Tag Archives: North Cotabato
Reproductive Health Concerns among the Internally Displaced Persons in Pikit, North Cotabato
Introduction
In Asia and the Middle East, the most prevailing issue for many decades has been the internal displacements of populations due to armed conflicts and wars. The plight of the hapless victims of displacements is deplorable. In the Philippines, mainly in the southern Mindanao regions, internal displacements due to acts of violence and armed conflicts between the military forces and Moro’ Front groups have been the most predominant.
In times of local armed conflicts and the ensuing internal displacements, women and children account for the biggest casualties and are the most vulnerable to risks of health, social dislocation, and loss of property or even life. Accounts of women and children affected by armed conflicts and war indicate that they suffer mainly due to displacement and its consequence of poor access to food, safe drinking water, privacy, reproductive health (RH) care, and psychological support (NSO, 2002).
Fr. Eliseo Mercado, OMI (in NDURC, 2004) contends that internal displacement is one of the five urgent issues confronting Mindanao. In Central Mindanao, in particular, the armed conflict between the Philippine military and the Moro Fronts since the early 1960s has caused displacements in many communities. The affected families usually live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) for extended periods away from their homes and sources of livelihood. Separated from kin and community support systems, they are rendered most vulnerable to health risks and hazards.
Every time war erupts and civilians have to evacuate, media reports document the number of people affected, cost of damaged property and infrastructures, and figures for morbidity and mortality. There are scarce data, however, on the quality of life and the difficulties encountered by the victims of conflict, particularly on their health issues.
This study examines the reproductive health concerns of women who had experienced life in Pikit evacuation centers in 2000 and 2003. It also explores how they coped with reproductive health concerns in order to hopefully provide information for policy makers and other stakeholders on the impact of war and displacements on the lives of women caught in conflict situations.
The Research Sites
This study was undertaken in the municipality of Pikit in the province of North Cotabato, Central Mindanao.
Central Mindanao or Region XII has a population of 3,222,169 (NSO, 2000, cited in NDURC, 2001). Created in 1996 through Executive Order No. 36, the region has a total land area of 20,566.26 square kilometers covering the provinces of North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, and South Cotabato and the cities of Cotabato, Kidapawan, Koronadal, General Santos, and Tacurong. The Lumad,’ such as the Tbolis, Blaans, Kalagans, Terurays, Manobos, Iranons, Ubos, and Tagakaolos inhabit the mountainous and hilly parts of the region. The Moro, such as the Maguindanaons, Maranaos, and Iranuns share space in the municipalities along with the settler Christians, mostly composed of Ilonggos, Cebuanos, and Ilocanos.
North Cotabato, with its 6,657 square kilometers, sits on about forty-five percent of the land area in Central Mindanao. Its seventeen towns host 544 barangays within which reside 658,643 Ilonggos, Cebuanos, Ilocanos, Maguindanaons, and Manobos (Cotabato Province Annual Report, 2003). The province is bounded on the north by the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon, on the east by Davao City, on the south by Davao del Sur Province, on the west by Maguindanao Province, and on the southwest by Sultan Kudarat Province.
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The highly conflicted town of Pikit in North Cotabato has a total land area of 604.61 square kilometers. Within its jurisdiction are forty-two barangays, in which reside Maguindanaons (69 percent), Cebuanos (18 percent), and Ilocanos (9 percent). Pikit is bounded on the north by Aleosan, on the east by Pagalungan, on the south by Sultan sa Barongis, and on the west by Midsayap. Datu Piang lies on the southwest.
Since the late 1990s, Pikit has been the site of armed struggles between government forces and the Moro liberation groups. Among the communities most adversely affected by firefights are the largely agricultural barangays of Takepan, Inug-ug, and Rajahmuda, which are the study sites.
Barangay Takepan
Situated on the south-central part of Pikit, Barangay Takepan has seven sitios inhabited by 457 households with a total population of 2,749. Predominantly Christian in composition, Takepan has two sitios with a Christian—Muslim mix and one that is mainly Maguindanaon. About seven kilometers away from the Pikit poblacion. Takepan has been tagged a “Space for Peace,” along with six other barangays (Canuday, 2004).
Barangay Inug-ug
Located along the National Highway, Barangay Inug-ug has three sitios and 200 households. About sixty percent of these households are Maguindanaon. This barangay suffered losses during the conflict episodes in 1997, 2000, and 2003, with a number of houses damaged or destroyed.
