Tag Archives: Politics

Rethinking Political Dynasties

Rationale for the Rethinking Process

Why do we need to rethink political dynasties? Is it not common knowledge now that traditional political families are the most despised feature of Philippine politics? Was not this sentiment passionately manifested in the Anti-Epal campaign that bombarded social media in the months preceding the last elections? In fact, was not the result of the May 2013 elections an unequivocal illustration of the Filipinos’ revolt against family dynasties in public office?

I remember appearing before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) during the chairmanship of a political family patriarch (Benjamin Abalos). I was advocating for a client who was publicly indicated in campaign attacks as “guilty” of being in a political dynasty. Our contention was that since there was no provision under current election laws, which criminalize the existence of political dynasties, campaign materials pronouncing guilt as if there was such a proscription constitutes undue harassment on its target candidate. it was a novel argument but sadly the petition was eventually mooted for as the general public now knows, in the 2007 elections Senator Koko Pimentel had to face off with a more sinister election adversary.

I am relating this personal experience simply to demonstrate that there is something objectively disagreeable with politicians who are part of political dynasties running (and competing) for public office. Pertinently, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) blog cited here reported that candidates belonging to 10 of the 20 well-entrenched political families lost their grip on power in the last elections. Sadly, this result seems terribly insignificant in the light of the overall political landscape of the nation as illustrated by the current composition of the Senate with siblings and scions making up this formerly august body. In fact, the reality after the election dust settled last May 2013 still shows that “at least 55 political families will have each controlled an elective post for 20 to 40 years straight.” Political clans are still a prominent feature of modern Philippine politics. Political clans are still a prominent feature of modern Philippine politics. Political power is still concentrated on a select segment of the polity that is relatively unchanged. The family names may have changed, but the quality of those who wield the power has not.

Our Right to Vote: A Century After

A cornerstone principle and bedrock of our 1987 Constitution is that the Philippines is a republican and democratic state. One of the hallmarks of democracy is the people’s right to vote. With the rising temperature of the election fever during these cold February days, allow me to speak on this crucial topic, even though it may have lost its appeal to many who now view elections as merely a chimerical episode of democracy amidst the political realities in our country.

In ancient times, the great thinkers did not easily subscribe to democracy. Dismissing it as a riotous rule by the masses, Plato disapproved of democracy. He cautioned that if all the people would rule, those of low quality would dominate the state by mere superiority in numbers. He expressed the fear that the more numerous masses would govern with meaness and usher the “tyranny of the majority.” Plato predicted that democracies would be short-lived, as the mob would inevitably surrender its power to a single tyrant and put an end to popular government.

Plato’s prophecy did not come to pass. Democracy meandered through the Middle Ages in Europe, which elevated the importance of the equality of all men and sparked a revival of interest in democracy. It migrated to the United States of America, whose Founding Fathers espoused its liberal ideas.

Legal Audit of Cases of Extra-Judicial Killing in the Philippines

The first and foremost of human rights is the right to life. It has long been accorded universal status, for the existence of all other rights is premised on the preservation of life. The extra-judicial taking of life is the ultimate violation of human rights. It cannot be allowed anywhere, and it has to be resisted everywhere. Extra-judicial killings also constitute brazen assaults on the rule of law. (Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, “A View from the Mountaintop”, delivered on the occasion of the National Consultative Summit on Extra-Judicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances – Searching for Solutions, 16-17 July 2007, Manila Hotel)

Political killings and other forms of human rights violations have once again beleaguered our country, reminiscent of the martial law years during the Marcos regime. The number of people killed, or tortured, or have disappeared has risen to unprecedented height since 2001 up to the present; and although the incidents increase by the day, the conviction of perpetrators remains elusive.

A number of victims’ families and human rights organizations have mustered the courage to file criminal complaints to seek justice. However, the pace at which the resolution of these cases has moved is in itself a cause for serious and grave concern. But, even more alarming is the fact that a number of these cases have reached a dead end without being resolved and some have been archived or considered closed or resolved and dome have been archived or considered closed or labeled “cold cases” because the perpetrators have not been identified or the accused is/are at large or witnesses have refused to testify out of fear.

Identity, Land, and the Politics of Add and Rule

In the past, the tendency of the different Mindanao tribes was to emphasize their differences instead of their commonalities. Their tribal identities dominated their relationship with each other. And so they fought each other to control human and material resources.

Since many of the tribes were fragmented, they also fought among themselves. The Manobos fought Manobos, the Mandayas fought Mandayas, etc. The frequent intertribal and intratribal wars strengthened the sense of independent clan or community identity as no supreme leader emerged who could unify the tribes.
Present Mindanao ethnography counts 18 Lumad tribes and 13 Moro tribes. You can just imagine how turbulent Mindanao was because of this diversity and lack of unity among various tribes and communities. As the Maguindanaos and Tausogs reach a higher level of social and political organization, they were able to control a wide territory in Mindanao. In addition, they freely raided the Visayas, even Luzon. It is said there are still areas in Moroland today where the word Bisaya means slave.

But this did not mean that the Tausugs and Maguindanaos had complete control over the other tribes. The other tribes would also fight back, but invariably they would lose because the Moros had more advanced weapons. In Davao, there were communities who paid tribute to the Maguindanaos, but they were more independent that vassals of  the Maguindanaos. This means the Tausugs and maguindanaos were still continuing their campaign to subjugate the other tribes. The tribes therefore largely retained their separate distinct identities.

When  the Spaniards arrived, they fought the Tausugs and Maguindanaos for control of territory and tribes in Mindanao. In Davao, this only began in 1948 when Jose Gangrenous wrested the territory from the kalagan Moros. To civilize the tribes, the Spaniards rounded up the inhabitants and forced them into reductions. Because they were not used to living in concentrated settlements, and they had to pay tribute besides, the tribes escaped to the mountains at every opportunity. Sometimes the Lumads launched treacherous attacks to get even. The Spaniards largely blamed the Moros for the failure to reduce the Lumads.

In 1888 Jesuit priest pablo patells made this observation about the Moros.
It is well-known that the people of Mindanao and Jolo are of
bellicose character. They live in far places away from the capital of
the archipelago and look askance at Spanish domination, and
therefore they try time and again to consolidate their independence
through piratical raids undertaken all these year, without the
haphazard retaliations of our soldiers nor the evangelical preaching
of our missionaries having been able to put a stop to their infamous
attacks.

To destroy Moro power, Pastells suggested the following steps to Governor General Valeriano Weyler:
The policy. . . (is) to isolate them completely in the interior by means
of the missions and when necessary establish some military posts
among the nearby pagan population. Following the mission and the
establishment of the military inside the dominion of the Moros, villages should be formed, whether with people living in the locality,
or by fomenting the immigration of people from Bohol or from Ilocos. Every year either a fixed company of married soldiers should be established to be taken from the standing army all over the  islands, or married deportees should be settled, including slaves or other vassals of the datus wishing to live under the protection of our flag.

The Spaniards were kicked out in  1899 without having succeeded in subjugating the Moros and the Lumads. Under their rule, there were only very few settlers who came to Mindanao. Many of them were disciplinarios and deportees, that is, criminal and political offenders from Luzon and the Visayas.

When the Americans saw Mindanao, they were simply amazed at the fertility of the soil. They called Cotabato the “land of promise,” and Davao “the garden of the gods.” They proceeded to transform the island into abaca and coconut plantations. But the Lumads resisted plantation work. So severe was the labor shortage the Americans recruited workers from the Visayas, including Japanese labor.

The American planters and officials of the Moro Province had originally sought to annex Mindanao as territory of the United States. They wanted to turn it into a white man’s country, and at one time, encouraged Italians or Americans to settle in Mindanao. But this project failed. And so they had to the northern islands to recruit labor.

The recruitment of laborers actually served two purposes. It did not only solve the acute labor shortage, it also effectively diluted the Moro and Lumad populations. It had taken the Americans 10 years before they could impose complete hegemony in Mindanao, and to consolidate their rule, they now put the politics of add and rule in full swing.

Under the Americans, particularly during the Commonwealth period, Japanese plantations flourished in Davao. Workers and settlers also flocked to Davao. By the end of 1930, the demographic profile of Davao had changed. The settlers now outnumbered the natives . Imagine that annually, almost 10,000 settlers arrived in Davao. With the encouragement of the Republic of the Philippines, more settlers continued to pour into Mindanao so that today, the demography of the island has been totally changed. Now the natives have become the minority in their own hand.

What Pastells had recommended to arresr the expansion and consolidation of the Moros, as well as the Lumads, has finally become a reality. If you look at the placement of the settlements were really an extension of war. I call Mindanawons. The settlements were really an extension of war. I call this civilian warfare, in which civilians are used to advance the strategic goals of war.

The Lumads fought the Spaniards and Americans, but because they were defeated they resorted to evasion and fight to the mountains. In that way that way, they were not conquered and thus retained their identity as they were also successful in resisting the foreigners.

In retaining their identity they also retained their own culture. The terms for their political leaders such as sultan and datu, which the Spaniards also sought to make obsolete, persist. But where is their land?
In the past, If you said Bagobo, it did not only mean a person. It also meant language, clothing, customs, and religion. And most of all, if you said Bagobo, you meant Lobo, Digos, Tudaya, Toril, Bansalan, Makilala, Mt. Apo, and Sibulan, the known centers of the Bagobos. In short, when you spoke the word Bagobo it automatically meant territory.

That is also the meaning of the identity of the other tribes. The name of the tribe carries with it a constellation of meanings rooted in the territory. Each tribe  had its own territory that it defended against the instrusion of other tribes. Oral history tells of a treaty forged among the

Dibabawons, Mansakas, was to de and Mangguwagans to define the boundaries of their respective territories so as to avoid conflict. The treaty was agreed upon even if each tribe did not have a supreme leader. But like the Bagobos, the Mangguwangans, Mansakas, and Dibabawons have no clear territories of  tribes their own today.  This is also true to all the other ,including the Moros.

The Lumads and Moros have angry two reactions to this altered situation very in Mindanao. Some have become very shy, while others have become very shy, while others have become very angry.

We can observe the shyness among the Lumads. In fact, many of them are ashamed of being Lumad because as a tribe they have been left behind in terms of development. They are considered backward, if not uncivilized. They are marginalized and excluded from mainstream society. In the past, their songs and epics celebrated the glory of their tribe and the pride of their baganis and braves – Tuwaang, Agyo, Sandyo. But now what you hear are the laments of their fate.

As a Mandaya chanter puts it: “All our land is gone / O gone is our pristine world. . . Our dignity is trampled upon/ O we have become worthless/ O they have become powerful/These aliens on our land.”

And the Tbolis lament: “This lake of Sebu/ Other people claim it/ Other people lord over it/ The Tbolis have nowhere to go/ The outsiders have prevailed/ They rule over the Tbolis/ Do you understand my song?”

We can also hear these laments of the Lumads in conferences and forums. It is not only land that has been taken away  from the Lumads. Their gold, arts and crafts have also been  taken away, and they fear they will be exterminated in the near future.

As one Bagobo puts it: “Our problem is not illiteracy. It is assimilation that is slowly depriving us of our identity as Tagabawa bagobo.”

