 Constitution considered a comprehensive agrarian reform program as a reform strategy designed to solve the problems of poverty and insurgency, promote industrialization and strengthen democracy by giving opportunity to
the majority of the Filipino people who are poor to actively participate in the political process.
The present agrarian reform program is heavily anchored in the social justice principle set out in the 1986 Constitution. Article 18, Section 1 mandates that “The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.”
Social justice focuses on the reduction and removal of inequalities by democratizing wealth and power. This, in turn, connotes changing or modifying power relations. This means the economic and political empowerment of the powerless — the farmers and landless farm-workers. It is within this context that RA 6657, more popularly known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the legal basis of CARP, is supposed to be promulgated.
An analysis of the law indicates an ambivalence regarding how to achieve social justice through agrarian reform. In the declaration of principles and policies, RA 6657 underscores the need for a more equitable distribution and ownership of land. This entails the establishment of owner-cultivatorship and economic size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture. Yet, agrarian reform is defined in the law to signify not only the redistribution of land and provision of support services, but also all other “arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of land such as production or profit sharing, labor administration and the distribution of shares of stocks…”. At present, there are already four specific cases of such arrangements. Three involve lands formerly owned by a government corporation and leased to multinationals then to cooperatives composed of regular workers (and office employees). These cooperatives are supposed to lease back the land to the corporation. The stocks held by the workers’ cooperatives are equivalent to the value of lands.
Whether these arrangements could indeed provide social justice is a debatable issue. Initial analysis indicates that some aspects of these arrangements might counteract the full attainment of social justice. For instance, in lease-back arrangements, the dual position of the workers — both as members of the cooperative leasing the Land to the corporation, and as workers or employees of the corporation —might inhibit them from attaining a strong bargaining position in relation to the corporation. Recent findings of a study conducted by the Institute of Agrarian Studies indicate the possibility of corporate management influencing the organization and the decision-making process of the cooperatives.
Nevertheless, it is significant to note that where the labor union is strong, the cooperatives bargaining power is likewise strong. The workers’ situation is even more dramatic where stock ownership arrangements are pursued. In such cases, the participation of the workers in corporate decision-making will be minimal considering that, in general, the equivalent value of the land to total corporate assets is only about 20-25 percent. (Cornista, 1990, 15). Past agrarian reform programs have shown that land redistribution alone is not sufficient to sustain the benefits of agrarian reform. Failure to provide adequate, accessible and timely support services to beneficiaries has resulted in the minimal impact of past programs on rural welfare. In fact, the continued selling and mortgaging of land rights and the persistence of share tenancy in agrarian reform areas could be partly attributed to the lack of sufficient services to beneficiaries to help make their farms productive and viable.
One important support service is credit. Currently, there are two schools of thought that permeate policy-making. The first adopts a free market orientation. It argues that subsidized credit and government’s direct lending will distort the financial market. Moreover, it claims that not all farmers need credit. The second school of thought posits that since farmers, particularly agrarian reform beneficiaries, are poor, government intervention to financially assist them, is necessary. Hence, it favors subsidized credit and collateral-free loans. The government must take a more definitive stand on this issue. RA 6657 underscores the importance of government assistance in the delivery of rural credit. The initiative shown by the Land Bank of the Philippines, the financing institution for agrarian reform, in providing low interest rates on loans to agrarian reform beneficiaries is significant to note (Ibid.).
There is also a need to consistently pursue an extension approach that emphasizes community organizing and people’s participation. While these principles are already widely accepted as most effective for the delivery of support services to beneficiaries, their implementation has yet to be realized. Two reasons can explain the dilemma. First, people’s participation connotes a “bottom-up” decision making process. The government bureaucracy, however, still tends to think from the top down and, consequently, decision-making remains largely centralized. Second, field implementors have been practicing a diffusionist extension approach for a long time. Reorienting and retraining them to adopt a community organizing approach is therefore imperative.
A very positive development in the Philippines is the rise of non-governmental and people’s organizations that are willing to participate in agrarian reform and rural development. There is already a widespread awareness of the important role they can play in the delivery of support services to individual beneficiaries. Thus, the Land Bank, realizing its limited reach, has targeted cooperatives and farmers’ associations as the conduits of its lending program. Further institutionalization of the relationship between government and non-governmental/people’s organizations must be pursued in order to eradicate the suspicion that permeated their past relationships.
Under the CARP Law of 1988, there were two measures designed to improve the tenurial and labor relations: the determination of lease rentals and production sharing (Legada, 1989, 13). Under the first measure, the DAR is mandated to determine and fix the lease rentals in accordance with Section 34 of R.A. 3844 and to periodically review and adjust the rental structure for different crops, including rice and corn, in different regions in order to improve progressively the conditions of the farmers, tenants or lessees (Section 12). With the second measure, multinational corporations and those engaged in commercial farming and any enterprise adopting the production sharing scheme are required to execute within ninety days a production sharing plan (Sec 13).
The declared basic policy on labor and industrial relations is stated in Arts. 3 and 217 of the Labor Code, paraphrased thus:
1. Afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
2. Regulate relations between workers and employers (Art 211, Labor Relations).
The stated policy of the government is to promote free trade unionism and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization and collective bargaining. During the last decade, however, there was a gradual decline in the strength and number of unions in the labor movement, perhaps due to government actions, such as limitations on the right to strike, restructuring, limitation on organizable workers, legislated wage increases, and leadership in Unions (Jimenez 1984: 25-28).
In this study, only 251 cooperatives were covered during the two-week survey period. The sample was, however, revised based on the comments of Mr. Borja (Marsman Estate Plantation) during the initial data presentation at Grand Men Seng Hotel in Davao City last January 19, 1999. It was explained that the Tagnanan, Bongabong and Tagdangua cooperatives were not banana corporations prior to CARP implementation and thus should be omitted as part of the sample. The recomputation of the sample resulted in 358 samples from nine (9) cooperatives with CLOA at the time of the survey. Necessary field re-interviews were done from February to early April 1999 to complete the desired sample.
The sample cooperatives came from five banana corporations. These were Stanfilco, Checkered Farms, DAPCO, Hijo Plantation and Soriano Fruits. The Stanfilco cooperatives have three Certificate of Land Ownership Awards; two of which were covered by the survey (SEARBEMCO and DARBMUPCO). The other CLOA composed of three cooperatives (ARBEMCO, FIAGRO and DOSGRO) were not covered by the survey given their small number of members. DARBCO has a separate CLOA so as with CHEFARBEMCO. Hijo-based cooperatives (HEARBCO1, HEARBCO2 and HEARBCO) have only one CLOA. However, as a result of conflicts in the management of the mother cooperative, two groups have separated from the mother-cooperative. The CLOA for AMS Magatos Employees Multi-purpose Coop and the Soriano Fruits Employees Multi-purpose Coop were not yet released by the company, given problems in the leased lands from the owners.
The data needed to answer the objectives of the study were collected using an interview schedule, which was discussed and drafted jointly with the researchers from the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and Employment, Manila. The draft survey instrument was subsequently pre-tested in Diamond Farms, where the Diamond Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-purpose Cooperative was located. The survey instrument was thereafter revised based on the pretest results.