Barangay Rajahmuda
Barangay Rajahmuda is an all-Maguindanaon community about five kilometers from the National Highway. The barangay is bounded by the Pulangi River and the municipality of Pagalungan on the east. In 2000 and 2003, armed conflict forced all families in its five sitios to evacuate to the poblacion of Pikit. More than fifty families opted not to return to Rajahmuda after the 2003 conflict. As of 2005, Rajahmuda was home to around 528 families.
Data Sources
In-depth interviews were conducted to surface women IDPs’ experiences in conflict situations, the living conditions they found in evacuation centers, and the coping strategies they applied. Key informant interviews of barangay leaders, local health workers, school officials, and representatives of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs) provide data on institutional responses to the needs of women in conflict situations, as well as the provision of support mechanisms for IDPs.
Information on armed conflicts and displacements and on health and related issues were also retrieved from reports of the municipal offices of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Health (DOH), and the Mayor’s Office, among others.
The Context of the Armed Conflicts in Central Mindanao
Despite the signing of the Peace Accord between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996, trouble still hounds Central Mindanao and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), where for over thirty years now different Islamized ethnic groups struggle for either autonomy or independence.
The Moro struggle of independence was initiated with the organization of the Muslim Independent Movement (later known as the Mindanao Independence Movement or MIM) by Cotabato Governor Udtog Matalam in 1968. At this time, some members of the MIM were undergoing guerrilla training in Sabah. Sometime in 1972, the year when Martial Law was declared by President Ferdinand Marcos, the Muslim movement took an armed revolutionary approach to the struggle.
The movement for secession was a response to the Jabidah massacre, land grabbing, and the Moro disappointment with the government’s inadequacy in dealing with the socioeconomic problems of the Muslim communities. Although the Islam religion was the common bond for membership in the Moro Front movement, its members Came from varied backgrounds. There were members who may have been disgruntled politicians who saw involvement in the movement as a means to forward their own political ambitions. There were also displaced farmers, victims of military abuse or police brutality, religious leaders who would like to construct an Islamic theoretic state, idealistic intellectuals and students moved by a sense of social duty, adventurous young men who would like to test their fighting prowess, and still others who joined because they had friends and relatives in the movement.
The demand for an independent Bangsa Moro Republic by the MNLF included Mindanao, Sulu archipelago, and Palawan. However, the Tripoli Agreement that was signed in 1976 defined the regional autonomy only for thirteen provinces and nine cities. In these areas, the Muslims comprise about twenty percent of the population.
In 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), under Hashim Salamat, was formed. The front reasserted for a separatist movement in Mindanao parallel to the autonomy movement being pursued by the MNLF.
With the approval of Republic Act (RA) 6734 or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 1989 by President Corazon Aquino, a plebiscite was conducted to identify the provinces that wanted to be part of the ARMM. The results of the plebiscite identified only five out of the thirteen provinces: Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Sulu, Lanao del Sur, and Maguindanao. Despite the signing of the Organic Act of 1989, fighting and armed encounters between the military and the Moro Fronts continued in Central Mindanao and in the ARMM.
In September 1996, the Peace Accord was signed between the Government of the Republic of tile Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF, defining the implementation of two phases of action (Aguirre, 1999). The first action was the proclamation of a Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the establishment of the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development .(SPCPD), and the creation of a Consultative Assembly (CA). They were formed to serve as transitory mechanisms to coordinate peace and development efforts in the SZOPAD within a three-year period. One of the additional stipulations in the Accord provided for the integration of MNLF elements into the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The second action was. the establishment of a new era of autonomy, which required the Congress to amend or repeal RA 6734 at the end of the three-year transition period. The government permitted the holding of a plebiscite in 1999 to determine the prospects for expanded autonomy for Muslim Mindanao.
In 1996, there was- yet optimism that the military activities of the Islamic groups would end. The MILF, however, asserted its own representation in the: Mindanao crisis. It engaged in armed conflict with the governnwnt to assert its identity as separate from the MNLF. Eventually, in 1997, it signed an agreement with the government on the general cessation of hostilities. However, this was to be repeatedly violated.
In the meantime, the goverment outlined a four-point program for national security to address the Mindanao crisis: a) to restore or maintain peace; b) to promote socio-economic development; c) to pursue peace talks with the MILF; and d) to fully implement the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. To date, achieving this peace agenda is still gaining ground.