That is why a lot of the Lumdas were happy when the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued Department  Administrative Order No. 2 (DAO 2) that paved the way for the Lumads to claim and own their ancestral domain, or what is left of their inheritance. This department order was the basis of the Indigenous challenged in court but was upheld by the Supreme Court.

But some of the tribes are not too happy with this law because it was made outside the tribe, it was written in a foreign tongue, it had no sanctions from the elders, and it contained totally alien provisions regarding the ownership, titling and registration of the land. Aside from these objections, what is this so-called ancestral domain compare to the vast territory that they owned not so long ago? It is a simple case of the state beginning the process of colonizing the lands and resources of the indigenous peoples and communities, and its weapon of choice is
the IPRA.

In other words, IPRA continues the relentless assault on and appropriation of the land that the Mindanawnons have experienced since the arrival of the Spaniards. That is why for some of them it is non shame they feel but anger.

Many of us from the majority culture raise our eyebrows when we hear about the complaints of the Lumads. We operate  from the framework that all this is Philippine territory, the state has sovereignty over all the land, and all citizens enjoy the right of transferability of residence within the said territory.

But while here in Cebu almost everybody is Cebuano, the language is Cebuano, the customs are Cebuano, this statement is not ‘transferable’ to Davao. We cannot say Davao is inhabited by Dabawnons, the language is Dabawnon, and the customs are Dabawnon. Because Davao today is Cebuano, with some admixture of the other tribes from other places. The Bagobos themselves, and Giangans, Mansakas, Diababawons have all been dispersed in remote areas.

I wonder how the descendants of Dagohoy would feel if Tagbilaran were now controlled by Maranaws, Tubigon by  Maguindanaws, Jagna by Manobos, Sagbayan and Belar by Bagobos, and Antiquiera by Mangguwangans? Would they not establish a Bol-anon Liberation Army?

As we can see in Mindanao this not a hypothetical question. We know the response of the Moros. Their sense of identity has been strengthened and now they are struggling on various fronts to claim their own space where they can build their own independent political
power and live a life of their own according to their own culture and beliefs.

Even if the Lumads are dispersed this has not prevented some of them to dream of Lumad unity. A few months ago, the Bungkatol Liberation Army emerged in Agusan del Sur. According to the reports, this army is composed of various Lumad tribes – Manobos, Higaonons, Mamanwas, Talaandigs, banwaons, Mandayas, and Umayams.

In Cotabato, the Indigenous People’s Federal Army announced its birth with a series of bombs to call attention to its demands.

How strong these groups are only time can tell. But these are signs that identity is a burning issue in Mindanao. In the case of the Moros, they have gone a long way even if tribal tensions plague their ranks. They have waged a bitter struggle for 30 years, but the forces of the Philippine government have proved stronger and the still cannot establish their own independent political regime.

The Lumads face a more difficult problem because of the deep, splits in identity, land and consciousness. They continue to be divided into small tribes. Their fragmentation prevents their political unity.s. Without unity, they have no power, no voice. This fragmentation exacerbated by the fact that they do not occupy a contiguous territory: d therefore it is also difficult to forge a I, mad national have inherited consciousness.

These are just the two of the more serious identity problems that we have  inherited from the politics of add and rule that the Spaniards started, which the American intensified, and which the present government wants to perpetuate. Today, there is no need to add settlers anymore in Mindanao as the balance is already skewed in favor of the settlers.

Now the question: What is the future face of Mindanao?
If the Lumads and Moros only had their own power, the settlers would have long been deported from Mindanao. Today, this is no longer appears possible. The demographic profile of Mindanao appears irreversible. Th settlers have stayed here for three generations or so, now consider themselves Mindanawnons. For good or for ill, the so-called tripeople character of Mindanao is here to stay. The Lumads, Moros, and settlers now share the land.

We know the political goals of the Moros militants. After so many years of struggle, some of them have become so desperate they have resorted to bombing of civilian targets, and kidnapping and beheading of innocent civilians.

On the other hand, what about the majority objective? What do we want to happen to the Moros and Lumads? Do we insist on integrating them or assimilating them? Or do we now launch the politics of subtraction, that is of exterminating them, so they will not trouble us anymore? Are we going to hold on tight to this seemingly divine law of Philippine sovereignty? Can we never give them a space where their identity and their land become one and the same again?

Deradicalization and the Defeat of the Feminist Movement: The Case of the Philippines

Past paradigms associate radical politics with waging a revolution that is class-based, armed, thorough-going. In the Philippines this was represented by the communist-led nationalist democratic liberation movement of the previous decades. After the fall of the socialist regimes and the split of the local leftist movement in the early 1990s, radical politics has become anyone’s claim. The national democrats, for instance, are now judged by its critics as stuck in the past, reduced from vanguard to rear guard of radical politics (Weekley 2001, 259). This viewpoint goes with the current civil society movement that debunks statism and class struggle. On the other hand, staunch proponents of revolutionary change regard civil society engagement as reformist, a cooptation with neo-liberalism.

So much harder to speak on today is feminism. While many women identify with feminist thoughts and live out in their personal lives what could be construed as feminist practice, a greater number are reluctant to be identified with feminism. Others outrightly reject the label. This can be attributed to an absence of a cohesive mass movement that engages the support and interests of women and an attendant lack of feminist theorizing to inform everyday politics.

A difficult question to ask in discussing feminist politics in the Philippines is whether the feminists of the 1980s and early 1990s fought (and were defeated) as feminists or as the women contingent of the national democratic forces. This paper argues for the latter and reiterates that: There is no longer a feminist movement to enlist oneself to in the Philippines today. The feminist and proto-feminist consciousness of the 1980s has been superseded by other competing cultures and ideologies that invaded in the aftermath of the 1990s Upheaval. Those who choose to carry on a radical position stand to be extinguished.

Feminism and the National Democratic Struggle

Women organizing in the national democratic revolution had been the task of the Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (MAKIBAKA – Independent Movement of New Women). From a Women’s Bureau of the Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) in 1969, the national democratic organization’s women department grew into the MAKIBAKA in 1970, which later became the nationwide organization of women, mostly youth and students. In 1972 it changed its name to Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan (Patriotic Movement of New Women) to emphasize the national democratic intent of the organization. During the Martial Law years MAKIBAKA activists were deployed all over the country to build a basic alliance of women across all sectors of society, specifically the workers, peasants and lower petty bourgeoisie to support the goals of the revolution. MAKIBAKA women became the progenitors of the national democratic feminism that always laid great stress on the need to unify. One of the oldest calls of this tradition is to combat wrong ideas that work against the solid unity of the oppressed class.

Many women writers trace the beginnings of the women’s movement in the Philippines to the anti-colonial struggle of 1890 when the revolutionary movement Katipunan produced heroes like Gregoria de Jesus, Teresa Magbanua, Melchora Aquino and Gabriela Silang (Pagaduan 1993, 106). While there had been various movements pushing for the advancement of women’s rights since 1891 when the right to vote was first waged by middle-class women, in contemporary time, the women’s movement was strongest from the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. Feminist critic Delia Aguilar (1993, 94) ascribed this to the declining influence of the Left, as well as the macho stance of the revolutionary movement at its height. At the time autonomous2 organizations were sprouting and GABRIELA, then claiming around a 100-member national federation of women-organizations, was leading the mobilizations of grassroots women and making national issues such as the U.S. bases, human rights, foreign debt, IMF-WB, etc. women’s issues. GABRIELA held sole claim to pursuing a “Third World feminism” that assigns gender oppression to problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Guided as it was by the national democratic project, GABRIELA sought to bridge head-on the inherently tense relations between women’s distinct concerns and pressing national interests (Aguilar 1993, 92).

As a federation of women organizations, GABRIELA has always been criticized as primarily a national democratic formation, rather than a feminist organization. As a movement, it had no autonomous agenda but anchored on the program of the national democrats. That GABRIELA’s mass organizations dispersed following the momentary demise of the national democratic agenda in 1993 must lend credence to this. While there were independent women’s movements that surfaced in the 1980s, these did not have GABRIELA’s number and mass character. These groups were easily dismissed by the national democrats as Western-influenced bourgeois feminist formations.

In the Philippines, women’s training in political struggles has always been in support of broader movements for freedom and democracy. The most intensive and extensive training they’ve had was in the national democratic struggle of the 1970s and 1980s. As enlistees to this cause, their first commitment was for the advancement of the revolution. As Aguilar asserts, “tied as it was to the orthodox Marxism guiding Party praxis,” feminism did not find a friendly home in the national democratic revolution (and in MAKIBAKA in particular) (Aguilar 1993, 92). The national democratic strut e of the previous decades always subordinated all other axes of oppression (gender, ethnicity, environment) to class strut: e. If a feminist consciousness did not fully develop in the women’s movement a good part of the blame can probably be laid on this continuing alliance with the male-dominated leadership of the national democratic movement (Angeles, cited in Aguilar 1993, 133).

Despite its hostility to feminism, the culture of radicalism fomented by the national democratic revolution brought on tremendous changes in the lives of people who were involved in struggle. Relationships were restructured as the needs of the revolution came first. Comradeship was replacing other bonds based on bourgeois institutions, and the nuclear-patriarchal family, although still regarded even by revolutionists as a site for reproduction (and women seen as bearers of sons who would carry on the struggle) was being complemented by the bigger family – the collective.; A proletarian worldview was being developed, denigrating middle-class values and institutions and condemning bourgeois consumerism and other MNC-friendly tendencies.

Retrenchments in the Camp: From Feminism to Genderism

The “post-revolutionary era” following the defeat of the national democratic program in the 1990s was a period of vigorous search for alternatives to past paradigms. While activists looked for “interstices and spaces within the political system to advance the progressive agenda” (FOPA 1993, 7), the Ramos government was hastening the country’s integration into the world market. Development aid poured into the country, a big bulk of which was re-channeled through non-government organizations. Activists were getting “new money” to do development work with and a whole new set of NGO jargon developed along with the new formations and relationships. With the passing into law of the Local Government Code of 1991, non-government organizations and people’s organizations were given more power in development policies. Gender projects likewise proliferated, redeploying feminist energies into new programs. This signaled the absorption of feminist-activists into aid agency structures.

With adequate support from funding agencies abroad, the women enterprise branched out into several directions: peace advocacy (gender and peace), eco-feminism (gender and environment), children’s rights, women spirituality, gender and micro-enterprise development, VAW (violence against women), and so on. This broadening of perspective worked two ways: it opened up more avenues to coalesce and work with other groups in important social issues; on the other hand, it further diffused if not finished off the unconsolidated feminist agenda.

This shift in political practice fell in line along the reform and renewal program being pursued by the broader progressive movement that now encouraged heterogeneity and pluralism (via participatory politics, legislation, community-based self-help projects, micro-enterprises, etc.) in development practice — in lieu of hegemonic social transformation projects. There was adequate financial support coming in this direction as traditional funding agencies were themselves reacting to what they felt to be a mistake they made in the past: backing up organizations that sought to destabilize government while incapable of responding to popular sentiments and not directly serving the socio-economic needs of the poor.

With no overarching national or class struggle to hem them in, women projects expanded, from women studies to socio-economic initiatives. Basic services likewise improved as more health centers, reproductive health clinics, and crisis centers were put up. Women desks, committees and GAD (gender and development)5 focal points were installed in both government and non-government offices – a landmark in the women’s struggle welcomed by many, but bothered some. Feminist critic Aguilar (1993, 94) expressed concern saying while it boded well for the women’s movement, it could also take an inauspicious turn of creating a (feminist) bureaucracy dependent on dole-outs from foreign sources.