Five field interviewers were trained on how to properly implement the survey instruments. They were deployed to various sampled cooperatives from October 1, 1998 to November 15, 1998. The second set of data collection was done from February to early April 1999. Spot-checking activities were likewise conducted to ensure that the survey instruments were properly used.
The data were processed using the Epiform program. Simple descriptive statistics were utilized in the data analysis, such as means, frequencies, percentage distributions, and mean ranks wherever appropriate.
The Socio-Demographic Data
The sex distribution of the respondents denotes the type of gender divide in the farm work. As shown in the data, the males outnumbered their female counterparts, i.e., more than three-fourths of the respondents (78.2%) were males while 21.8% were females.
The age range denotes the type of workers hired by the company in terms of age. The majority of the respondents fall between 37 and 46 years of age (60.4%). The mean age was computed at 41.4 years, indicating that the respondents were in their early 40s.
The civil status of the respondents reveals that plantation workers were mainly married couples. This has been ascertained by
the findings of the study where 95.5 percent were married. Only a few were single (1.4%), separated (0.8%), widowed (2%), or living together (0.3%).
The findings on the education of the respondents indicate the standard used by the plantation in hiring workers. The plantation hired workers without a clear criterion on education. Hiring was based solely on the workers’ willingness to work regardless of their educational attainment. The majority of the workers were high school graduates (61.2%), followed by those with an elementary education (19.5%). Only a little over 15% were in college (16.8%).
Close to half (42.7%) of the respondents were from Region XI (Southern Mindanao), the location of most of the farmers’ coop with CLOA, followed by those from the Visayas (36%).
The data on birthplace further revealed the geographic mobility of the respondents. Over half (57.3%) of the respondents were migrants, i.e., 36 percent came from the Visayas, with the rest coming from different areas in Mindanao, e.g., Zamboanga, Cagayan de Oro City, Bukidnon, Cotabato, and from the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. A limited few (1.7%) were Luzon-migrants.
The respondents migrated to the survey sites during the 1950s and 1960s. These were the years when people from the Visayas and Luzon were encouraged by the Philippine government to move 7.0 Mindanao and settle here. The 1970s marked the period of the banana plantations starting operations in the survey sites, which further encouraged migration from the neighboring regions and municipalities, including those from the Visayas and Luzon, thus recording the highest proportion of migrant workers (55.6%). Others migrated to the survey sites in the 1980’s (19%) and 1990’s (13.4%).
The length of stay in the survey sites reveals the possible exposure one has in his environment. It is assumed that an individual who has lived in the area for a longer time has more knowledge on what is happening in the area than the newcomer. Thus, the longer the respondent has stayed in the survey sites, the better his views will be on his environment compared to the recent arrival. The respondents have stayed in the survey sites from one to 50 years, with close to half (46.1%) residing in the survey sites from 21 to 30 years. On the average, they have lived in the survey sites for at least 20.3 years.
The total number of living children is indicative of the economic responsibility and needs of the respondents’ family. The higher the number of children, the more efforts are needed to provide for their family’s needs than those families with lesser number of children. The total number of living children ranged from one to 12, with most of them indicating three to four children (41.3%), followed by those with one to two living children (27.8%). A smaller proportion (18.7%) have five to six living children. They have an average of 3.8 or four living children.
The monthly income received by the respondents ranged from P1,000 to over P5,000 prior to and during CARP. There were more of those who received P3,500 to P3,999 during CARP (60.9%) than those prior to CARP (39.1%).
The average monthly income of the respondents during CARP (P3,827.71) was higher by P324.31 from the average income of the respondents prior to CARP implementation (P3,503.40), which was three years or more years ago. However, such amounts were very much lower compared to the average monthly income of P7,755.33 in Southern Mindanao established by the National Statistics Office/ National Statistical Coordinating Board as of August 1998 (September 1998). The average income of the respondents prior to CARP was lower by 121.4 percent while the average income during CARP implementation was lower by 102.6 percent compared to the average monthly income pegged by the National Statistics Office (P7,755.33).
As explained by the key informant from DARBMUPCO, wage increases were the result of the employers’ conscious efforts to follow the mandated wage increase policy of the government. They increased the wage by 27 percent from its pre-CARP level (i.e., P117 x 27% = P148.59). However, it is also worth noting that some cooperatives reduced the salaries of their members, such as the case of the Hijo ARBs, from pre-CARP level of P144.36 a day to P110 a day in 1997 and to P140 in 1999. The case of Soriano Fruits
Employees Multi-purpose Coop is different. They received P159 a day because the company continues to provide their salaries. While their CLOA was already released, however, it (CLOA) was kept by the company. This suggests the range of discretion possible in determining wages for the coop members by the cooperatives. At the same time, these phenomena explained as adjustments made by the cooperatives, i.e., being new to the business, and depending on the proceeds of the sale of bananas from the buyers. But they were hopeful that if the economy stabilized, they will make the necessary adjustments to provide the workers the necessary increases in their wages and wage-related benefits.
A check with the Department of Labor and Employment -Region XI revealed that the workers received more-than the minimum wage pegged by the Regional Wages and Productivity Board, i.e., P123 per day. And since the workers were receiving more than the minimum wage per day, they will not be provided with cost of living allowance, amounting to P10 a day.
Terms and Conditions of Work Prevailing
in Plantation Placed Under CARP
As a result of placing banana corporations under CARP, the data on specific tasks performed by the workers revealed that there were tasks performed during CARP such as managing the coop, first aid and legal benefits officer, which were not done prior to CARP. Job positions such as drivers, time keeper, tissue culturist, pump/ tractor operator and janitorial services were no longer needed under CARP. These show that while the cooperatives tended to forego some of the specific tasks done prior to CARP implementation, new tasks were, in turn, undertaken.
The inclusion of new tasks was a must for the workers are no longer mere employees but employers as well. The exclusion of some tasks could perhaps be viewed as the coops’ way of limiting their tasks to those which were necessary, and thus reducing costs on unnecessary expenses. This could be a venue for agencies involved in training to forge relationships with the cooperatives to enhance the skills of cooperatives and their members. This is a new strategy for worker s who were once employees and have now become their own managers.
The mode of payment of income of the respondents did not appear to vary greatly prior to and during CARP implementation. While the respondents prior to CARP reported two modes of payment, i.e., “15th and 30th of the month” and “pakyaw” (parcella system), all the respondents during CARP reported a “15’h and 30th of the month” mode of payment of their salaries. These workers were paid their salaries on the 15th and 30th of the month. The daily workers as well as the piece workers were still paid on the 15th and 30th of the month.
Working Conditions and Relationships
The respondents were asked to rate their physical working conditions by asking them to choose which of the responses best described their answers to the questions. The choices included “very adequate” = 1, “adequate” = 2, and “not adequate” = 3.