In 2000, the hope for peace considerably diminished. The Estrada government initiated an all-out military offensive in March 2000. Renewed clashes between the military and the MILF prompted massive displacements once again. Military offensives waged in Central Mindanao areas aimed to dismantle the various MILF camps. Camp Abubakar in Matanog, Maguindanao, the largest camp of the MILF, was a prime target. Fighting ensued and spilled over to many other areas in North Cotabato, Lanao del Sur, South Cotabato, and the cities of Cotabato and General Santos. In Central Mindanao alone, thousands of people fled their homes, and evacuation centers were set up. Even today, there are still families that remain displaced because of this war.
The 2004 report on the social assessment of conflict-affected areas in Mindanao (NDURC, 2004) noted that the Moro land issue is a conflict that can be understood in part by attributing it to opposing systems of land use practiced by the indigenous Moro groups and the non-Moro migrant settlers who have come to occupy territories traditionally owned or controlled by the Moros. The tensions over the land rights are both a cause and an outcome of conflict.
Varied reasons are raised as contributing to the cause of the Mindanao conflict. Among them are the resentment from minority deprivations, economic and social marginalization, local and foreign political crisis, and government inefficiency. The Mindanao conflict is also attributed by some quarters to the general underdevelopment of the region, an unequal redistribution of wealth, and limited efforts by the government to integrate the Muslim population in Mindanao into the political and institutional fabric of the country. And while it may appear that religion is an element in the conflict, it is not and has never been among the contentious issues under negotiation. Some analysts observe that the rich reserves of untapped natural resources and raw materials of Mindanao, particularly in the Moro area, may also be a strong incentive for the government to fight the Muslim secessionist movements since the 1970s (NDURC, 2004).
The Armed Conflict Experiences of the Pikit IDPs
The 2000 All-Out War saw major military offensives launched to take the various MILF camps in Central Mindanao and the Lanao provinces. Most targeted was the heavily fortified Camp Abubakar, the main MILF camp that stretched across the Maguindanao towns of Buldon, Barira, and Matanog. All over Central Mindanao, the military offensives caused massive displacement.
Pikit was one of the most affected municipalities in 2000 because the Buliok complex, a major MILF camp, is located at the border of Pikit and Pagalungan, Maguindanao. About 45,205 persons from the twenty-three Pikit barangays fled their homes; 16,245 persons were distributed in twenty-nine evacuation centers while 28,960 persons opted to live with their relatives in the poblacion of Pikit and other neighboring barangays.
Buliok was finally captured in February 2003, after the military offensives had affected twenty barangays in Pikit. Around 6,460 families with 38,760 persons were displaced. About 2,594 families with 15,564 persons stayed at the evacuation centers in Pikit while 3,866 (23,196 persons) stayed with their relatives somewhere else. Sixteen evacuation sites were put up in Pikit during this period.
The evacuation centers used by the local government to temporarily house the IDPs were the agricultural warehouses, day care centers, schools, a chapel, a gymnasium, and makeshift tents. At these evacuation centers, the displaced families had to endure the congested sleeping quarters, lack of privacy, and scarcity of food and potable water. The families endured severe heat during the day and cold during the night. Deprived of their livelihood source, they depended heavily on the relief
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assistance extended by government and various NGOs, which began to dwindle a few weeks after the height of the conflict.
Among the barangays affected by the 2000 and 2003 conflict episodes were Takepan, Inug-ug, and Rajahmuda. Both times, these barangays were used as the exit points of both the military and the MILF armed groups.
In May 2000, Muslim residents from barangays Saranay/Gantong, Brotherhood I, and Brotherhood II in Barangay Takepan evacuated to Batulawan for at least three months, while their Christian neighbors stayed for a month in the Pikit Parish Gymnasium and Pikit Pilot Elementary School. The offensives spilled over to Inug-ug, prompting people to move out, especially when an intense firefight occurred there on 16 June 2000. At this time also, Barangay Rajahmuda residents believed that the government troops suspected the barangay to be an MILF camp. All of them fled to some parts of Pagalungan in Maguindanao and to evacuation centers in Batulawan and the Pikit Mahad School.