As a strategy in development practice, the gender framework (also called the GAD framework) moves away from a feminist stance that challenges existing social relations (gender inequality, for one) to an accommodationist (gender) approach that tries to live within a given social order. A feminist approach is basically a political demand, while GAD is essentially an economic strategy which seeks to find relevance within the economic-development regime of the neo-liberalist era (1990s onward). In other words, GAD works within the interstices of the dominant capitalist system.

As what has been forwarded earlier, there is no longer a feminist movement in the Philippines. What we have now is a scattering of women’s causes and projects that serve women’s welfare without really hurting free-market and the neo-liberal regime on one hand, and male hegemony on the other hand. A real bane that many well-funded gender projects do is siphon off the political energies and resources of the women’s movement, contributing to a culture of indifference that is so hostile to radical politics.

In the branching out into multifarious gender interests, feminism thus becomes just one of the older twigs one need not hold on to. It is not surprising that not a few women activists now express queasiness over being called a “feminist,” others even preferring to call themselves “genderist.” Feminism is so associated with the confrontational politics of the 1980s and is seen as “anti-male,” ergo, has no place in a supposedly all-inclusive, enlightened, gender-sensitized civil society movement of the 1990s and 2000s.

Getting Rich on the Home Front?

The dismissal of the class struggle of the previous decades following the triumph of elite politics and the rise of the civil society movement in the 1990s likewise brought changes in the lifestyles of erstwhile proletarian practitioners. For one, the collective life withered away, as bourgeois institutions of old (the nuclear family, the conservative church, government) gained new ascendancy in the lives of former rebel-activists. For another, the pouring in of development money likewise created an NGO bureaucracy living under the employ of development aid, producing in turn a “new middle class” composed of activists formerly trained in the proletarian ethic of “simple living and hard struggle.” Joining them are young university graduates with varying political persuasions and vague ideas about previous social transformation projects.

The 1990s was also the time when people were trying to live down the upheaval of the previous decade. The anti-fascist struggle that claimed lives of family and friends; the discovery of the mass purges; all the aftermath of a failed revolution gave people a sense of disillusionment and a desire to withdraw from “bloody” political action. Self-transformation projects and spirituality quests, deemed to be what the last transformation project lacked, were drawing a number of ex-activists. There was also a sense among many ex-activists that the “post-conflict” climate (post-adversarial politics) might be their one opportunity to compensate for “lost time” to go back to a forsaken career, or to children and family. Guilt-tripped over past parental or filial neglect, the home gained new importance. Housing plans, educational plans, health insurance plans and car plans became “basics” as family life normalized. Under this arguably more peaceful and more affluent regime, a new (political) attitude has developed: one that attunes to, even embraces, capitalist modernity. Proletarian austerity is thus exiled, superseded by middle-class consumerism.

The Hegemony of the Family and Feminist Politics

In the Philippines, the family is decidedly a very powerful institution. The family is also the Catholic Right’s strongest argument against feminist politics. In its fight against Free Choice, for instance, it portrays the recently passed House Bill 4110 (Reproductive Health Care Act, which legalizes all forms of contraception, including post-abortion care) as the gravest threat in present time to the “sanctity of the Filipino family.” While “Third World feminism” has been always concerned with family welfare, reproductive rights and sexuality remain a thorny area that directly put it in direct collision course with the Church. The Catholic Right, in particular, shows great aversion to what it calls the “sexual revolution” ushered in by the invasion of Western products and information base via advances in telecommunications technology.

In the past, the Catholic Church had ironically been GABRIELAs moral ally, particularly in campaigns that had to do with sexual exploitation of women. Though each employed a different language,’ both the women groups and the Catholic Church are for the elimination of prostitution. The present dominance of the Catholic Right and the conservative view that looks at feminism or the idea of female independence as a toxic substance from the West has so much to do with present-day retreats and disavowals in the women’s front: There is no longer a coherent and strong voice — and a mass movement— to challenge misogyny and patriarchy. Besides, the broadening civil society movement draws forces from the multiplicity of voices from various social classes (that includes the religious and the middle-class based and conservative civic groups) that if one wanted to productively pursue advancement of equally worthy causes (e.g., anti-corporate, anti-globalization, peace, environmental protection, etc.), she has to be careful in treading the alliance ground. Feminism being a less attractive fight (since it also fights at home and fights men and bishops), some dissemblance and a little compliance had to be resorted to by practicing women advocates.

Conclusion

In the Philippines, a flowering of people’s initiatives and independent formations occurred following the crumbling of the once solid Left (due to strategic and tactical mistakes) that used to control and define the social transformation project. Abetted by a series of political reforms on the side of governments, e.g., decentralization with the enactment of the Local Government Code, and a system of representation that accommodated in Congress erstwhile state opponents and critics; the absorption of Left personalities in the Cabinet and strategic government agencies; and the pouring in of money in official development aid that has transferred billions of development money into the hands of non-government organizations; all combined to change the face of dissent, what is now called deradicalization. The defeat of adversarial radical politics in favor of an accommodationist, even cooptative, reformist politics. Taking place in an expanding job market and a flow of cheaper consumer goods (thanks both to trade liberalization), not to mention a climate of peace and greater “political freedom” (barring class politics) a better life seems to be “on sale.” The erstwhile activists (a good number of them, anyway), having left class politics and the trenches and having now joined the ranks of the middle class are inevitably trapped into reproducing a way of life that maintains middle-classness. Needless to say, they contribute to the creation of a neoconservative political climate.

For the feminist movement that always rallied behind the once national democratic cause, the defeat of the once Solid Left in the 1990s led to political disarticulation, disorganized the women forces, and demobilized them for a while. With the loss of the Left hegemony and with the emergence of pluralist politics (as encouraged by the State and adequately funded by Churches and governments abroad eager to sponsor political democratization and economic development in the country), new opportunities have been opened for their specific agenda to be heard. However, the sponsorship of gender by development organizations (and the concomitant resources allotted it), and its adoption by government (and the policies and laws enacted to support it) while helping to boost the women’s chances to be accommodated in the male structures of development discourse and processes, also co-opted them. Feminist dissent has been reined in – chastened and placated into complacency and compliance by the laws and institutions that are responsible for their subordination, in the first place. So that even as these women formations struggle to advance their gender interests, their own (feminist) energies get diffused in supposedly more encompassing projects: in the anti-corporate and anti-globalization movement; and in more “compassionate” projects (read as not anti-male): in the peace movement, in the gender and environment movement, in children’s rights, in welfare projects and socio-economic endeavors that do not carry a specifically feminist agenda. All these to reconcile women with, rather than question and challenge, traditional roles that spell their oppression. As feminist causes get institutionalized and the women’s movement relocated to the academe, government offices and other such safe places, adversarial politics and the equality project it seeks to install are demolished. For anyone who insists to stand by this oppositional politics, she stands to lose.

‘What are We in Fieldwork for?’ Ethics and Politics of Ethnographic Research

The practice of ethnographic fieldwork is first experienced as a social intervention before it is transformed into a textual invention.   Fieldworkers do not only work in the field, however the field is understood; they also work it. In the process of inserting themselves into a community or accompanying a group in their movement they also encounter, delight in, collide with, adjust to, miss or misunderstand other people’s actions and reactions. They impact on the lives of the people involved in their study perhaps as much as those people transform the researchers’ views of things. Fieldworkers then move almost inevitably from the already complex participant observation to an even more entangled, often multistranded, partisan participation (Gupta & Ferguson 1997; Marcus 1995). This seems especially true in studying nascent social movements in the context of contested development projects (Gardner & Lewis 1996; Albert 1997) as the following reflection on a Philippine case wishes to show.

From Narmada to Apo Sandawa

This reflection on the political and practical dimensions of fieldwork started when I met Medha Patkar who was the leader of the Narmada Bachao Andolan in India. From London, I took a short one-month visit between July and August in 1994 to the area of the Bhils who were among those affected by the Narmada Dam Project. Medha Patkar’s position posed a challenge to me. Exploring her Hindu and Gandhian tradition, she moved among the tribal groups as speaker and chanter, sometimes as cook and counsellor, as trainer and translator. Among those supporting the movement were book writers, some of whom were themselves vending their own books on top of cars during rallies.

I thought that there must be a way of doing research without always having to draw a very sharp line between academic rigor and social relevance, and that if pressed to make a preference, one could go further by considering a legitimate people’s movement more important than one’s research. As Medha Patkar argues, “general writing on paradigms of development, even alternative development…would not change the world and the exploited systems.” The necessary thing to do was to commit oneself to a real community, “like staking a territory as your own by planting your flag there, by capturing a symbol and shaking it for all its worth” (Patkar 1992, 278).

In the Philippines, Virgilio Enriquez pioneered a search for an ethical, relevant and culturally appropriate approach to social science research (1994b). One can argue that his call for a “liberating” research practice (Enriquez 1992 and 1994a) ran the risk of equating the social with the national project (Pertierra 1997, 11-12.20; 1992, 43). But I resonate with the way he stretched the meaning of “indigenous facilitation research.” Whereas participatory research assumes equality between the researcher and the researched, indigenous facilitation research “goes farther by recognising the superior role of the participant or the culture bearer as the one who determines the articulated and implied limits of the research enterprise”. In this framework, the facilitative researcher becomes more of a “morale booster, networker, or at most a consultant who confers about the research problem with the community who are, in this case, the real researchers” (Enriquez 1994b, 59).

And just before going to the Philippines to start my fieldwork in 1995, I visited a Dutch anthropologist in Chiang Mai. Leo Alting von Geusau has built up a library on the Akha. In the short weeks that I was with him, I learned how, along the way, his scholarly work became inseparable from his commitment to the people he studied. He explained, “I discovered on the one hand, a wealthy, enormous complexity of the Akha culture. On the other hand, I discovered the many problems they have. I felt committed, ‘very involved’ (Alting von Geusau 1985, 44).

This involvement resonates with the words of Dell Hymes, who recognized that “by virtue of its subject matter, anthropology is unavoidably a political and ethical discipline, not merely an empirical specialty” (1974, 48). Our simply being there among the people we study already has consequences, over and above the textual production which results from that experience. Nancy Schepher-Hughes puts it more emphatically: “We cannot delude ourselves into believing that our presence leaves no trace, no impact on those whose lives we dare intrude” (1992, 25; 1995). So, for better or for worse, wittingly or unwittingly, the practice of fieldwork places the ethnographer in a relative position of power, the handling of which calls for an ethical and disciplinal reflection (Gledhill 1994, 217; cf. Kahn et al 1998).

Anthropological reflections in the 1980s promised to provide insights on this notion of practice (Ortner 1984; Marcus & Clifford 1986, etc.). This project unfortunately narrowed down its focus on the poetics of representation (cf. Fardon 1990; Pels & Salemink 1994, 5.16ff; cf. Denzin 1996). Apparently, the new ethnography neglected the “social and political processes almost completely, riot necessarily by denying them salience, but by backgrounding them to questions of representations, construction and deconstruction” (Gledhill 1994, 225; also Scheper-Hughes 1992, 24). The concept of practice as a set of activities, strategies and social intervention was “relegated to the back burner” despite its relevance to issues of development and social movements (Gardner & Lewis 1996, 40).