The responses of the respondents revealed that they considered the working tools, working equipment, protection from harmful chemicals, availability of medical facilities and availability of medical supplies as “adequate”, as evidenced by the rating of the respondents of these items as “adequate”, i.e., 2.02 prior to CARP implementation and 2.20 during CARP implementation. The ratings suggest that in terms of the physical working condition, their situation prior to the CARP implementation was better than during the CARP implementation. Such perceptions are to be expected since these arrangements were new to the cooperatives. They still had to exert more efforts in understanding how the cooperatives may be handled well. Under the cooperatives, it was not easy for them to disregard the working conditions which they were used to under the company for fear of losing their workers.
Though the ratings related to physical working conditions were lower than when they were under the company, they rated their working equipment as more adequate (2.16) and the availability of medical supplies as more inadequate (2.26). The working equipment under the cooperatives were still the ones they were using when they were still working under the supervision of the company. Their cooperatives could not supply them with all their equipment. Their rating on the availability of medical supplies was explained by the fact that when they became members of the cooperatives, they had to buy these supplies from the drugstores unlike when they were under the company, where these supplies were readily available. Furthermore, it was not easy to avail of related services such as transportation for their medical needs. Hospitalization was also easier to avail of from the company than when they were under the cooperatives.
This variation in their ratings of their physical working conditions implies a shift in the needs of the workers prior to and during CARP. During CARP, the workers’ pressing need was medicines while prior to CARP, their pressing need was protection from harmful chemicals.
The respondents also rated their working relationship with supervisors, relationship with co-workers, relationship between and among managers, sensitivity of the officers to the needs of the members, trust and respect of members for each other, and encouragement of officers for the members to express their opinions openly. They were asked to choose from the following answers: “very satisfactory” = 1, “satisfactory” = 2, “unsatisfactory” = 3 and “very unsatisfactory” = 4.
The data revealed that the respondents under cooperatives appeared to be more satisfied with their working relationships (1.84) than when they were under the supervision of the company (1.97). This was attributed to the change in treatment provided to them by the officials of the cooperatives, i.e., on a more personal basis as co-workers than when they were under the company where they were treated with impersonalism for their relationship was governed by the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which they Iliad forged with the banana plantations. Under the cooperatives, these former company employees were not just workers but owners of the cooperatives as well.
Analysis shows that they were more satisfied with their relationship with their co-workers (1.84) and their relationship with the officials of the cooperatives (1.91). These facts could perhaps be due to their new working environment where everything was discussed among themselves being owners and workers of the cooperatives. They now have a stake in all the affairs of their cooperatives compared to when they were under the Company. Small discussions among the worker-owners of the cooperatives brought them closer to one another. However, they appeared to distance themselves from the officials (1.99) and they rated the sensitivity of the officials to their needs as less satisfactory (1.98). This behavior of the workers could be a carry-over from the time when they were still workers of the banana corporations. They viewed the officials as a source of control despite being co-owners and co-workers of their cooperatives.
Other than asking them to rate their physical working conditions and working relationships, the respondents were further asked about the benefits they received prior to and during CARP implementation. The data revealed the top three most mentioned benefits received by the respondents. Prior to CARP, the respondents received wage increases (82.7%), vacation leaves (81.6%) and 13th month pay (79.3%) while during CARP, the respondents received wage increase (88.3%), 13th month pay (86%) and maternity leaves (80.2%). These findings show that though both groups of respondents identified wage increase and 131″ month pay as the usual benefits received, they, however, differed with regard to the other benefits received, i.e., vacation leaves for those prior to CARP and maternity leaves for those during CARP.
Looking closely at the proportions of respondents per benefit received, it can be deduced that while all the benefits were received, more (8 out of 14) benefits were actually received by the CARP-beneficiaries than their pre-CARP period.
However, a review of the data taken from the cooperatives further revealed that of the benefits provided to the workers, only six out of 14 benefits enumerated during the interview were provided by all the cooperatives, such as wage increase, vacation leaves, sick
leaves, maternity leaves, paternity leaves, and medical benefits. Other benefits were not given by all. The 13th month pay was part of the dividend from DARBMUPCO and was still to be decided upon by the DARBCO. MARBUCO and SFEMUPCO never gave transportation allowances prior to and during CARP. Christmas and midyear bonuses were never given by the cooperatives to their co-workers for these were never given to them even in their union days.
These facts show that the cooperatives were still providing the benefits their workers were receiving under the Company. While the cooperatives still provided vacation and sick leaves, the number of days was reduced, i.e., from 16 days under the company to 6 days under the cooperatives.
Other than asking the respondents about the benefits they received, they were further asked to rate the benefits they have received. They were asked to choose from the following ratings: “unsatisfactory” – 3, “satisfactory” = 2, and “very satisfactory” = 1.
The results show that the respondents both prior to and during CARP implementation agreed in their rating of the “more satisfactory” and “least satisfactory” benefits they received. Both groups of respondents rated the wage increase as “more satisfactory” (1.76 and 1.65, respectively), and health and safety benefits as the “least satisfactory” (1.99 and 1.91, respectively). This shows that the company and the cooperatives failed to adequately provide the workers the necessary health and safety benefits for their protection, which was a gross violation of the provision of the labor laws. In the case of the cooperatives, such constraints were understandable because of their being new to the business endeavor. They were thus considered by the Department of Labor and Employment to be in their labor-relations legislation stage. However, the company should be held responsible, being aware as they were that these benefits should be given to the workers.
Looking closely at the ratings per benefit, the data revealed that 9 out of 11 benefits were rated higher by the respondents during CARP than prior to CARP. Such results suggest that the coop members were relatively more satisfied with their CARP benefits than those
given in their pre-CARP days. Such individual ratings are further confirmed by the overall ratings where the respondents prior to CARP implementation had rated the benefits they have received as “1.92” while the CARP respondents had rated it as “1.83”.
“Hours of work” refer to “all the time an employee renders actual work, or is required to be on duty or to be at a prescribed workplace,” which is eight hours in a day (Workers Calendar, 1999): When the respondents were asked about the number of hours they worked a day, the results show that there were more respondents during CARP implementation who worked only 8 hours a day (99.4%) than prior to CARP implementation (83.2%). Also, there were more respondents prior to CARP implementation who worked for 12 hours a day (16.8%) than those respondents during CARP implementation (0.3%). A follow-up interview with the coop officials revealed that the workers pre-CARP and during CARP were only required to work 8 hours a day. However, they were required to work more than 8 hours a day if there were packing operations needed to speed up the harvest of banana fruits. Furthermore, workers assigned in the packing house were required to work overtime until the packing operations were completed.
One respondent during CARP implementation worked only two hours a day (0.3%). However, during the follow-up interviews with the officials of the cooperatives they reported that none of their workers worked only two hours a day. The officers perceived that this particular worker might be thinking of the overtime work he actually rendered in the plantation.
There were more respondents during CARP implementation who worked overtime (92.5%) than the respondents prior to CARP implementation (77.6%). Overtime work was required from the workers prior to and during CARP every time there were packing operations to provide the needed services to meet the deadline for shipping bananas to the concerned foreign countries. Normally, the workers were required to do overtime work one to two hours a week because the banana plantations harvest banana fruits three to four times a week depending on the color coding. The color coding reminds the workers on what week the banana fruits should be harvested.