On Eid’l Adha in 2003, the Rajahmuda residents would again flee the barangay as government troops bombed the Islamic Center of Buliok Complex. Lower Inug-ug, on the other hand, saw people moving out as early as February to stay at an evacuation center set up for them at Mahad in Fort Pikit or among relatives. Meanwhile, residents in Takepan experienced at least two violent episodes that caused them to leave their homes that year. On 11 February, soldiers and MILF rebels clashed in neighboring Barangay Dalengaoen, such that the Muslim residents from Sitio Saranay/Gantong rushed for refuge at the makeshift evacuation center along the National Highway fronting the Takepan Elementary School. Three months later, unidentified armed men fired at Barangay Nalapaan, an adjacent barangay. Fearing further harassments, the Muslim families went to Batulawan. Most of them eventually ended up at an evacuation site near the Church of Christ.
In May 2000,16,245 Pikit residents were in twenty-nine evacuation centers located in the Poblacion, Fort Pikit, Takepan, Nunungan, Paidu Pulangi Elementary School, and Manaulaan Mahad. In 2003, the DOH recorded that most of the 15,564 Pikit IDPs were staying in the evacuation centers in the Buisan Dryer, National Food Authority Warehouse, and Pikit Mahad School.
The evacuation centers were mostly located in schools or day care centers, mosques and warehouses, multipurpose structures, and
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makeshift tents at the town plaza or on small patches of idle lands along the highway. These evacuation centers were very crowded and lacked the necessary facilities to address the daily needs of the refugees. In most instances, families camped in the evacuation centers for extended periods. Some even stayed for years, enduring deplorable conditions there, because they feared that war would break out in their barangays again.
The DOH also reported the prevalence of fever, flu, cough, typhoid fever, and pneumonia in the evacuation centers in Central Mindanao. Skin diseases, acute respiratory infections, gastroenteritis and diarrhea, mostly among children, were also reported. A number of adults succumbed to cardiac arrest due to the severe heat. Skin diseases afflicted many women and children. There were also deaths.
Reproductive Health Concerns in the Evacuation Centers
Close to fifty percent of IDPs were female (Cotabato Province Annual Report 2003) — young girls, middle-aged women, elderly widows, or single mothers. Interviews in Takepan, Inug-ug, and Rajahmuda revealed the health hazards of life in the evacuation centers. These included problems related to: personal hygiene,
particularly during menstruation, due to the lack of water supply or non-access to appropriate services; birth planning and gynecological services; sexual health education; medical assistance during labor and delivery; special needs of nursing mothers; health of newborns and young children; nutrition and healthy food sources; prevention and control of infections of the reproductive tract and urinary tract and other diseases; and pregnancy and abortion.
Following are some accounts of the IDPs’ experiences about life in the Pikit evacuation centers:
Death, trauma, and health problems
Baikong, 40, is a Maguindanaon widow with three children. She shared that,
Ito nangyari noong 2002 conflict. Ang Auntie ko na 60 years old ay namatay sa sakit sa puso, sobrang nerbiyos; hindi na nadala sa doctor. Ang Uncle ko naman na 70 years old, may asawa ay na-shock at nabuang. Hanggang ngayon, buang pa rin siya. Pag makarinig na may sundalong parating, magbitbit na ng kahit anonggamit sa bahay at pupunta sa labas, at gusto magbakwit. Magdala din ng baril. Mag-alis din siya dahil sa takot, kung minsan hindi na magdamit, hubad talaga. Kawawa nga ang asawa niya kasi kung magbawas siya kahit saan na lang, kahit nakapantalon pa sya. (My 60-year-old aunt died of heart failure because of extreme nervousness. She was not brought to a doctor. My married uncle who is 70 suffered shock and eventually became mentally ill. He is still unstable. When he hears that soldiers are coming, he would grab anything he could find in the house, rush out, and say they have to run. He would get his gun, too. Afraid, he would leave the house naked. We pity his wife because he would defecate anywhere, even with his pants on.)
Yung asawa ng Kuya ko na 32 years old, sa Sitio Diruyuden, nanganak sa evacuation center. After one month, namatay ang baby niya. Hindi ko alam ang dahilan. (My brother’s 32-year-old wife from Sitio Diruyuden gave birth at the evacuation center. After a month, her baby died. I don’t know what caused the baby’s death.)
Dahil sa sobrang init sa evacuation center, palagi man katning mainitan, naging masakit sa akin ang pag-ihi. Bumili lang ako ng garnot, di kaya ay tnanghingi ng gamot sa Health Office ng Pikit sa Poblacion. (Because of the extreme heat in the evacuation center, I found urination painful. I just bought medication or asked for medicine from the Municipal Health Office of Pikit).