The more recent studies call for flexibility in diversifying our knowledge from different field positions (Gid 1998; Gupta & Ferguson 1997; Clifford 1997; Hastrup & Fog Olwig 1997). They call, too, for reflexivity and ‘self-awareness’ (Pels & Salemink 1994) in the ways we as fieldworkers “follow” our subjects and their movements (Marcus 1995), or ‘tame’ them to become good informants (Hobart 1996). Finally, they call for “reflection” on how our “fieldwork relationship meant to our research subjects” (Paine 1998, 134; Ginsburg 1997, 140, 123).3 All this suggests that anthropology stands to gain by seeking to combine reflexivity and relevance in making fieldwork itself as a time, space, and infrastructure for people’s self-assessment and empowerment.

I carried similar ideas and models of solidarity during my own fieldwork in Mount Apo Sandawa, site of the geothermal power plant which was constructed by the Philippine government and was opposed by environmentalists and advocates for the indigenous people’s rights. Although I was in contact with the protesters as well as the government, I found myself studying and working with a small Manobo social movement that was critical of both camps. My Manobo hosts became key figures of this new indigenous movement. The group, called Tuddok, wanted cultural regeneration and ancestral domain claim. And for this aim, they saw my research as a possible ally. Without formal contract, but with constant assessment of our roles, a partnership developed between my cultural research and their cultural movement. My research then served as a resource for the movement just as the movement provided substance for my research. To understand this, we need a general background on how the Mount Apo environment has been politicized.

Geothermal Project and Political Protest

Burdened with debts and wanting to catch up with Asian tiger economies, the Philippine government decided to speed up the exploration of its indigenous sources of energy. In 1987 the government-owned Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) drilled two exploratory wells for the 250 MWe Geothermal Project at the heart of the remaining rainforest of Mt. Apo, the highest mountain in the Philippines. This home of the endangered Philippine Eagle is included in the 1982 United Nations List of National Parks and Equivalent Reserves, and is listed as one of the heritage sites of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. More importantly, perhaps, Mt. Apo is considered the ancestral territory of the Manobos and the Bagobos.

A wave of protest emerged, starting from a small tribal organization and individual government officials. The protest intensified with the participation of big environmentalist groups and Catholic and mainstream Protestant church activists, supported by advocates not only in Manila but also in Britain, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United States. This led to a decade of debate on issues ranging from the legal status of the project to its environmental consequences and its cultural impact on the resident tribes who claim Mt. Apo as their ancestral domain (Broad & Cavanagh 1993, Mincher 1992).

In 1989, twenty-one datus from nine tribal communities around Mt. Apo performed a Dyandi, a historic blood pact, vowing to “defend Mt. Apo to the last drop of our blood.” This was followed by a counter-ritual called Pamaas, sponsored this time by PNOC, to dispel the cosmic effect of the Dyandi curse. This conflict of rituals dramatized the violent exchange between the government military and the Communist New People’s Army, which claimed lives from both camps. A huge multisectoral coalition, called Task Force Apo Sandawa (TFAS), spearheaded the fight against the PNOC’s “development aggression” and coordinated the local and international opposition (Rodil 1993, Broad & Cavanagh 1993, Durning 1992, 5, Tabak 1990)

As a result, PNOC operation was temporarily suspended. The World Bank and the ExIm Bank of Japan withdrew their funding commitment. PNOC’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) had to be redone. Its staff had to reexamine the company’s policy and improve its technology.

But in 1991, PNOC submitted a comprehensive 10-volume Environmental Impact Study which included a module on the sociocultural dimension of the project and its response to the legal and environmental complaints of the opposition. This won for the company the much-coveted Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Other factors also led to the granting of the ECC. Extreme droughts rendered the existing hydroelectric power plants incapable of supplying enough energy. The result was long months of daily 8-hour power outages. The Gulf War also triggered insecurity on the part of government planners who warned against too much dependence on the Arab oil-producing countries (Lamberte & Yap 1991).

Appeals against the granting of the ECC were dismissed by the Supreme Court. A special Presidential Proclamation carved out from the 72,000-hectare national park the 701 hectares of the project as geothermal reservation. In 1992, President Ramos signed the Memorandum of Agreement between the government and the representative organizations of the affected communities thus sealing the legal status of the project.

Meanwhile, PNOC was winning the battle of representation. It had succeeded in presenting itself as a “nature-friendly” company. It even received environmental awards from government and private sectors for its Environmental Impact Study. In terms of policy, the company moved from simply providing mitigating measures to winning social acceptability and even championing environmental and social sustainability (De Jesus 1996).

But national and international advocacy against the power project, especially in London and the Netherlands, continued even up to the mid-1990s (e.g., PRC 1994, Broeckman, et al 1996). In Mindanao, the local Catholic clergy kept the fight by continuing to denounce the project in its pastoral messages and radio homilies. The annual commemoration of the Dyandi blood pact dwindled in attendance, but a significant number of protest groups still maintained the hardline stance of “no compromise” with the power company.

Existing researches and documents tended to reduce the actors in the field into two: the project proponent and its loyal opponent. The former was learning from and winning over, but not quite beating, the latter. Those who did not fall within these categories were not considered actors. This was clear, for example, in the thesis written by a PNOC manager who studied in Britain. Castro, who helped create the PNOC office for “dealing with public opposition,” did not discuss those who were in between “since we do not expect severe complications” from them (Castro 1996, 11). Castro’s analysis is valuable for the understanding of the company’s discourse and practice. Her lack of fieldwork, however, prevented her from seeing other contextual actors who might not be as disturbing as the project protesters, but would later become quite crucial in their emergent roles.

(En)Countering Culturelessness

From initial readings, I reckoned that the controversy surrounding the Mt. Apo Geothermal Project would make it difficult for me to enter the village. So armed with permits from the Provincial Governor, the Office of Southern Cultural Communities, the Municipal Mayor, and the Chief of Police, I approached the Barangay Captain. While he appreciated my research, he asked me to explain to the Barangay Council the following week. The Barangay Council expressed fears regarding my stay in the village. It asked me to come back the following week to explain my research project to the Tribal Council. The Tribal Council, which included the resident Protestant pastors and the paramilitary personnel, also raised a number of issues attendant to my proposed residence in their area. From the open discussion and from the informal conversations that followed, the following arguments led the Council to suspend its decision and to call instead a special session of the Tribal Assembly:

First, being a priest, I was automatically identified with the activist local clergy that had been in the forefront of protest against the State-owned power project. Since the protest movement was associated with the Communists, they feared that if I stayed in the area, the place might get militarized again.

Secondly, being a Catholic priest, my presence could be divisive of the village that was predominantly under evangelical Protestant churches. The stigma of being a harbinger of the fatal “666” from the Book of Revelation had never been totally erased even up to this time.

Thirdly, being a Tagalog from Manila, I could also end up getting their lands, as the settlers from the north had supposedly done since the war. The fact that I was born in the same island of Mindanao did not help.

Finally, what do people get from researchers, anyway? They take pictures, interview old men, and report about them to faraway places. Apparently, they had bitter experiences with researchers both from the supporters of the project as well as from its opponents who used them only for their own agenda.

Later, the Tribal Assembly was convened. They decided that I could visit but not reside in the village. In the process, I got to learn about their political institutions and practices. Their questions revealed their fears, which in turn gave hints about their history.

It dawned on me that within this Protestant Manobo village penetrated by a government project and hurt by the consequences of political and environmental activism, this dual identity of being a Catholic priest and anthropologist also meant double access to both knowledge and power which these people had all the right to be cautious about. Looking back, the rejection of my stay in the village was the people’s way of establishing some kind of a damage control to my potential for harm (cf. Hobart 1996).

The most disturbing question, however, came from the sidelines. “But Father,” asked Apo Ambolugan, a gentle elder in the village, “why do you still want to study us? We have no more culture here.” This question really hit me hard. It betrayed the state of collective low self-esteem of the tribe.

He continued. “Why us? Why not the T’bolis of Lake Sebu? Or the NIatigsalugs of Bukidnon? They still have agongs there. They still dance. And they still wear our native clothes. We have nothing left here.” This avowal of what may be called “culturelessness” (cf. Rosaldo 1989, 197; 1988) haunted me for the rest of my fieldwork James Eder (1993, 131), working among the Bataks, also found a parallel “deculturation” “the single most vexing problem” he encountered in his own research in the field.

Apo Ambolugan’s statement could just be an oblique way of driving me away. But he was not alone in harboring this feeling. There was, indeed, a prevailing feeling of kahiubos or collective low self-esteem among the Manobos, not simply in relation to the Visayan settlers but to other tribes as well.

Part of this feeling marginalized is due to the marginality of the land itself, The terrain is mostly steep and sloping. The climate is too cold for the lucrative fruit crops like durian and marang. Bananas are plagued by many kinds of diseases. Other possibilities like strawberry and cut flowers are still at the experimental stage. The only regular source of income is soft broom production using tiger grass or tabiti. Coffee would have been good if they had not been abandoned in favor of PNOC employment. The PNOC road promised access to big markets for the natives’ products; unfortunately more goods come up to the village than go downtown.

The original center of the tribal community, an open space that served as a basketball court and cultural arena, was abandoned when the new PNOC road was constructed. Many houses transferred to the side of the new road, thus symbolically and literally splitting the village to give way to the huge trucks that connect the geothermal plant to Kidapawan poblacion.

In the genealogy of the Apao, the first ancestor remembered by the local people was himself a poor man. He was so poor he had to borrow garden tools from the Tagabawas on the Davao side of Mt. Apo. The name Apao itself means a tiny flea. Apao left no legacy of handicrafts or huge dwellings. But Apao had at least five wives and many descendants. And they like talking together, and they have dreams. For at least two people, these were enough to start with in regenerating their culture. And for academic as well as personal reasons, I decided to share my research with their project.

Simple Steps, Complex Moves

I had the courage to say to Apo Ambolugan that I knew they had springs of energy because on 5 October 1995, on my very first visit to Sayaban, I met the two would-be leaders of a gentle cultural regeneration of the tribe. They were the cousins Beting Umpan Colmo and Pastor Tano Umpan Bayawan. Even before I arrived, they had already dreamt of “regenerating” their culture.

“We start with a family reunion,” Tano and Beting explained. “We envision a lively tribal culture. But since we are not in any influential position to do so—we are not the barangay, we are not datus, we are not wealthy—we will start with our family or clan. The Umpan clan. If we could bind ourselves together, and then later play the agong, and dance as a family, then we can perhaps be the model for the rest of the clans to follow”

It sounded extremely modest. But considering the entropic situation as I was beginning to understand it, it made realistic sense.

My instinct told me that this was the kind of movement I was looking for. In the midst of a general social paralysis, here was a source of energy. They told me they did not want to become involved with and be manipulated by NGOs who present themselves as alternative to the powerful government and development projects. They wanted a movement of their own, addressing the tribal situation according to their own analysis and interpretation. Theirs would not be an action directly or primarily against PNOC, although it might have to reach that point later. It would have something to do with their dignity as a people. It would touch on the land issue, but the first priority was culture.