Occupational Safety and Health
The respondents were asked what gear/clothing was necessary for the protection of the workers prior to and during CARP. The respondents were asked to answer by identifying the gear/clothing for selected banana operations such as land preparation, slashing, spraying, fertilizer application, pruning, hauling, packing, and other operations of the banana plantation.
For both groups of respondents, boots were considered necessary for land preparation, slashing, and pruning, and gloves for packing. Both groups, however, differed in the gear/clothing mentioned in other aspects of banana operations. While the respondents prior to CARP mentioned mostly boots and gloves For hauling and other banana operations, they cited mainly gloves and shoes for similar activities during CARP.
Other than asking the respondents about the gear/clothing necessary for the protection of the workers, they were further asked about the gear/clothing that they have actually used.
Though the respondents indicated that boots were highly considered as necessary, the data showed that none of the members of the cooperatives has actually used them. This is tantamount to saying that before the CARP there was a gross violation of the Labor Laws where provisions of appropriate safety devices like boots were mandated. And, sad to say, now they were no longer covered by the Labor Laws for they were no longer employees of an employer but worker-owners of the cooperatives. The cooperatives should thus be encouraged to seek ways of providing the necessary gear/clothing for their co-workers. As observed during the data collection period, most of the workers in the field used slippers.
During CARP, gloves were used in slashing, pruning, hauling and packing; T-shirts and pants for land preparation; shoes for spraying; shoes, T-shirts and pants for fertilizer application; and boots for other banana operations. Prior to CARP, boots have been the most used gear for land preparation, slashing, fertilizer application, hauling and packing while gloves were used in spraying, pruning, and other banana operations.
When further asked about the efforts of the cooperatives to promote safety and protection of workers, the results showed that the majority of the respondents reported that the cooperatives had maintained the tools and equipment regularly (95%), workers were oriented on the use of the tools and equipment (98.9%), and workers were required to use protective gear and clothing while doing any tasks in the banana operations (92.7%).
Close to three fourths of the respondents (76%) had known of work-related accidents in the plantation during CARP, with 24 percent, claiming otherwise. However, only a few of the respondents actually experienced such work-related accidents during CARP (27.4%), e.g., slashing fingers, falling in the ditches, a sprain while carrying newly-harvested banana fruits to the cable way, and skin irritation as a result of spraying chemicals and chemical poisoning. Similar experiences were observed prior to CARP.
However, during the follow-up interviews, the officers of the cooperatives revealed that workers involved in accidents were usually scolded by the supervisors of the company for their failure to protect themselves.
Forms and Modes of Organization and Bargaining
The respondents were asked about their membership in labor unions prior to CARP. This issue was raised because of the common notion that only those who were union members prior to CARP were entitled to be members of the cooperatives. However, the results of the survey showed that not all of the members of the cooperatives were members of the union. The majority of the members (93.3%) were members of the union prior to CARP while only 6.7 percent were not members of the union. The non-union members prior to CARP were the staff of the banana companies who were assigned by the company to the cooperatives. They were the ones serving as
officers of the cooperatives. The respondents believed that it could be one way in which the company could control the decisions of the cooperatives. In the words of one of the respondents “mao na inga dili kaayo mi naga-participate sa activities sa among cooperatrive tungod kay control lang gihapon sa companya, abi namo ang cooperatives para lang sa mga workers nga miembro sa union ug ang dapat nga officials sa coop gikan sa amo” [This is the reason why we do not participate in the activities of the cooperative. We thought that the cooperative is for the workers of the company who were union members but it is not true. We also believe the officers of the coop should come from us.]. A check with the Department of Agrarian Reform-Region XI, revealed that the guidelines on qualifications on who will be the members of the cooperatives are ambiguous and are due for review.
Those claiming to be union members were further asked to identify their union. National Federation of Labor appeared to be most popular among the respondents(34.7%), followed by NAMADIFA (22.1%) and Southern Philippine Federation of Labor (16.8%). The dominance of National Federation of Labor members may be attributed to the higher number of respondents from the Stanfilco subsidiaries, i.e., Diamond, DAPCO, Checkered Farms and Stanfilco.
The majority of the respondents cited that their union was affiliated with the federation (96.7%), with a few (3.3%) reporting that their union was independent.
Union membership was greater than membership in the cooperative. The data revealed that the members of the union were more than 1,000 (41.6%) compared to that of the cooperative, which was a maximum of 799 members (31%). This could perhaps be due to the fact that the union was for all the workers of the banana plantation while the cooperative was limited only to those who were interested. Only those who signified their interest in being members in the cooperatives were thus considered. Those workers who did not join the cooperatives were either retired, or retrenched or paid by the company (separation pay) — thus adding to the number of unemployed members in society. These workers either returned to their place of origin or just stayed around.
When the respondents were asked whether or not the members of the cooperative decreased when CARP was implemented, the majority of the respondents claimed that the membership in the cooperative decreased (72.6%). This may be due to certain factors, e.g., some of the union members joined the company-formed cooperatives (39.6%), some did not sign the CARP document (21.5%), or some were retrenched (11.5%). Still others did not work as contractual workers or were paid by the company their separation pay and signed a document not to avail of the CARP (10.8%), was retrenched but worked as contractual workers (4.2%), stopped working (2.7%), did not want to be members of the cooperative or were not registered in the final documentation (0.4% each).
An interview with the head of the Farm Cooperative, Atty. Koronado Apuzen, revealed that the reduction of members of the cooperatives could be due to the fact that in one company, there may have existed more than one cooperative so that former union members were dispersed. Stanfilco has five cooperatives; Hijo plantation has three; Soriano Fruits has two; while Checkered Farms and DAPCO have one cooperative each.
Furthermore, the reasons cited on the decrease in the cooperative membership could have some implications on employment opportunities. The Labor Laws provide that “The State shall promote full employment, provide equal work opportunity, provide equal work opportunity regardless of gender, race or creed and regulate employee-employer relations” (Workers Calendar, 1999). But this poses a dilemma to the State inasmuch as under the cooperative management approach, the former company workers are now both workers and owners of the cooperatives. The State still has to redefine the meaning of labor relations in a cooperative management approach, where those once company workers are now both owners and workers of the cooperatives. What then are the indicators of labor relations in a situation where the workers are owners at the same time?
Focusing on employment implications, what could he done while the State is undertaking a series of studies in this new approach of management? These once company workers could be organized into a pool of workers where the cooperatives can request assistance for services needed in the banana plantations.
When the cooperative was in place, it was expected that the union would cease operation; thus, the respondents were asked about the dissolution of the union. Slightly over one half (51.2%) of the respondents reported that their union was dissolved when they joined the cooperative. Some 48.8 percent of the respondents cited that their union was not dissolved.
For those who reported that their coop was dissolved when they became members of the cooperative, the majority (65.5%) claimed that the dissolution of their cooperative was reported to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) while 34.5% did not report the dissolution to said agency. However, Atty. Koronado Apuzen of the Farm Coop revealed that it was not necessary to report the dissolution of the union to DOLE. Such reports are to be made on the initiative of the cooperatives themselves.