Lower abdominal pain, cause unspecified
Miriam, 26, a Maguindanaon mother of three, had two years of college education. She had a history of urinary tract infection (UTI) prior to the 2003 evacuation. She said her health condition might have been aggravated in the evacuation center because she would hold her bladder, afraid to go out and relieve herself. She experienced intermittent lower abdominal pain.
Nagpahilot lang ako para mawala ang sakit. (I just requested a traditional healer to massage my abdomen to alleviate the pain.)
She also had vaginal itchiness. She said it was due to allergy sa tubig (water-borne allergy).
Nagpakonsulta din ako sa health center sa Poblacion, Pikit. Niresetahan ako at bumili ako ng ointment panghaplas. Yong sakit sa may puson, hindi ko alam bakit yon, basta pinahilot ko lang. (I went to the Health Center in Poblacion, Pikit. I was given a prescription for an ointment, which I bought and applied. The pain was in lower belly, I don’t know why [it was painful], but I just had my abdomen massaged.
Baby contracts skin disease and dies
This was recounted by an 18-year-old Maguindanaon mother of two:
Ang anak ng kapatid ko ay nanganak sa tent lang. Pagkatapos ng dalawang buwan ay nag-kaluli. ‘Yon ang dahilan bakit namatay ang bata. Wala silang mabili na gamot. Inasikaso din ng mga lider at nagbigay ng gamot pero `di na nakayanan. (My sister’s daughter gave birth in a tent [in the evacuation center). After two months, the baby contracted kaluli [a type of skin disease]. That is the reason for the baby’s death. They could not buy medicine. The leaders gave some assistance and medicine, but it was too late).
Ang pinsan ko rin, 22 years old, ay natamaan ng baril. Naglalakad Lang papuntang evacuation center nang natamaan ng baril. Sundalo daw ang nagpaputok. (My 22-year-old cousin was hit by a stray bullet on his way to the evacuation center. They say it was a soldier who fired the shot.)
Auntie ko, 40 years old, sumakit ang tiyan at ulo; nagtae-tae, mainit kasi masyado sa evacuation center. Binigyan ng gamot pero hindi na nakayanan, namatay na. (My 40-year-old aunt complained of a headache; then she had diarrhea, maybe because it was just too hot in the evacuation center. She was given medication, but she was too weak, she died.)
A very public birthing
Bai, 28, is an Iranun/Maguindanaon mother of three. She was unemployed and pregnant with her fourth child at the time of the interview. She said she was pregnant when armed encounters reached their barangay, forcing her to hike all the way to the evacuation center in Pagalungan where she gave birth. She said,
Mahirap manganak sa evacuation center kasi sa trapal lang, malamig masyado. Nahihiya ako dahil maraming tao. Tinitingnan ako ng maraming tao ha bang nanganganak ako. Wala naman akong magawa. (It’s hard to give birth in an evacuation center. We had only a tarpaulin sheet, it was very cold. I was also embarrassed because a lot of people were looking while I was giving birth. I couldn’t do anything about it).
Marumi kasi ang paligid. Humingi lang ako ng gamot sa Pikit Health Center para sa sakit ng pag-ihi. Bago lang kasi ako nanganak noon. (The surroundings were dirty. I just asked for medication for painful urination from the Pikit Health Center. I had just given birth then.)
Reproductive tract infection symptoms
Bai, 29, is a Maguindanaon farmer and mother of seven. In 2000, Bai had the following physical symptoms — frequent and painful urination and lower abdominal pain. She explains that,
Dahil siguro sa dumi ng paligid… Mom lang ng tubig ng niyog. Lyon lang ang ginamot ko. (Maybe because of the dirty surroundings. I just drank coconut water. That’s my only remedy.)
Sa sobrang pagod, akala ko malaglagan na ako noon. Pinagamot ko sa manghihilot, nilagyan nya ng herbal oil. Pero paulit-ulit ko man naramdaman ito, nagpahilot lang din ako. (I thought I would lose my baby because I was extremely exhausted. I went to a traditional healer who applied herbal oil. I had it massaged every time the pain recurred.)
Before the conflict, she also experienced painful urination, which she thought was due to her pregnancy. She remembered that,
Pag-umiinom ako ng tnainit na tubig, mawala na (Every time I drink warm water, the pain would go away.)
Bai shared that she started active prevention of future pregnancy:
Nagsimula na akong gumamit ng pills noon pang 2003. Marami na kasi akong anak. Gusto ko matulungan ang asawa ko kaya dalawa kaming nagdesisyon nito. (I started on the pill back in 2003. I have so many children already. I want to help my husband, so both of us decided on this).