Tano and Bering came from slightly different backgrounds. Tano Bayawan, in his late thirties, was a pastor of the Church of Christ. His work as a Bible translator under the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) was for him a spiritual devotion and a service to his tribe. But SIL was not addressing the development of their culture to which he was equally committed. He wanted a book written about their tribe.

Like Tano, Bering was also in her thirties. But unlike her cousin, Beting had been away from the tribe for many years. Her Visayan father already had children when he settled in the nearby Muaan. Her Manobo mother died when she was six. She was reared by her Visayan half-sisters who, aside from inheriting more lands, attempted to instil in her a disgust for her tribe. Her other sister by her native mother, who had more experience with the tribals, later became an outspoken opposition of PNOC. Beting worked with a human rights law office and with a foundation for young victims of war. She received a German scholarship for a college degree in psychology which, for some reason, she did not complete. After seeing the ways of NGOs, and the situation of her fellow natives, she decided to go back to her tribe. It was just in time that I met her accidentally in my first jeepney ride to their place. She was very articulate in Visayan, Tagalog and English. But she needed to brush up on her Manobo.

When the Tribal Assembly rejected my stay, I decided to concentrate on their movement. They welcomed my research as possible assistance to their cause. In what follows, I shall offer some instances illustrative of the overlapping projects of research and movement during fieldwork. Like Ginsberg (1997, 140), I want to present this “not as self-justification but as part of perennial discussion of the role of scholarship in processes of social transformation.”

1. Family, Movement, and Ironies of Fieldwork . From the time we decided on a kind of partnership, Bering and Tano started listing down their relatives. The process so excited their relatives that, to their surprise, the planned clan reunion was held in three months’ time rather than in two years’ time.

There was one problem during the preparation. Since they had no single percussion left, I was asked if I knew anyone who could lend them an agong and a set of kulintang (brass drums). Because I was not allowed to live in the village, I had to stay in the parish at the town center. Through my new contacts in the parish church, I was able to convince a Manobo family, already residing in the lowland, to lend their heirloom.

On 5-7 January 1996, the whole clan of Ayon Umpan gathered in Muaan, the legendary origin-center of migration among the tribal communities in Kidapawan. It broke the ice of lethargic existence. They revived an old ritual called Pakaa’t Kallo, which literally meant feeding the tools of the farm. A number of young Manobos recited their poems in the vernacular. These poems were created during a poetry workshop we held a few days before the reunion. The family marked the grave of two relatives who drowned in the river. They also invented a new ritual of giving native names to those who had only “Christian” names. A guest prietess improvised the naming ritual out of traditional elements like bamboo, water, flower and comb. And where did they get their native name? From our unfinished genealogy that Beting presented on the table. The presence of the musical instruments spelled a big difference. They were surprised to recall the many tunes they feared they had forgotten. There was joy in being able to dance again. Then the children took over the drums when their elders got tired.

Towards the end of the Kalivungan (celebration) they selected officers for the new organization, called Tuddok to Kalubbaran ni Apo Ayon Umpan (Pillars of the Descendants of Elder Ayon Umpan). Beting, my research partner, was appointed leader of the Tuddok. Then they formed committees to handle concerns like financing marriages, assisting the sick members of the family, establishing communal farm, and sending children to school.

They also created a special committee to work on their ancestral domain claim. The committee reflected a recent concern. They argued that regenerating their culture meant, among other things, the revival of dancing. But how could they continue to dance if they were not secure in their land?

Legally, there was an opening for this plan. They had heard of the Department Administrative Order No. 2 (DAO No. 2), which provides a detailed procedure whereby a tribal community could present a claim to their ancestral domain. Once the claim was validated, the government could grant a certificate of its recognition. Tuddok started working for this recognition.

Some leaders of the protest groups dismissed the Tuddok initiative for being clannish. They wanted to help them so that their narrow vision of the Mt. Apo problem could expand to include the bigger issues of development aggression, biodiversity, and ethnocide.

Tuddok leaders argued, however, that the issue-based protest campaign against the powerful geothermal project had done nothing to stop it. That type of movement had not improved the lives of the affected tribal community. They wanted to assert their self-determination not only in the face of the PNOC geothermal company, but also of the NGO community. In her written reflection, Beting said that Tuddok aimed to explore a path of development that was an “alternative to the alternative”.

At this point, it was clear how the new group was opening up a new space for their participation in the making of their contribution to history. The consolidation of the clan, the marking of places for the living and the dead, the invention of a naming ritual, the resourcing of their genealogy for the new generation, the re-playing of the agong and the re-animation of the body in dancing- these were all micro-processes charged with the Manobo agency.

In this light, would the fieldworker’s facilitation in the loan of musical instruments be considered a breach of professional standard of objectivity or a form of militant interventionism? If in earlier fieldwork, extracting artefacts- by buying or borrowing or simply receiving as gifts- was considered part of fieldwork practice, does working the other way around that problematic?

2. Mobilizing Bloodlines. The movement that chose to start from the family and the body had to encounter the trial precisely there- in the weak family attending to a sick body. Ettok, the seventeen-year-old poet-artist, was sick. He worked part time with the geothermal company to earn his allowance for is secondary education. But he came home one day with infected marrow in his left thigh. After the long discernment whether it was caused by mountain spirits or by company chemicals, they finally decided to bring him to the hospital- in the faraway Davao City.

Ettok’s case became complicated. Ettok had to undergo two operations. His daily antibiotics and food alone cost the equivalent of the family income in one week. Ettok’s father thought of selling a piece of land. In the midst of their struggle to claim their ancestral domain, they were sometimes pressured to do what they hated most in their forefathers’ mistakes.

My fieldwork identity also had to be reshaped. At one point, the PNOC Community Relations Officer needed a priest to bless their new office building inside the power plant. Most of the employees, he argued, were Catholics. The parish priest found different alibis to evade it. The task fell on me because, as a researcher, I was supposed to be in a more neutral position. But what could blessing the PNOC premises mean to NG0s, to activist clergy, and to Tuddok members themselves? With the consent of my Tuddok friends, however, I agreed to perform the rite and even managed to drop a line during my homily which, according to some employees, disturbed some company personnel. After presiding at the liturgy, I brought the collected money to Ettok. The managers assured me that the money did not come from the company but from the Catholic employees themselves. The gesture was to save me from possible rumors.

At another instance, Bering and I decided to approach the manager of Oxbow, the Canadian company constructing the power plant for the PNOC. The Canadian manager twice visited me in the parish church and I remembered that he offered to help the tribal people in the area. Bering knew that the opposition groups, her sister included, would not have approved of asking help from the “enemy”. But the donation of the Oxbow manager—who said he had 25 percent Indian blood—supplied Ettok’s medicine for a precious few days.

Ettok’s importance to the new cultural movement could not be measured. Although he would not normally be considered a movement entrepreneur, his attitude towards his sickness, not to mention his artistic gift itself, inspired its leaders. Bering, for example, almost left the Tuddok movement during one of her deliberations on the value of their cultural struggle. “Was it worth her sacrifice of personal search for a stable relationship?” During one telephone conversation, she confessed that the sight of Ettok sketching Manobo scenes in the Davao hospital energized her. Ettok once borrowed a wheelchair and started roaming around the hospital, talking to fellow patients and their nurses. People flocked to his drawings. Among his drawings stood out Manobo old folks playing the traditional musical instruments. Bering realized “how silly of her to brood over petty things”. There was Ettok, the supposedly lame man, arousing in people new reasons to go on.

Ettok’s hospitalization had certainly sharpened the Manohos’ sense of financial poverty, but at the same time it dramatized their capacity for cultural integrity.

I had scanty notes on these episodes because I was not certain during fieldwork whether they were just time-consuming, altruistic, emotionally-draining distractions from the “real” research (Gardner & Lewis 1996; Gledhill 1994, 218). I include these details, however, to point that social movements or, better still, cultural struggles in face of development, involve not only big mass rallies, but also minute practices and processes of almost invisible self-assertion, improvisation and production of meanings (Melucci 1989; Escobar 1992). In these micro-processes and micro-spaces, even the “non-entrepreneurs” (cf. Hilhorst, forthcoming) of the movement play significant roles. They also reveal that neither disciplinary distancing nor principled militancy suffice to explain the formation of the research relationship or the direction, meaning, intensity or pacing of a movement. Strategies and principles, agency and passivity, objectivity and militancy are all constantly renegotiated in face of unforeseen episodes.

3. Roonvorks and Paperworks . The more visible struggle of claiming ancestral domain made Tuddok busy during most of the succeeding months. In claiming a portion of Mt. Apo National Park, Tuddok, and later Apao, had to contend with a rival Manobo claimant from a neighboring village. The contest on the rightful land claim required Tuddok to present a more convincing local history and ethnographic evidence that had been submitted by the other data. The rudimentary history and fragmentary genealogy of the resident clan taken so far from individual interviews had many “gaps”. They were worried that the stories of the elders would not be coherent when the time for public hearing came.

Remembering what I had picked up from the Obo-Manobo Phrasebook published by the Summer Institute of Linguistics, I explored the use of the word kodpotongkooy (SIL 1994, 30-31). Kodpotongkooy simply means talking to one another. This informal discussion could range from visiting kin to sharing itulan (history which is true) to ponguman (legends and therefore not necessarily true) and to kalivungan. I asked whether it could also used to check genealogies and collate historical accounts. That discussion itself became a kodpotongkooy. They then thought of gathering all the elders who have been interviewed already, plus others who have not been consulted. But to attract as many participants as possible, they called Apo Salumay, via the provincial radio station public service, to lead their series of kodpotongkooy. Apo Salumay, a highly respected former village chieftain of Savaban, but who had been away for the past 27 years, became the primary historian of the group.

It had since then become customary to call kodpotongkooy whenever the group wanted to discuSs a problem or make any decision. This to my mind was one of the most important sequences during the research-movement partnership. Not that kodpotongkooy was not there before. As a matter of fact, this informal way of discussion constituted the most common way of exchanging views and making collective decisions. But its new application in what could be called a ‘discourse formation’ was, according to Datu Arawan, a source of konokkaan or strength. From the casual conversations with people on the road, to visiting relatives and feeling deeply for them, to very formal caucus of elders, people could get strength. They can speak, they can discuss, they can debate, they can argue. Somehow the planning for family reunion and the listing down of the genealogy saved the way for the formation of a local discourse, an alternative to the government rhetoric and especially to the silent transcripts of the tribal people themselves.

In kodpotongkooy, as in other oral history exercise (e.g., Mace 1998), speaking out and talking together, in opening spaces for a new discourse to develop, the tribe comes to life again. This is where the old men are given importance. This is where dreams are accepted as a source of knowledge. This is where plans are made real. This is also occasion for bodily performances as well as the school for audienceship. This is where the tribe is very much itself (Racelis 1999).

In contrast, so much in the process of development conspires to silence them. Authentic assistance, it appears to me now will have to touch on the multiplication of space for the blossoming of their local discourse “facilitating in finding their voices, rather than speaking on behalf of them” (Gardner & Lewis 1996, 47-48). To some extent, this ethnography shares in the search for konokkan (strength, energy) by entering into intimate kodpotongkooy with the actors in the field as well as in this text.