Those who reported a dissolution of the union was reported to the DOLE gave various reasons: It is a DOLE requirement (18.7%), as part and parcel of the quarterly report submitted to the DOLE (15.2%), for DOLE people to know about the existence of the union (12.5%), as a requirement to have a cooperative (14.3%), and the establishment of a new union (5.4%). At least a third (33.9%) of the respondents failed to explain why such reports were submitted to DOLE.
On the other hand, those who claimed that the dissolution of the union was not reported to DOLE explained that the union was still existing (64.4%). Others clarified that it was only an association (16.9%), that it is not a requirement (6.8%) and “we just left it to our officers” (8.5%), because there will be a new union and it has expired (1.7% each).
These reasons suggest one possible problem faced by the union as a result of the change in management from company-controlled workers to cooperative management of the plantations, i.e., whether or not to report to DOLE. A dialogue between the cooperative officials and the coop workers is thus necessary to discuss what happened to the union when the cooperative took over the management of the banana plantations to avoid misconceptions arising from the situation.
Part of the right to self-organization is collective bargaining where the representatives of the employer and the union, duly authorized by the majority of the employees within the union, agree to fix and administer terms and conditions of employment which must not be below the minimum standard fixed by law and to set a mechanism for resolving their grievances, resulting to a collective bargaining agreement, otherwise referred to as the CBA (Workers Calendar, 1999). Based on this, the respondents were asked about the presence of the CBA and grievance machinery. The majority of the respondents (96.1 %) claimed that they had a CBA prior to CARP. About 3.9 percent claimed otherwise. These findings suggest that the functions of collective bargaining will cease once the company becomes a cooperative for there will be no conceivable room for the union members to maintain its collective bargaining functions which could lead to sectoral disputes or conflicts of interest within and among coop members. But as observed and as gleaned from the responses of the respondents on disputes experienced, it is deemed necessary that there must be some sort of agreement that will be forged between the coop officials and the workers notwithstanding their being owners of the cooperatives. This is to protect both the workers and the officers. However, Atty. Koronado Apuzen asserted that agreements on the expectations of the workers and the officers should have been discussed during assembly meetings. They can no longer observe the mechanics of collective bargaining under the cooperative management approach because the workers are all owners of the cooperatives.
Section 1, Rule XIX of Department Order # 9 of DOLE, clearly states that “the parties to a CBA shall establish a machinery for the expeditious resolution of grievance arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies”. Thus, in this study, the respondents were asked about the presence of a grievance machinery prior to or during CARP. The data show that the majority of the respondents revealed that prior to and during implementation of CARP they have a grievance machinery (76% and 50.3%, respectively).
How does the grievance machinery work? The two most frequently mentioned processes prior to CARP implementation were reporting the grievance to the officers (22.8%) and the union leaders then to management (18.4%). During CARP implementation, the grievance was resolved by submitting the complaints either to the superiors and subsequently to the management for action (33.3.6%) or to the Board of Directors and then to management (13.9%).
The respondents were further asked whether they had experienced any labor disputes. The data shoived that prior to the implementation of the CARP, over one half (52%) of the respondents did have disputes while only 9.5 percent of the respondents claimed to have had labor disputes during CARP implementation.
The majority of the respondents reported that prior to CARP they had labor disputes mainly on the CBA deadlock (66.7%), notice of strike or actual strike (25.8%) and unfair labor practices (21.5%). To a limited extent, others mentioned the certification of election (3.8%). These were no longer true under the cooperative management. During the implementation of CARP, the disputes were limited to the non-provision of some of the benefits (88.2%), delayed releases of salaries given the delayed releases by the company to the cooperative of the proceeds of sales of the bananas (29.4%), and unfair labor practices (2.9%). Such findings suggest that labor disputes during the implementation of CARP have been reduced. A possible explanation may lie in the employees now being collective owners of the land so that things are discussed thoroughly.
However, it is good to stress that disputes should not occur in a cooperative since the employees are both owners and workers at the same time. Everything should have been discussed among themselves and rules and regulations should have been discussed to make effective the new endeavour that they are into. But, in the words of one coop manager, such disputes are nonetheless expected, the coop member being new to the management approach. He further cited the lack of adequate preparation for the union members to become coop members, i.e., not having the necessary information on the wages and benefits under the cooperative arrangements.
When the respondents were asked about the existence of a Labor Management Coordinating Council, only a few of the respondents responded positively prior to (28.5%) and during CARP implementation (3.9%). This was usually referred to as the labor management council prior to CARP (56.8%) and as the Board of Directors during CARP implementation (50%). Prior to the CARP implementation, others referred to it as the board of directors, steward, labor management consultative meeting, labor-management relations, and negotiating panel. The cooperative members, i.e., during the CARP implementation, usually referred to it as the board of directors, labor management council and the labor management relations. This means that given these experiences with the union, the cooperatives were still conscious of these structures installed during their union days to the extent that these were carried over to the cooperatives. This can be seen as an innovative approach in the cooperative system.
Perceptions on the purpose of the labor-management coordinating council vary. The majority reported that prior to CARP implementation, the Labor Management Coordinating Council was for negotiating between the union and the management (80.4%), to thresh out problems on labor and productivity (36.3%) and to solve problems (16.7%). Other respondents reported that the functions of the labor-management coordinating council were to negotiate the collective bargaining agreement, to help the workers against the management, to settle disputes regarding working relationships, and to serve as an arbiter and a pacifier. During the CARP implementation, the Labor Management Coordinating Council (LMCC) was perceived to focus mainly on problem-solving (50%), particularly those related to labor and productivity (35.7%).
The LMCC was likewise seen as a negotiating body between the cooperatives and the company regarding marketing arrangements.
This was a new form of bargaining between the cooperatives and the company. DOLE assistance may now be explored in terms of organizing these cooperatives and identifying the possible legislation that will protect the cooperatives from the exploitative maneuverings of the company regarding marketing contracts and other contracts.
The Support Services Extended by Corporate
Employers to Their Former Employees
It is assumed that the operations of the cooperatives were made possible through the contributions of the coop members. Asked about the amount of the capitalization of the cooperative, the survey-respondents reported that the capitalization of the cooperatives ranged from less than P100,000 to over P900,000, with the majority concentrated in the less than P100,000 capitalization bracket (64.3%). A smaller proportion of the respondents reported capitalization greater than P 100,000.
When asked about the sources of their capitalization, the majority of the respondents (57.3%) mentioned their contributions or capital shares which were either fully paid from their separation pay or deducted from their salaries. Other sources of capitalization included excess from land rental, income from sales of the bananas, bank loans, company loans, and management financing. It is interesting to note that 19 percent of the respondents did not know where the capitalization of their cooperative came from. Such responses may be those of the respondents from DARBMUPCO, where the respondent-manager of the cooperative explained that they get their capitalization from the DAR through the Land Bank of the Philippines. Others borrowed from STANFILCO for operation purposes, deductible from the proceeds of the sale of bananas. Such findings indicate that the cooperatives adopted varied ways of putting up the needed capital build-up to operate. Likewise, it was a venue through which financing institutions could venture into and revise their policies regarding capital borrowing from these emerging management approach under transnational corporations. Companies as sources of capitalization are indicative of the support that the cooperatives have from their former corporate employers.