Dire consequences of dirty water
Monera, 21, is Maguindanaon mother of one. She recounted that,
Ang anak ng kapatid ko, mga dalawang taong gulang ay narnatay dahil sa diarrhea. Ang tubig na inumin sa evacuation center ay galing sa kalot. Ito marahil ang dahilan ng pagtatae niya. Dinala sa ospital ang bata pero hindi na makaya. (My sister’s 2-year-old died of diarrhea. The drinking water at the evacuation center was drawn from a well. Maybe this caused her frequent and watery discharge. The baby was brought to the hospital to no avail.)
Monera herself also experienced problems with the water:
Nakaranas rin ako ng vaginal itchiness. Dahil din sa tubig na curling ginagamit. Niligo ko lang at naglinis ng katawan. (I had vaginal itchiness. It was also because of the water. I just bathed and cleaned my body.)
Unexpected, unwanted pregnancy
Baikong, 27, is a Maguindanaon farmer and mother of six. She was pregnant in 2000 when her family had to evacuate. She narrated that,
Marami akong karanasan sa gitna ng kaguluhan sa among barangay. Una, ang Tsang anak ko nagka-diarrhea sa evacuation center. Dahil din sa sobrang lamig sa sentro, ayaw niyang magdede. Malapit na sana mamatay. Dinala namin sa Pagalungan Health Center at na-dextrose pa siya. (I had many experiences in the midst of the conflict in our barangay. First, my child had diarrhea at the evacuation center. Because of the extreme cold, the baby did not want to suckle. She nearly died. We brought the baby to the Pagalungan Health Center, where she was fed intravenously.)
Baikong said she had given birth in an evacuation center:
…sa Pagalungan Municipality kami kasi nagbakwit. Noong nanganak ako, walang mga gamic. Kulang ang pagkain, sobrang lamig pa sa tent. (… in an evacuation center in Pagalungan Municipality, where we evacuated. When I gave birth, we had no things [for the baby]. We lacked food, and it was very cold in the tent.) She also experienced frequent urination which she did not mind so much in the belief that it was all part of being pregnant. She did not know why she sometimes had painful urination, abdominal pain, and vaginal itchiness. She disclosed that,
Ang ihi ko yellow kasi. Magpakulo lang ng tanglad, yong tubig inumin ko. Palaging masakit and tiyan ko. Ewan ko, baka sa pagbubuntis ko. Nagpahilot lang ako. (My urine was yellow. I made lemongrass tea to drink. I had constant abdominal pain. I don’t know why—maybe because I was pregnant. I tried to have it massaged.)
She said she got pregnant before war escalated and that she had not been happy about it:
Nalungkot ako, dahil marami na ang anak ko. Pagod na akong mag-alaga ng bata. Gusto ko sana mag-abroad, hindi payag ang Tatay ko dahil marami na akong anak, kawawa kung iwanan. Tinuloy ko ang pagbubuntis kaysa ipalaglag ko. Pero palaging rnagsakit ang ulo ko. Sabi ng asawa ko, magpunta ako sa health center, magpa-BP kasi anemic ako-80/60—at hindi maganda ang paningin ko. (I was despondent, because I had many children already. I was tired of looking after babies. I wanted to go abroad, [but] my father didn’t approve of it because my children would suffer if I leave them. I chose to keep my baby instead of going for an abortion. But, I have recurring headaches. My husband told me to go to the health center and have my blood pressure checked because I am anemic —[my BP is just] 80/60 — and my eyesight is not too good).
She had experienced delayed menstruation before the conflict episode in 2000 when she had profuse vaginal discharges.
Nagpahilot ako, pagkatapos nagdugo na ako. Hindi ko alam ang dahilan. Nagbaba ang matres ko. Sumasakit ang tagiliran ng tiyan ko, pinahilot ko. Humingi ako ng tulong sa midwife. Magbili na lang ng gamot, sabi niya. Wala akong pera kaya pinabayaan ko na lang. Pero uminom ako ng tanglad, pinakuluan, at nawala naman. (I had my lower belly massaged, after a while I started bleeding. I didn’t understand why. My uterus was [displaced and] too low. Then I had pain here on one side, so I had that massaged also. I asked a midwife for help. She told me to buy medicine. I had no money so 1 just ignored it [the pain]. But I drank a concoction of lemongrass tea, and it disappeared).