This upbeat assessment of collective discourse formation, however, should be tempered by the complexity of local politics. When the Tuddok land claim was gaining momentum, some local managers of the power company called the village officials to a secret meeting on village leadership in ancestral domain claim. As a result, a local leader took some of our documents without permission. Tuddok had to send a formal complaint to the PNOC office in Manila to stop the secret company intervention in the legal process.

4. Towards an Alternative to the Alternative Movement . Tuddok’s assertion of self-determination was put to the test when it expanded in numbers as well as in activities. Their meager finances, reinforced only by my tight research budget, could not cope with their growing needs, even just to provide coffee for meetings which have become more frequent. I broached the idea of opening their movement to some potential supporters. Their initial vehemence to the idea made me feel guilty for introducing the topic. They did not want to have anything to do with NGOs and other funding agencies.

Beting explained this stance in an abridged article sarcastically entitled “Our Simple Story,” which she published ironically in the newsletter of the protest. “We were considered and looked upon as powerless beings. The people in the alternative movements, therefore, saw that we were in need of their liberating development plans, strategies and projects. Ironically, in this move, we were not viewed as partners but plain `beneficiaries.’ …We may want to correct the misrepresentation of our voices but how can we offend our saviors?” (Colmo, cited in Alejo 2000).

These sharp words find kindred spirit in contemporary literature articulating similar sentiments both at home (cf. Tauli-Corpuz 1993) and abroad (cf. Warren 1997, Benda-Beckmann 1997). Upon serious consideration of the actual predicament, however, the group picked up the suggestion of accepting assistance from outsiders, but only under certain conditions. I summarize these conditions here based on Tuddok documents and practice:

First, donors should not give huge amounts of money. Tribal leaders had been corrupted by money. They believed they were not exempt from this weakness.

Second, donors should not visit them in the area unless they are formally invited. The presence of outside donors in the area triggers the suspicion that the leaders of the movement are getting a lot of money.

Third, donors should not give them seminars. The Tuddok leaders insisted that they were yet trying to discover what they know. Seminars generally created the impression that the speakers knew what was best for the group. It would be difficult to reject the teachings of the seminar teachers if they happened to be their aid-givers, too.

Fourth, donors should not invite them to join coalition groups. These big coalitions generally tended to be dominated by strong groups with political or ideological agenda. The whole network then would be forced to agree to big statements which the likes of Tuddok could not maintain or understand.

Fifth, Tuddok did not want to use or be used by media. They wanted to have control of the representations made of them. Since the media had its own priorities, they refused to accept being objects of advocacy using TV or radio broadcast, or even print media. Along this line, Tuddok also harbored deep suspicion against researchers who needed the people only for data-gathering but had no place for them in doing analysis.

They admitted that these were extremely stringent rules. They beg, however, for a genuine trust in their capacity to discern what they could do by themselves with some help from friends.

Fortunately, an enterprising NGO accepted the challenge. A friend of mine, working for a research NGO, came for a visit. Her visit coincided with celebration for the return of the tribal culture through their newly bought agong. When she returned to the city, she recommended to her NGO to consider assisting Tuddok in its continuing cultural movement and research, but under Tuddok’s own terms. Her NGO, the Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM), adjusted its policies and practices to absorb the conditions of the Tuddok movement seriously. In time, Tuddok also appreciated AFRIM’s assistance and formally welcomed it in the community through a simple ritual.

From January 1997 up to the present, AFRIM and Tuddok have been experimenting on this new type of relationship between an extremely sensitive people’s movement and an understanding NGO. The result seems good so far. In November 1997, Tuddok, in the name of Apao, filed its petition for their ancestral domain claim covering some 20,000 hectares of forest and farmlands within the Mt. Apo National Park and including the 701 hectares already occupied by the PNOC. While the PNOC project remains in the area, Tuddok now has achieved, in less than three years, a better bargaining position for the people most directly affected by the project—something the protest intervention never quite achieved in a decade.

5. Fieldwork and The Uneasiness Of Research Practice. The following sequence reveals other aspects of the researcher’s positionality in the field and how learning from the field could be applied to fieldwork itself.

The geothermal company, in its desire to understand the indigenous culture around the project and its future sites, commissioned a multi-disciplinary sociocultural study of ten indigenous cultural communities around Mt. Apo (Gloria 1997). A group of consultants from different universities gathered together, but the contract was signed by the president of the Davao University run by my fellow Jesuits. The research team leader invited me to attend the presentation of the initial result. The venue was the most luxurious island resort in Davao City. I was grateful for being asked to join the privileged group of government policy makers and academic consultants. But I also had to ask whether they invited any one from the ten communities who were the subject of the multimillion-peso study. They did not. I was told that the research result was strictly for those who would make use of it in policy and planning. The consequent plans would be echoed to the communities later.

Beting and Tano did all they could to be given a place during the consultation. They even sent a fax message to the Manila office of the PNOC. Frustrated, they just had to rely on me to tell them about the controversial conclusions and methodology of the commissioned research. The controversy reached the formal and informal forums of the National Association of Anthropologists in the Philippines (UGAT). The ironic twist was that Tuddok leaders also implicated me in the PNOC research because I was associated with the Jesuit university that conducted the research.

Several months later, in October 1996, it was my turn to present a paper about my ongoing fieldwork to the annual conference of UGAT. Learning from the PNOC experience, I requested the conference organizer to allow Bering and Tano to attend the discussion which was focused, propitiously, on Indigenous Peoples: Knowledge, Power and Struggles. At the very opening session, Bering grabbed the microphone, and after introducing herself she said, “I come here to study how you study us.” From then on, almost no discussion was closed without Beting’s views being heard. Bering stayed behind after the conference to visit the northern tribes. That experience and exposure led to future contacts and networking which proved useful to the succeeding steps undertaken by Tuddok (cf. Tauli-Corpuz 1993; Warren 1997).

More than a year after I left the field, I felt a consultation session with Tuddok was in order. In April-May 1998, I went back to the Philippines aiming to meet not only the Tuddok leaders but also those who initially had problems with my stay in Mt. Apo. Contrary to my expectations, my Tuddok partners felt very awkward with my presence. They also had to meet me in Davao City and not in Mt. Apo because the old accusation of a priest being behind their movement reemerged together with the formation of a new faction within the village. The NGO partner, however, was already accepted in the village. It would not be helpful to the movement if the NGO becomes associated with the priest. The group also had serious division within. I came out of the whole exercise with a more pragmatic, but still realistically hopeful view of the ethics and politics of social research on social movements.

Between and Beyond Objectivity and Militancy

In the beginning of this essay, I referred to the researchers in the field as fieldworkers. The “largely ignored,” “overstretched and under-resourced” field worker, Eric Dudley observes, “must juggle the issues and strike pragmatic compromises between policies which tend to come to the field in the form of contradictory messages” (1993, 11). To see the researcher in the field not just as ethnographer but also as de facto “field worker” might help us understand more fully the significance of focusing on fieldwork practice in its own right.

As such, fieldworkers play different roles, including some not often associated With professional practice. They shift positions at the risk of being haunted by “methodological anxieties” in producing knowledge based on “varying intensities and qualities” (Marcus 1995, 100; cf. Clifford 1997, 219n3; Gupta & Ferguson 1997, 37).

So it is not a matter of choosing between being objective or being militant. To say that we should as much as possible eschew conflictive situations is untenable. This leaves anthropology superficial, not able to confront the basic human predicament that includes hunger, suffering as well as struggle and hope (Hastrup 1993; Kleinman 1997; Gledhill 1994, 217). On the other hand, “too much engagement could be problematic as too little” (Gledhill 1994, 221).

As already noted, it could be time-consuming and emotionally draining such that as Hobart wisely notes, “students who forgot their disciplinary background for a moment and actually got on with the people studied often have terrible trouble textualizing what happened” (1996, 22).

I hasten to iterate some clarificatory points. First, it is important not to reduce this line of action purely as a work of advocacy. One temptation is to steal the show from the movement actors (cf. Gledhill 1994, 219). Another temptation is to be fixated with addressing only the outsiders when conveying the result of the research. “What these approaches fail to explore”, Burdick laments “is the extent to which certain kinds of claims to ethnographic knowledge may be able to help refine debates and self-critiques within social movements” (Burdick 1995, 363). Even reflexivity could be fruitfully shared between the researcher and the researched (Rudie 1993). Fieldwork should have some internal, both critical and creative, function to the host community.

Secondly, this thrust should not be associated necessarily with political or ethical militantism. Marcus calls it circumstantial activism (1995). But Bruce Albert (1997) supplies a more experiential clarification. In the process of studying the people’s struggle for ethnogenesis and access to resources, the researchers also get recruited to serve in various other activities like mediation, documentation, action-oriented research, and didactic ethnography. In this context, the anthropologist’s “observation” is no longer merely “participant”; his social participation has become both the condition and the framework of his field research. (Albert 1997, 57-58). That is how they could go on doing their research especially within a community that has grown more sensitive to the politics and ethics of being researched.

Both Burdick and Albert are careful enough not to totally conflate the project of the researcher and that of people they study. Burdick stresses the critical function of the fieldworker within the movement. He also includes in the practice the “relativization of the ethnographers’ voice” (Burdick 1995, 374). Albert advocates a kind of “critical solidarity” that does not limit professional practice to “a mere reproduction” of the host’s “ethnic discourse” (Albert 1997, 58-59). Overlapping of projects does not mean a total congruence of concerns and interests.

What most of these discussions miss, I believe, is the glaring reality that the personality of the researcher matters a lot during fieldwork. I do not mean to talk about gender or class or geopolitical origin, hybridity of identity, threshold for trauma, sexual orientation, technical skills, wealth, and political or religious affiliation per se. While they may all be potential sources of tension, creativity, and involvement, it remains to be discovered and negotiated which of these aspects of the fieldworker’s subjectivity would be contextually  relevant within a particular research situation.

I was supposed to be going smoothly in my fieldwork because I was “at home” in my country. But I was not allowed to reside in that Protestant tribal village partly because of my being a Catholic priest. “Wherever there is a priest, there is conflict,” many would say. The fact that I was also a Christian or that I was born in the same island did not matter in that particular milieu. My positionality as a priest, however, provided my “host family” with external contacts which facilitated the hospitalization of a young tribal artist who, in turn, inspired the depressed leaders of the new social movement by the way he produced painting, poetry, and pottery despite his sickness.

This sensitivity to the ground level complexity of the fieldwork identity of the researcher challenges the traditional notion of professional anthropological practice. In the field, professional anthropologists cannot and are not only professional anthropologists. Robert Paine realizes its importance to the discipline. “It surely matters personally to most of us what ‘they’ think of us (and that likely influences our research and it’s `objectivity’)” (Paine 1998, 134).

Once in a while, too, anthropologists are called to respond to life situations according to their temper and even passion. This is not bad news to the discipline. Being human in the field should not be considered as a hazard to the study of fellow human beings. In fact anthropology-should include in its ragbag repertoire even the human failings of the researcher. Rosaldo argues, quite passionately, that “human feelings and human failings provide as much insight for social analysis as subjecting oneself to the ‘manly’ ordeals of self-discipline that constitute science as a vocation…Why not use a wider spectrum of less heroic, but equally insightful, analytical positions?” (1989, 173).