Prior to CARP implementation, the respondents had attended various types of training but the majority attended human resource development (46.5%), and organizational development programs (39.4%). During CARP implementation, the majority attended the training for the cooperatives (87.2%). To a much lesser extent, others attended trainings on human resource development (3.3%) and enterprise development (2.9%).
Such findings indicate the need for more training for the cooperatives and their workers. However, they are limited by their meager capitalization compared to when their members were company workers. Such a situation will not change unless government and non-government agencies are able to package their services to be provided for the coop members to enhance people empowerment. As gleaned from the specific trainings received, most of the respondents have availed of independent or one-shot types of educational inputs. It is suggested that the current trainings received by the workers of the cooperative be reviewed in consultation with the members to be more effective and relevant trainings.
The specific training attended on cooperatives during CARP implementation focused mostly on the pre-membership seminar on cooperatives (73.3%), followed by the cooperative training/seminar (23.9%). Others cited training on leadership, basic orientation seminar, farm coop management, skills training, and educational seminar. The respondents likewise showed that prior to CARP implementation they have attended trainings on the cooperative training/seminar (50%) and the pre-membership seminar (40%).
A limited number of the respondents attended trainings on land management. During the CARP implementation, however, most of them participated in such trainings (57.1%), including those on quality mind setting, leadership seminar, and basic orientation seminar. Those respondents prior to CARP implementation had attended mostly the training on quality mind setting (50%), with some citing training on basic management skills and research.
Similarly, only a few of the respondents had attended training on crop management during CARP implementation. They had attended trainings on banana culture practice, land valuation, and leadership training. Those respondents prior to CARP implementation had attended mainly training on international standardization organization (78.8%). Others participated in trainings on chemical use, the role of leaders during meetings, research training, and leadership training.
As with the earlier trainings mentioned, only a few of the respondents during CARP implementation attended trainings on human resource development, e.g., quality control, maintenance, rights and privileges, and HRD seminar. The respondents prior to CARP implementation, on the other hand, had had training on “KAIBIGAN” (91%). Others mentioned trainings on “influencing others” and basic health.
Only one respondent during CARP implementation had training on marketing schemes. Prior to CARP implementation; the respondents had training on the quality control circle, marketing schemes and international standardization organization.
On enterprise development, the respondents during CARP implementation had training on banana plantation operations and development, productivity training, fisheries, and management of the cooperative. Those respondents prior to CARP implementation had total quality management, and productivity training.
Similarly, only one respondent during CARP implementation had attended the Workers Organizational Development Program, specifically on values formation. The majority of the respondents prior to CARP implementation participated in trainings on the quality circle (82.1%) and on total quality management (13%). Other trainings indicated were genuine trade unions, grievance handling, and “KAIBIGAN”.
The sponsors of the trainings varied, depending on the specific trainings attended by the respondents. During CARP implementation, trainings on cooperatives were handled mostly by the Board of Directors of the Cooperatives and the Cooperative Development Authority (33.61% and 33.2%, respectively). The other sponsors consisted of the DARBMUPCO for training on land management, and DAR for training on crop management and enterprise development training. Others mentioned the Cooperative Development Authority for human resource development, marketing scheme, the cooperatives and the MASS-SPEC for workers organizational development program, and the management or the company for other trainings.
However, prior to CARP implementation, most of the respondents cited two sponsors — the Cooperative Development Authority for trainings on cooperatives, and the company for land management, crop management, human resource development, marketing scheme, and workers organizational development program.
The findings not only revealed the minimal support from former corporate employers, particularly in training on land management (cited by one respondent) and other trainings (mentioned by six respondents), but also most of the training institutions were government agencies. Thus, it is imperative that the government facilitate the establishment of linkages between the cooperatives and the non-government agencies for their training needs by providing them a list of the non-government agencies who provide trainings for cooperatives and how these services may be availed of.
Coping Mechanisms
While preparing for the transfer of farm management from the company to the workers through the cooperatives, particularly when the concept of cooperatives was not fully understood by the respondents, some of them started establishing “sari-sari” stores, kitchenettes or canteens. Others sold banana rejects, engaged in trucking services and food processing. The majority, however, failed to do anything at all. Income-generating activities were undertaken not only for retirement purposes but likewise as a fall-back mechanism, realizing the time-lag for the development of cooperatives. Some cooperatives engaged in livestock raising for their co-workers but this was not sustained, given the cash-strapped situation of the workers’ families. Given such needs, it is hoped that DOLE will prioritize these families through their Public Employment Service Office. Other non-government agencies are likewise encouraged to design programs for the families of these workers, where the unemployed household members are organized and provided trainings on livelihood so as to earn additional income for their families.
The transfer of farm management to former union members is not an easy task since funds are necessary to finance the field operations. Some members were fortunate in being provided credit by their corporate employer as their starting capital, payable as soon as the proceeds from the sale of bananas were received by the company. Most of them, however, agreed among themselves to put up the necessary funds from their separation pay ranging from P1,500 to- P4,000. Some were able to arrange for management financing (former corporate employer), avail of loans from the bank, or secure salary deductions.
Being new to this type of management, the officers of the cooperative availed of the immediate and necessary training from the Cooperative Development Authority such as accounting, management of cooperatives, and staffing, as well as contract-formulation. Meetings with the co-workers-owners were held as a constant feedback mechanism on the status of the cooperative and how problems arising from the complaints of the workers-owners on benefits and wages could be resolved. Members of the cooperative attended any training regarded as important for the welfare of the co-worker-owners whenever funds were available.
Because of the sudden paradigm shift from company-controlled workers to worker-owners, it was generally expected that the worker-owners would complain about the wages and benefits to be received. Would they receive similar wages and benefits under the cooperatives as in the companies? Upon implementation of CARP, all wages went down to P92 per day but this increased up to the time of the survey. The decrease was attributed to the unilateral contract drawn up by the banana corporations. To date, the majority of the cooperatives covered (HEARBCO1, HEARBCO, SEARBeMCo, DARBCO, DARBMUPCO, and CheFARBeMCo). were receiving P160 a day except for the Hijo Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Coop 2 (HEARBCO), which was receiving P140 a day. All these cooperatives with marked wage increases used to sell their bananas to Stanfilco while HEARBCO2 sold their bananas to the company.
The respondents indicated under their former companies that the presence of a body which addressed their complaints about unfair labor practices while under the cooperatives, no such body exists. The cooperatives thus established such a body .that would attend to all the problems of their co-worker-owners. The usual disputes between the coop management and their workers were more related to wages and benefits, which could easily have been threshed out among coop members.
Issues and Concerns
The majority of the respondents prior to CARP implementation cited that the main problems were about minimum wage (53.1%) and safety measures (31.3%). To a lesser extent, others mentioned health benefits (18.9%) and leave provision (3.3%). However, during CARP implementation, most problems regarding safety measures (46.4%), leave provision (37.4%), health benefits (34.1 %) and minimum wage (24.6%). The findings suggest a shift in priorities, i.e., that prior to CARP implementation, the respondents concentrated on minimum wage while during CARP implementation, they were more concerned with safety measures. The present concerns may be attributed to the fact that prior to CARP, the workers had the collective bargaining agreement as a basis for their claims regarding their wages and benefits. This is not, however, present under CARP. For the CARP beneficiaries, the concern was about protection of the workers from health hazards. It is thus perceived that this could not be adequately provided by the cooperatives at the moment since the more pressing concerns were marketing contracts.