Postpartum mother flees the fighting
A 29-year-old Maguindanaon mother of two who was a resident of Sitio Saranay/Gantong of Barangay Takepan had this to tell:
Noong nagkagulo sa 2003, limang araw pa lang akong nakapanga n ak, nakaranas ako na umabot ang bola sa tabi ng bahay namin. Kaya kahit nakakaranas pa ako ng pagdurugo napilitan akong sumamang tumatakbo palayo sa aming tirahan. (It was just five days after I gave birth when violence broke out in 2003. Bullets hit the house next door. So even though I was still bleeding, I was forced to flee along with others.)
She had just a year to go in college but had to stop schooling.
Hindi na ako nakapag-enrol dahil nasa bakwitan pa. Pagkagaling sa bakwitan, nag-asawa na ako.” (I couldn’t enrol because we were still in the evacuation center. After that, I got married.)
Pregnant and contemplating abortion
Fatima, 27, is a Maguindanaon farmer with three children. She did not complete elementary education. She claimed to suffer from ulcers. She disclosed that she got pregnant while staying at the evacuation center during the conflict in 2003.
Malaki na ang tiyan ko pagbalik namin gating sa evacuation center. Noong nalaman kong buntis ako, Tsang buwan pa Yon, nagplano akong ipalaglag siya kasi nagkasakit ako. Naglagnat ako, nanginig ang buong katawan ko. Naisip ko rin na baka maapektuhan ang bata. Sinabihan ko ang midwife tungkol dito. Sinabihan niya ako na hindi ituloy, matakot ako dahil dalawang buwan pa lang ang pagbubuntis ko. Gumaling naman ako noong dalawa at kalahating buwan na. Hindi ko na pinalaglag. Nasa akin na lang daw ang desisyon sabi ng asawa ko. Hindi ko na rin tinuloy ang pagpalaglag. (My tummy was already big when we came home from the evacuation center. When I learned that I was a month pregnant, I wanted to have it aborted because I got sick. I had fever and chills. I thought the baby might be adversely affected. I told the midwife about my plan. She advised against it, [fearing complications] because I was already two months pregnant. Anyway, I felt better at around two-and-a-half months so I did not have my pregnancy terminated. My husband let me decide.
Lack of proper toilet facilities
Vina, 42, is an Ilocano mother of one. She teaches high school in Barangay Takepan. During the conflict episode in 2003, Vina shared that,
Pirmi lang ako maka-ihi. Walay tarong nga maihian. Nag-inom lang ko ug tubig sa niyog para mawala. Dili ako makaihi sa bakwitan kay makahadlok man maggawas ug layo para mag-ihi lang. (I needed to urinate often. There was no proper toilet. I drank coconut juice to make it go away. I couldn’t go to the bathroom as often as I needed because I was afraid to go farther off where I could relieve myself).
Mother considers abortion
Sahara, 30, is a Maguindanaon mother of seven. She is an elementary school graduate. She said that before the 2003 hostilities, she had hoped to have some rest from childbearing and was even contemplating the use of family planning methods:
Dili nako gusto mabuntis Ey! Huna-huna nako pwerteng krisis na gyud. Mga bata gahi ug ulo. Magsakit ang akong ulo sa pagbuyag sa ila. Usahay makasulti ko, pwerteng daghana na nila. Ipahilot unta nako para ipakuha. Nag-ingon man ang manghihilot nga makagaba daw. Wala na lang nako gidayon ug palaglag. OK man pud unta sa akong asawa nga ipakuha nako. (I didn’t want to get pregnant any more. I realize we were in a major crisis. My kids are hardheaded. I get headaches minding them. At times, I tell myself, there’s just too many of them. I thought of having it [the baby] aborted by a traditional midwife. But, she warned me that it’s bad luck. That’s why I did not go through with it. It would have been fine with my husband if I had it aborted.)
About family planning, she said:
Mahadlok ko kay ang uban musulti madaot ang tiyan. Naa man daw namatay ana — labi na ang nagpa-Depo. Naa daw namatay ana. Gusto sa akong bana, mag-pills ko sa una. Ako lang ang dili kay mahadlok ko. Pero gusto na nako karon, kay daghan naman gud akong anak. Kining akong kamanghuran gani (pointing at her baby) ipakuha unta gani nako ni, pero dill lang musugot ang manghihilot. (I’m afraid because some said it can damage the insides. They say there have been deaths — especially from using Depo [Provera]. Some have reportedly died because of it. My husband wanted me to take pills then. But I didn’t because I was afraid. But now, I want to because I have so many children. I even planned on having this youngest [child] aborted, but the traditional midwife was unwilling [to do it].)