My title “What are we in fieldwork for?” alludes to a common idiom “What are we in power for?” I assume here that doing fieldwork is, to some extent, an exercise of power. The ethnographer qua ethnographer is not a powerful political actor. But it remains true that in some cases, in the field, prior to the packaging of the research result, the fieldworker might have some power—if only the capacity to do harm. It remains equally true, however, that we can take the opportunity of fieldwork to give due recognition of each other as persons, that is, as non-unitary and complex beings, who are each grappling with very different life circumstances’ and dislocations (Hobart 1996, 32). Hobart, however, should expand the notion of recognition to include the actual practices of fieldwork which he tends to lump into the penal gerund “disciplining”. But “seeing, listening, recording,” as Scheper-Hughes (1992) asserts, “can be, if done with care and sensitivity, acts of fraternity and sisterhood, acts of solidarity. Above all, they are the work of recognition. Not to look, not to touch, not to record, can be the hostile act of indifference”.

To this struggle for mutuality and solidarity, anthropology itself as a discipline is called upon to participate and its practice changed. As Dell Hymes appealed a couple of decades ago, “anthropology must lose itself to find itself, must become as fully as possible a possession of the people of the world” for otherwise, “our work will drift backward into the service of domination” (Hymes 1974, 54).

This witnessing is not without critical function. But its practice of criticism is not so much to denounce but to announce the emergence of what Foucault calls new signs of existence. Far from the narrowly conceived deconstructive criticism that he had been associated with, Foucault’s dream is for the generation of life:

I can’t help but dream about a kind of criticism that would not try to judge, but bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply, not judgments, but signs of existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. (Foucault 1988, 326)

In the same vein, I can’t help but wish—perhaps dreamt also by Medha Patkar, Virgilio Enriquez, Alting von Geusau, and my Tuddok friends—a kind of fieldwork practice that would not try to manipulate people just to prove, improve, disprove or develop a theory or fill a gap in academic narratives; one that would not aim simply at constructing or deconstructing a discourse; one that does not reserve flexibility and reflexivity only for future textualization of experience; one that would not be tightly trapped within the demands of mutual disciplining and self-disciplining of researcher and researched, but would co-create new spaces from which new practices of freedom could emerge. I dream of a fieldwork practice that, though not without opportunistic pretensions, recognizes persons and generates energies. This obviously would involve an “ethics of thought,” as well as action, that is accompanied by “a trembling that is contained only with difficulty.”

Cyberspace as a Political Public Sphere

People aspire for the opportunity to participate in the political processes promised by a democratic government. In the context of nation-states, however, this mass appeal of democracy makes the very practice of democracy problematic. The citizens are too numerous to be present in the public spaces where political deliberation and decision-making take place. They can only be represented, therefore, by a few that the public spaces can accommodate. Representation, then, simply means the exclusion of the large majority from active participation in the processes o f governance.

Research on democratic theory partly includes research on spaces for active political participation other than the parliamentary halls. Technological advances have offered partial solutions to the problem. In his work, the German philosopher Juergen Habermas (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Translated by Thomas McCarthy [Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1982]) explores the contributions of the mass media in expanding spaces for participation. While print and broadcast media have allowed for the massive spread of information, they do not provide opportunities for interaction. They have only promoted a form of governance in which the citizens are mere clients and consumers of political products prepared by press relations officers of the administration.

A very promising area of democratic theory research is that which is opened by the Internet revolution. The Internet revolution has presented itself not only as a technological revolution but, more importantly, as a social revolution. It has generated structures that have important implications on social relations.

For this paper, I will reflect on the virtual reality of cyberspace as a communication medium and a locus of communicative relations, in relation to the social philosophy of Juergen Habermas. I will explore the promising aspects of cyberspace as a public space for active, democratic political participation. The question is: Can cyberspace be a political public sphere in the Habermasian sense? First, I will present cyberspace and its communicative structure. Second, I will present Juergen Habermas’s understanding of the liberal public sphere and the principles operative in it. Finally, I will show how cyberspatial conditions approximate the liberal public sphere, thereby revealing the political importance of cyberspace as an area for discourse.

Cyberspace

Cyberspace refers to that virtual space created by computer systems networked to each other, like the Internet. It was a term first coined by William Gibson in his science fiction novel, Neuromancer. In cyberspace, events occur and have relative position and direction, but not in the three-dimensional manner of events in real space (Bryan Pfaffenberger and David Wall, One’s Computer and Internet Dictionary, 6th Edition, 126). Here, spatial boundaries break down.

Cyberspace owes its being to the United States military through their Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). They wanted to “increase their command and control capability by enabling communication across a variety of physically dissimilar media, including satellites.” They also wanted “to create a robust network capable of withstanding outages, such as those that might result from a nuclear exchange.” In the event of a nuclear strike, they planned a scenario wherein the heads of the different branches of government are housed in different bunkers, but are in constant and secured communication with each other. This scenario allows the government to remain in control despite a nuclear war (Pfaffenberger and Wall, 30).

The network’s success as a communication medium prompted the expansion of linkages beyond the military and its partner agencies and universities. The network was capable of such an expansion because “its technology allows virtually any system to link to it via an electronic gateway” (Pfaffenberger and Wall, 269). Thus, today, almost every country is wired to the Internet. Millions of government, corporate, educational, organizational, and personal computers and computer networks are linked together into what has been called the “community of networks.”

Cyberspace, as a locus created by a network of computer networks, is primarily a medium for communication. Persons communicate through computers linked with each other by means of technology designed for audio, video and data communications. A computer installed with a network card or a modem can hook up through telephone to an Internet

Service Provider (ISP). These ISPs connect their computer network to other computer networks through telephone cables or satellite. Complementing these hardwares are communications softwares that allow a variety of forms of communication. The oldest forms of communication in the Internet are the electronic mail (e-mail) and the bulletin board system (BBS). The e-mail is the fast version of the postal mail, pejoratively called snail mail. Linked by high-speed data connections that cross national boundaries, e-mail lets you compose messages and transmit them in a matter of seconds to one or more recipients in your office, to another office in another city, or to a friend in another country.

The BBS is an electronic version Of the bulletin board. You can dial a BBS, post messages, upload and download public domain software, or play electronic games. Within the BBS, the newsgroup developed. This is a misnomer for seldom is there news here; discussion group is a more accurate name, but newsgroup has already taken root and is more commonly used. The newsgroup is a discussion group that is devoted to a single topic. Users post messages to the group, and those reading the discussion send reply messages to the author individually or post replies that can be read by everyone in the group. Both e-mail and BBS are interactive, but not real-time, communication utilities.

The Internet also offers interactive, real-time communications called “chat.” There are four types of chat forums available: the Multi-User Dungeon, Object-Oriented (MOO); the Internet Relay Chat (IRC); the Web (Java) Chat; and the ICQ (“I Seek You”). Chatting usually happens in a forum or conference where two or more callers, on-line at the same time, engage in conversation with each other by taking turns typing. The chat forum is capable of private and/or public exchange in real-time. In public channels, all chatters see in their monitors everything exchanged. Private conversation is also possible; technically, it is called “macking.”

All these communications taking place in cyberspace happen largely in the same way as face-to-face or telephone conversation. Unique cyberspatial conditions, however, have introduced new social organizations that traditional forms of communication can never produce. Intelligent, automated communication devices developed more recently have allowed the formation of virtual communities that transcend national, geographic and temporal boundaries.

Juergen Habermas’s analysis of the liberal public sphere will help us in understanding this novel phenomenon. The Habermasian theory will provide us with the criteria for presenting the necessary elements of cyberspace as a political space, as well as the clues for articulating its political implications.

The Liberal Public Sphere

Juergen Habermas’s political intention of furthering “the project of the Enlightenment” demanded a shift from a subject-centered “philosophy of consciousness” toward an intersubjective “paradigm of understanding” (Stephen K. White, Reason, Justice and Modernly: The Recent Work of Juergen Habermas. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1980, 27). According to White (1980, 4), “[t]his paradigm focused on the structures of intersubjectivity which are implicit in the understanding achieved in ongoing linguistic interaction, or ‘communicative action’ as Habermas calls it”. Among Habermas’s earliest attempts on this paradigm-shift involved the reconstruction of a public sphere in which critical-rational discourse takes place. As Thomas McCarthy points out, the importance of this reconstruction lies in the idea central to democratic theory, which this sphere claims to embody: “that of rationalizing public authority under the institutionalized influence of informed discussion and reasoned agreement” (Habermas, xii).

A Public of Private People

The public sphere generally refers to a space where people gather together to achieve an aim that affects all, that is, the public. Habermas points out that civilized history is replete with public spheres. The pop’s of Ancient Greece was a public sphere. The masters gathered together to leave behind the privacy of their households and appeared before their equals to compete or act in common. In the Medieval Ages, the royal courts served as the public sphere. Monarchs and nobles represented their resplendent authority before the people, dispensing their regulations to loyal subjects. In the era of modern liberal societies, the educated, private people gather together in salons, “table-societies,” or townhalls. These modern public spheres are venues for announcing what they think of issues in literature and politics. The public sphere, therefore, is a locus where what is hidden from others appears; where what is absent presences; where what belongs to the individual becomes common. The public sphere, in other words, is that place characterized by publicity, by pronouncements to the public.

Habermas distinguishes the modem liberal public sphere from the classical public spheres of ancient Greek democracies and Medieval monarchies. The classical public spheres were composed of public authorities: masters of households, and monarchs and nobles. They were all public persons vested with the authority to run the state. The liberal public sphere, by contrast, is composed of “private people come together as a public” (Habermas, 27). These are ordinary individuals without public authority who, nevertheless, gather for a public purpose. Habermas traces the beginnings of the liberal public sphere to the rise of the bourgeois class.

The bourgeois class was made up of the educated, such as the doctors, pastors, officers, professors, schoolteachers, and scribes, and property-owning peoples, such as the “capitalists,” merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs, and manufacturers. They performed important social functions, but had no power to rule. They were, in other words, the civilians. Thus, Habermas also calls the liberal public sphere as the “public sphere of civil society.”

This franchise would later on be expanded. The bourgeois class would be joined by the working class, the black subcultures, and the feminists, to broaden this “public of private persons.” This expansion is not surprising. Habermas understands that this public sphere stands or falls on the principle of universal access. “A public sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded was less than merely incomplete, it was not a public sphere at all” (Habermas, 85). Publicity, therefore, also means universality. No individual or group can be excluded from participation in this sphere on the basis of economic status, race, gender, or any other basis for subgrouping.

Moreover, the liberal public sphere, as a gathering of private people completely disregarded status in their dealings with each other. They did not relate with each other as equals in rank; instead, they related with each other based on tact. This means that status and rank are not determining factors within the public sphere at all.

The Political Function of the Liberal Public Sphere

According to Habermas, the Greek model of the public sphere drew the citizenry together to act in common, performing such properly political tasks as administration of law and military survival. The medieval model drew the subjects together only to receive regulations from their rulers. In both models, the public sphere belonged to the sphere of public authority, performing state-related tasks. These public spheres functioned primarily for the regulation of the res publica. The liberal public sphere breaks away altogether from the sphere of public authority and into the private sphere, and turning into the “ruling authorities’ adversary”.