Focusing on minimum wage, it appears that these are not the primary issues of the workers, now their wages being more than what was provided for by the agricultural plantations under the Regional
Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB). The minimum wage set before by RTWPB for agricultural plantations was P123 a day. At the moment, all the cooperatives covered by the survey indicated that they were receiving a daily wage of P 160, which was higher by P37.00 than what was provided for by the RTWPB. It was only the workers from the HEARBCO2 who received P140 a day.
Close to half of the respondents (44.6%) prior to CARP implementation cited that their wage was below the minimum level. On the other hand, the respondents during CARP implementation indicated that their wages were still not sufficient to meet their needs because they were given salaries below the minimum (60.5%). fhis suggests that the respondents had a different understanding of the minimum wage, other than what was provided by the RTWPB. One question raised was: “How minimum is minimum”? All the wages provided by the cooperatives to their workers were greater than the minimum wage pegged by the RTWPB.
Other problems cited prior to CARP implementation included delayed implementation of wage increases, not following the basic rate, wage orders not followed, COLA not being implemented root sufficient to meet cost of living, no overtime, contract not signed, unclear basis for computation, CBA deadlock on wage increase, and wage distortion.
During CARP implementation, the respondents identified the following problems on minimum -wage: delayed wages, wage orders not implemented above minimum wage, not sufficient to meet cost of living, no negotiation with the company, contract was not yet signed, and wage distortion. The perceptions of the workers regarding non-implementation of minimum wages which were, in fact, above the minimum wage should be corrected for they received salaries more than the minimum wage provided for by the RTWPB. A follow-up survey should thus be conducted to define their concept of a realistic minimum salary-level, i.e., one that is sufficient to meet the cost of living.
The delayed release of leaves of absence that were convertible to cash was cited by the respondents prior to CARP. During CARP implementation, most of the respondents (44.4%) indicated that there are no such leaves of absence. Those who did, explained that these have been reduced, e.g., from 16 days to 6 days vacation leaves.
Both the respondents before and during the implementation of CARP claimed that the health benefits were limited (25% and 34.7%, respectively). Some respondents cited problems on health benefits prior to the implementation of CARP, such as the absence of health benefits, not being attended to immediately by the health workers, lack of supply of medicines, medical assistance/medicine were deducted from the salary, delayed releases of health benefits, excess of SSS was deducted by the company from the payroll, health benefits expired within one year, no x-ray, and 50% being free health benefits for dependents.
During CARP implementation, the respondents cited similar problems such as the absence of health benefits, lack of supply of medicine, medical assistance which was deducted from the salary, Philippine Health Insurance was not clear, no monthly free clinic, coop had no money to finance hospitalization, SSS/Medicare remittances were not paid, no funds, free on emergency cases only, and contract was not signed yet.
Both the respondents before and during CARP implementation cited mainly the problem on the inadequate provision of safety measures (50% and 56.1%, respectively). Some respondents cited the following problems prior to the implementation of CARP: delayed releases of safety gadgets, no supply, non-provision of protective gear, and mishandling of chemicals. The respondents during CARP, on the other hand, furthered mentioned problems such as “no supplies”, non-provision of protective gear, lack of funds to buy necessary protective gear, no proper training on proper use of gear and delayed releases of new supplies.
The majority of the respondents (84.1%) identified their spouses as their immediate successors. Close to half of the respondents (43.8%) identified the children. Other respondents noted that other relatives may succeed the original beneficiary (2.4%).
The majority of the respondents preferred the coop-owned and management approach (69.5%). Others preferred .the leaseback approach (19.3%), grow ownership or contract growing approach (4.5%) and the joint venture approach (1.4%). Such responses indicate that while the respondents know about other possible management approaches that can be adopted in their situations, the majority; still preferred the coop management approach. This was their current experience.
Problems Encountered by the Respondents
on the Implementation of CARP
The respondents were further asked about on the problems they have encountered relative to CARP implementation. The majority of the respondents noted that they have encountered problems on the company/buyer level (58.6%), followed by coop members-related problems (42.1%), salary-related problems (40.7%), coop management (35.8%), other workers in the plantation (14%), creditors (8.8%) and other types of problems (3.8%).
The three most mentioned problems regarding coop management included incompetent officials (27.4%), “capital share is lost” (26.5%), and corruption (12.7%). Being new to the coop management approach, the officers were not well trained or lacked the necessary training on how to manage the cooperatives, thus they were viewed by the members as incompetent. The issue on capital share being lost, specifically in Hijo cooperatives, was cited because of the observed delay in release of their wages. They believed that the capital share would be used in paying their wages but it was partly used to defray costs incurred in farm operations. This situation readily led the workers to say that there was corruption.
The problems cited relative to coop members were lack of cooperation/understanding/unity (18.3%), members were now beginning to lose interest in becoming members because of corruption, consumer goods were lacking, CLOA holder was hard to control, and there was shortage of money lending (18.3%), break-away members/absentee members (16.7%), and lazy members (15%).
The majority of the respondents reported that they have problems regarding low salary (94.8.%) and the salaries not being sufficient to meet their needs (3.4%).
Most of the respondents cited problems regarding the lack of knowledge of the other groups in obligation-clarification (25%), which was true for the break-away group organized by the company, particularly in the case of DARBMUPCO. The break-away group was organized by the company to sow dissension among the members (Alano, 1998, 10-11) This was done by the company by identifying members who had shown weariness over the protracted negotiations between the cooperative and the company. Once identified, the company would provide the wrong information, e.g., that the cooperative was earning a profit of at least P26,000 per hectare every year and that there was no reason for the cooperative to be suffering because it had lots of money. The company, however, failed to inform the members that the cooperative actually incurred more expenses than profits because of the low buying price per box of bananas and the questionable charges deducted by the company from the cooperatives cash proceeds. Once the worker believed such lies, he/ she joined the break-away group. Another problem was the company wanted to recruit members and form a separate group from DARBCO (22.7%). Furthermore, they wanted a leaseback arrangement which would affect the coop (12.5%).
The majority of the respondents were not contented with the low buying price (60%). To a much lesser extent, others complained that the contract was ready but was not yet signed (5.9%) and the non-remittances of the sales from the proceeds of bananas (35%). Such findings indicate strategies employed by the banana companies to earn more profits relative to their meager concern for the workers. These are areas which DOLE can review relative to policies and laws for the welfare of the workers, e.g., by securing the actual buying price of bananas per box from the foreign buyers so that concerns of the workers are appropriately and effectively addressed.
The top three most mentioned problems regarding the creditors were the overpriced inputs (32%), the failure of the coop to pay the creditors (28%) and creditor charges that were not included in the deal (16%). The creditors were often the banana-companies while the debtors were the cooperatives. This is a situation where the banana companies took advantage of the cooperatives. Being new to the business endeavour, the cooperatives lacked the necessary capital to defray the costs in the farm operations. Thus, they were forced to avail of the inputs from the banana companies to be paid from the proceeds of sales of bananas. When payment time came, the cooperatives were confronted with the huge debts incurred. Otherwise, they believed they were earning significantly. (Such findings suggest a carry-over of the landlord-tenant relations or the middleman-farmer arrangements where inputs are availed of on credit at usurious rates so that tenants or farmers are perpetually in debt.) When the cooperative members were asked for suggestions to address this problem, they expressed their need for adequate cash so that they could buy the inputs from the market themselves. This implies the need for legislation to protect the cooperative from the exploitative pursuits of the banana companies.
Suggested Solutions
The respondents were then asked for suggestions on how to solve the problems they had encountered. Again, the three most mentioned problems were cited in the text while the rest of the solutions were indicated in the tables.
For the management of the cooperative, the respondents suggested that seminars and training should be given to the officers of the coop (23.5%), that there is a need to have a meeting or a general assembly (11.8%) to thresh out problems, that the company should sign the contact/agreement, and the need for proper accounting (9.8% each).
For the problems regarding members of the cooperative, most of the respondents reported that there is a need for seminars and training for the members (24.2%), that members should unite and make their stand stronger, and the need to educate members (10.8%).
For the problems relating to salaries, close to half of the respondents suggested the need to increase their salary (45.7%). However, salary increases can only be attained if the company enters into a marketing contract (22.4%) which will enable the coop management to update the salaries of the workers (10.3%).
For the problems relative to other groups in the plantation, the respondents suggested that such groups should establish their legal existence (22.5%) since they are perceived to be used by the company to sow dissension, that members of not good standing be expelled (17.5%) and that the marketing agreement should be signed (12.5%).
For the problems regarding the company/buyer, most of the respondents cited the need to increase the buying price (21.8%) of the bananas, that the contract be signed (18.2%) and that the marketing agreement (13%) be included.
For the problem related to the creditors, the respondents suggested direct buying of inputs (28%), the need for the contract to be signed to increase the price (24%), and the need to be vigilant with regard to the creditors’ accounting system (16%).
For other problems, most of the respondents suggested the need to sign the agreement so as to gain profits (45.5%).
The comments of the respondents regarding the implementation of CARP revealed that they were happy with the coop because they owned the land (17.3%), followed by those saying that the CARP implementation was good (14.2%), good if the implementation was according to law (11.2%), it helps poor people (10.9%) and it will be good if managed well (5%).
Impact of CARP on Corporate Farms and
Plantations with Unionized Members
The impact of CARP can be categorized into four areas, namely a) corporate farms; b) cooperative; c) labor relations; and d) employment opportunities. Corporate Farms. When the management of plantations was transferred to the cooperatives, the corporate farms lost control over their lands upon losing ownership of these lands. This transfer of farm management from the company to the cooperative means that the company will not be facing problems on labor relations brought about by the various needs of the workers, particularly on wages and benefits. Thus, there is no more collective bargaining agreement to negotiate. This means that the banana corporations will be focusing their attention on marketing bananas and thus have little responsibility over workers of the farms.
On the other hand, while the banana corporations may not have direct control over their lands, they still have control over the marketing and input needs of the cooperatives. Thus, they have not totally severed their relationship with the cooperatives. Being new to the business endeavour, the cooperatives still need the banana corporations for their marketing needs. They do not have the necessary network and facilities to market their harvested and packed bananas to the foreign buyers. Thus, they must have marketing contracts with the banana corporations. This is a new form of labor relations that DOLE should look into, i.e., the possible legislation that can be undertaken to protect the cooperatives from any possible exploitation by the profit-motivated banana corporations.
Furthermore, since the cooperatives do not have the needed capital and since the government has not established the necessary support services (with the existing policies perceived as too tough for the cooperatives to meet), said cooperatives borrow the needed capital or rent the needed facilities from the banana corporations just to maintain the needed farm operations.
Likewise, it is interesting to note that though the banana corporations have no more direct supervisory role over the workers of the cooperatives, they still exert efforts in guiding the cooperatives regarding the quality control of the bananas from planting to harvesting to packaging. Quality control is demanded by the strict requirements of foreign buyers.
Cooperatives. With the farm management placed under the cooperatives, the workers who were once union members under the banana corporations are now facing a new challenge in their lives, i.e., owning and managing the land. They are now assuming all the activities and the problems faced by the banana corporations in managing the farms. Payment of salaries and provision of benefits are now assumed by the cooperatives and in line with that they have to accumulate enough capital to defray the costs in farm operations, including wages and benefits of their member-workers.
In marketing their bananas, they have to establish marketing relations with the banana corporations which the land they were managing came from. They are not yet in a position to market their produce directly to the foreign buyers, not having met such buyers as yet. Being new to this business endeavor, none of the cooperatives escaped the exploitation of the banana corporations in the marketing contracts. They were subjected to the tough negotiating skills of the banana corporations regarding the buying price. per box. Initially, the cooperatives accepted whatever was dictated by the banana corporations regarding the buying price per box of bananas. However, after 10 years since the implementation of CARP, they have learned their lessons in negotiating the buying price of the corporations. The majority of the cooperatives were able to get a buying price of $2.60 per box (gross price). They get a net of $2.10 per box, after the deductions of their rental fees for facilities and inputs.
Labor Relations. “Labor relations” implies control of workers by their employers. This situation was clearly seen between the company and their workers. Existence of smooth labor relations was determined by the collective bargaining agreement forged by the company and the workers through their duly designated representatives, subject to negotiation every five years. However, this situation is now absent under the cooperatives because the workers are likewise the owners of the cooperatives who collectively manage the farms sold to them by the banana corporations. But we cannot deny the fact that even if workers are owners of the cooperatives, they are likewise managed by officials who came from within their ranks and who determine their wages and salaries. Such a situation also has an element of control and is thus part of the so-called labor relations.
One emerging aspect relation that needs legislation is the relationship between the cooperatives and the company in marketing their bananas, given observed tendencies of the banana corporations to exploit the cooperatives. Likewise, legislation should cover the other contracts that the cooperatives will forge with the banana corporations regarding the use of facilities and inputs where the companies charge exorbitant fees.
Employment Opportunities. With the transfer of farm management from the banana corporations to the cooperatives, there were workers who were displaced. Given the unclear status of cooperatives when the concept was offered to them, some workers either requested for separation, retired or were retrenched. With nowhere to go for new employment, some workers returned to their place of origin in Cebu, Bohol, Iloilo, Luzon, or other places in Mindanao. Some simply stayed. Some of these workers may be working while others may be unemployed, thus adding to the unemployment figures.
Under the cooperatives, it is assumed that any member of the family can work in the plantations. But according to the respondents and the officials of the cooperatives, it is not easy to just accept any member of the immediate family of the members of the cooperatives since these supposedly available members of the work-force have not undergone the necessary training in the banana operations. One area of concern is maintaining the quality of care of the bananas based on the requirements of the foreign buyer. Nonetheless, if the coop member retires and wants to pass on his work to his wife or son or daughter, it is acceptable, at least in principle.