Habermas explains this shift by reminding us of the primarily private foundation of the triumphant commercial and financial capitalist enterprises in the sphere of civil society. The sphere of civil society is characterized by private initiative and laissez-faire operation that leaves everything to market laws. State authorities, however, still maintain mercantilist policies in dealings with private businesses. Habermas argues that mercantilism never favored state enterprises. While the state encourages private initiative to establish commercial and financial enterprises, the same state steps in to regulate these enterprises. The state, therefore, ambivalently promotes “the establishment and dissolution of private businesses run in a capitalist manner” (Habermas, 24). This ambivalence has led to a problematic relation not only between the state and the capitalists, but also between the state and the consumers, who are affected by these public regulations as well.

The state’s unwanted interference in the self-regulating system of free-market competition is seen as arbitrary and unpredictable. It precludes the rational calculation of profits that is to the interest of private persons functioning in a capitalist fashion (Habermas, 80). This state interference, therefore, has provoked civil society to become critical of public authority in private matters. Moreover, this public meddling also has transformed civil society’s reproduction of life through commodity exchange and social labor from the domain of private domestic authority into a subject of public interest (Habermas, 24). This has led to civil society’s critical reflection on and expounding of its interests. The liberal public sphere has attained its political function.

The private people gather together as a public to confront public authority on the issue of the regulation of civil society. They are out to claim “the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves” (Habermas, 27). This does not mean, however, that they are out to wrest control of the state itself and rule in its stead. What they aim at, rather, is the protection of the private sphere and its interests from state interference. They intend to engage public authority in “a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor” (Habermas, 27). Thomas McCarthy expresses it as the attempt to replace “a public sphere in which the ruler’s power was merely represented before the people with a sphere in which the state authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people” (Habermas, xi). In other words, the liberal public sphere aims to make public authority accountable for its legislation. This is a demand to rationalize domination.

The rationalization of domination can only be achieved in two ways. The first is through the “full publicity of parliamentary deliberations” (Habermas, 63). This means that public authority must keep the public informed of all bases of political decisions. The press and the public hearings conducted by public authorities serve as institutional bases for this publicity. This requirement of publicity accomplishes the demand for rationalization, since it prompts public authority to propose legislation that can be rationally justified, and veer away from those that are purely whimsical. The publication of parliamentary deliberations leads to the inclusion of the public’s opinion in legislative matters.

The second way in which the rationalization of domination can be achieved is by submitting the political issues to the forum of the public of private people gathered together in a critical-rational debate. What may be an arbitrary decree of public authority becomes a rationally concluded, universal law when passed through the “public competition of private arguments” that aims at consensus or public opinion (Habermas, 83). In this sphere, power as the exercise of political will is transformed into the implementation of rational agreement. What makes this transformation possible is the public sphere’s use of communicative reason as a medium of political confrontation. The guiding principle of this medium is not feasibility, but universal agreement based on the unforced force of the better argument. Within this sphere, therefore, publicity is also operative. In other words, each one is allowed to express his views, his interests, his needs, his opinions and arrive at a position transcending private interests and expressing the public stand.

This rationalization of domination, according to Habermas, can only lead to the dissolution of domination altogether. As Habermas (82) says, “the binding of all state activity to a system of norms legitimated by public opinion already aimed at abolishing the state as an instrument of domination altogether”. In other words, in making public opinion the final forum for all political deliberations and decisions, public authority loses its power to dominate. But at the same time, the public sphere of private people renounces this power to rule. They are only interested in maintaining a domain free from coercion. Anyway, Habermas points out, sovereignty also cannot be attributed to public opinion at all.

Cyberspace As A Political Public Sphere

Like the liberal public sphere, cyberspace is a locus of human communicative relationships mediated by a network of computers. As such, cyberspace gathers people together and allows them to be present to each other. While there is interactivity, however, they are not present to each other in bodily form. Instead, their presence is simply as computer bits on a screen, usually in textual form. Their identities are indicated merely by Internet Protocol addresses. The usual bodily indicators of presence are not there. Nevertheless, it offers the advantage of being a broader sphere of interaction. There are no spatial boundaries that limit the number of participants in the public sphere. One of the major problems faced by the liberal public sphere when the franchise was expanded to accommodate everyone was “how to fit everyone inside the town halls.” The public spheres that were physical spaces have to address problems of communication and interaction when the public just became too large to fit inside the spaces. If everyone is to be informed, interactivity has to be sacrificed; if interactivity is to be maintained, the public has to be kept small, resulting in the marginalization of the rest. The broadcast media like the newspapers, the television and the radio solve the problem of information, but have to give up interactivity among the members of the public sphere. Habermas tells us that this compromise has resulted in reducing the public into mere consumers of information. Cyberspace as a broadcasting but interactive communicative structure addresses both problems of a large public sphere simultaneously. Newsgroups and chat forums have been structured by programmers for such a purpose.

Cyberspace, like the liberal public sphere, is also truly public in the sense that it is universally accessible. The liberal public sphere sets minimum requirements of communicative competence; cyberspace also sets minimum requirements of online communicative competence. Online communication competence refers to the ability of a person to hook into the Internet because of his having access to a computer with a modem, a telephone line, and an Internet Service Provider. Notice that I said “access to a computer” and not “have a computer.” This distinction is important because public Internet terminals are being established everywhere. For a surfing fee that is gradually becoming cheaper, anybody with a little cash to spare can now go online. Internet access is not anymore simply for the affluent; though it cannot be denied that they still have better access because of their affluence. Many libraries now have public terminals for their students. In the United States, the Clinton administration has embarked on a free public Internet terminal project for the least privileged members of American society. Most nations in the world are also already hooked up into the Internet. Access to cyberspace is not a First World privilege anymore. Log anytime and you can see people from even the poorest nations logged in also.

The chat software, servers and communication channels are all public domain—that is, free and easily accessible. The softwares have become user-friendly, especially the Windows-based ones. Minimum orientation is required to open the softwares and log into public channels. One Internet Relay Chat (IRC) guidebook boasts that all you need to graduate from “newbie”—jargon for a novice chatter—to professional chatter is familiarity with five basic commands. For those who need more, every chat software comes with an online help file; and there is always somebody online willing to help or boastful enough of his knowledge to tell you what to do.

Registration to these that servers is also free and usually protective of personal information. While some types of chat rooms ask for personal information as part of registration, there are guarantees of privacy; putting in fictional information is also common practice. Most chat rooms, though, just don’t bother you with personal information for admission into the channels. All you need to do is click on a server you would like to join, specify a nickname for yourself, and you’re in.

Since the participants enter the channels disembodied and usually anonymous, usual social barriers cannot operate online. Any distinguishing mark of the person and his personality—obvious in face-to-face communication—are absent online. A new chatter can, therefore, easily enter any communication channel without telling who he is in real life. His characteristics and personality only become known when he informs others about them. Everyone, therefore, with the minimum requirements–that is, competence–to communicate online is allowed to participate in almost any chat ongoing in the tens and thousands of public channels in cyberspace. Or you can start your own conversation channel.

I said “almost any chat ongoing,” because not all chat rooms are really publicly accessible. There are chat rooms designed by their operators to be private, that is, by invitation only. If you know the nick of the operator, though, you can ask to be invited. But these private chat rooms are more the exception rather than the norm in cyberspace. The norm is still that communication channels are universally accessible.

Cyberspace is also like the liberal public sphere because it remains within the private domain. It has been described as a decentralized communication system. Even though it started as a military-government project, cyberspace evolved into a network that is completely beyond government control. Anyone with access to a computer with a modem and a telephone line can apply for connection with an Internet Service Provider without having to ask for a government permit. Once online, what you do is primarily your own responsibility.

On the downside, this has led to the proliferation of the every kind of abuse imaginable without hope of control. Monitoring of all interactions occurring in cyberspace is impossible, even for the most powerful monitoring agencies like the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA). On the upside, cyberspace has become a venue for the most creative projects and interactions today. This lack of limitation and coercion has opened the floodgates of the imagination.

However, cyberspace cannot be said to have assumed a truly significant political function, as the liberal public sphere has. Conversation topics in the Internet vary widely. Most of these are private interests that people think deserve public recognition and discussion. Many of these never acquire their desired publicity though. If one surfs in cyberspace, one will find websites that seldom get visited because the public is not interested in what they offer, or chat channels whose operators are never successful in attracting chatters to come and stay. Conversation topics range from the banal to the profound, from the profane to the sacred. There are channels for teens as well as for the golden aged. There are channels for philosophy, for politics, as well as for a particular nation or religion. These serious channels already have their mainstays, but they remain few in number; very few compared to romance channels that are bursting with chatters. It is in these serious channels that critical-rational discussion in the manner of the liberal public sphere is taking place.

On 23 May 2000, at about 9 o’clock in the evening, I accessed the politics channel of chat server Undernet and stayed there for a few minutes. Two discussions were underway. The first was about the issue of racism. The contenders were white Americans and Latinos. There was the usual labeling, but there was also serious discussion on the implications of sending Latinos out of the United States. The second discussion centered on the basis and implications of the possible Bill Clinton disbarment. One interesting question was whether Clinton, as president, could pardon himself. Ideas were flying around when I left. This experience reveals the presence of serious critical-rational discussion taking place in cyberspace, but does not yet reveal the political influence that such a discussion may have. Three real cases, however, may reveal that potential.

Also early in 2000, the United States organized an online “town hall meeting.” Harking back to the town hall meetings of Revolutionary America, the White House allowed an online, real-time chat with Bill Clinton. A website functioned as a virtual town hall, with Clinton visibly and audibly interacting with chatters who logged in from around the world. Much of the discussion focused on political programs.

A few years back also, Bill Clinton also published an email address that American citizens could use to get to him directly with their opinions. The emails allowed people to tell the President directly what they thought and what they wanted done.

Here in the Philippines, cyberspace was also a very important communication medium in organizing the Anti-Charter Change movement against the Ramos administration. While rallies, demonstrations and press releases were being done nationwide, a website and mailing list were also created. The email list included the email addresses of people who were major rallying points during the event, people who were in the position to observe events, analyze their impact, or mobilize people. The e-mail list became one quick communication utility for circulating on a national scale information and analyses about the event. The significant e-mails were then posted on the website for wider circulation.

Currently, there is the Philippine Forum mailing list, called phforum. Its members belong to the under-age-50 leaders from the different sectors of the Philippine nation. The discussions in this mailing list are usually related to policies of the Philippine government. The current discussions in this mailing list are focused on the Mindanao problem.

Here in Mindanao, I know of two politically inclined mailing lists. The older list, founded on 23 November 1998, is a web-based group that posts and discusses issues related to the improvement of domestic and international air linkages in Mindanao. Began during the height of the PAL crisis, the “airlinkages” mailing list includes top business, government, NGO, and academic people in Mindanao.

The newer list is the mindanao1081 . It is composed of significant Mindanao personalities from the business sector, the government sector, the media, the academe, and the NGO. The discussions within this members-only email list focuses on political issues affecting Mindanao. It serves as a reminder of the danger of Martial Law when people keep their silence. The significant mails are published on their website.

These experiences successfully reveal the potentials of cyberspace for political discourse and action, even here in the Philippines. With the principles of universal access and equal participation operative in this arena, critical-rational discourse governed only by the unforced force of the better argument is now a reality for all who are communicatively competent.