A long drawn out war trauma
Rahima, 22, is a housewife. She is married to Junaid, a farmer. She has lived in Barangay Rajahmuda since birth. She remembered when the Islamic Center in Barangay Buliok was bombed. She reported what she witnessed of the attack.
Pinasok at binomba ng mga sundalo ang Islamic Center. Habang nagsamba ang mga Muslim, bigla lang nila pinaputukan ang mga ito. At dahil madaanan ang Barangay Rajahmuda papuntang Buliok, damay din sa putukan ang Barangay namin. May putukan ang Barangay namin. May papuntang Poblacion ng Pikit. Naglakad at nagtakbo para makalayo sa putukan. Ang iba nagkawatak-watak ang pamilya (The soldiers attacked and bombed the Islamic Center. While the Muslims were at prayer, they [the soldiers] fired at them without warning. Since Barangay Rajahmuda is on the road to Buliok, our barangay was exposed to the hostilities. There was gunfire in Rajahmuda that scared us so we immediately headed to Pikit poblacion. We walked and ran away from the firefight. Some families lost each other in the haste).
She got sick at the evacuation center and eventually manifested some serious stress reactions. According to Rahima,
Nag-trangkaso ako at ang mga kapatid ko dahil sa ibabaw lang kami ng lupa natutulog. Naglagay lang kami ng banig sa lupa para tulugan, trapal lang ang atip namin. Talagang mainit doon sa araw. Mga dalawang linggo ‘yon kasi natakot ako sa putukan. Naglagnat ako tapos wala na ako maisip. Mga tatlong buwan ‘yon na wala akong matandaan. Grabe ‘yon kasi natakot ako sa putukan. Sabi ng Nanay ko dahil daw sa takot ko, nag-lagnat ako at nagka-trauma ako. Minsan tulala ako. Umiiyak lang ako palagi. Umiiyak ako dahil matakot ako matamaan ng putukan. Sa bazooka, di ako makatulog. Minsan naglalakad lang ako, tulala, di nagsasalita, parang wala ako sa isip ko. Minsan nagahubad ako sa bahay (evacuation center). Nakapantalon lang wala t-shirt. Wala nga sa sarili. Ang ginawa ng Nanay ko, binabantayan ako para ‘di makalabas sa evacuation center. Minsan ang mga kapatid ko na kambal ang nagbabantay sa akin. Pinagamot ako ng nanay ko sa albularyo (I got sick with the flu, along with my siblings, because we were sleeping on the ground. We rolled out a mat to sleep on and hung a tarpaulin for roof. It was unbearly hot during the day. It was about two weeks after the start of the hostilities. i developed a fever, and then I could not think any more. For about three months, I had no memory of what happened. It was terrible, I was terrified of firefights. My mother said it must have been because of extreme fear that I had fever and suffered trauma. At times I would be dazed. I would weep uncontrollably. I would cry because I was afraid of being hit by a bullet. I couldn’t sleep when they fired the bazooka. Sometimes, I would just walk about, dazed, not speaking, seemingly not myself. At times, I would not have my clothes on in the house [evacuation center]. [I would have] my pants on, but [I had] no shirt. I was really not myself. What my mother did was keep a cloase watch so I would not be able to get out of the evacuation center. Sometimes, my twin brothers would help take care of me. My mother brought me to an herbalist for treatment.)
Living with a husband’s pain
Samra and Alimudin are residents of Barangay Inug-ug. They claim to have experienced three conflict episodes since they got married in 2000. While in the evacuation center, the couple quarelled several times because of Alimudin’s problem. The poor man had difficulty urinating. Samra said,
Tuwing sumasakit ang ari ng asawa ko, nag aaway kami. Magalit siya sa akin. Ang dahilan noon, ang takot niya sa putukan. Ganito ‘yon, isang linggong nakalipas pagbakwit namin, nilagnat siya doon sa evacuation center. Ang epekto noon ay natakot siya sa putukan ay nilagnat siya. Pagtapos niyang mag-lagnat, may lumabas na nana sa ari nya, at masakit daw kung mag ihi sya. Tuwing may putukan o kung may marinig syang putukan, natatakot siya. Pagkatapos mag-andar naman ang sakit ng ari niya, at inaaway niya ako. Minsan nga kung may putukan, sinisisi niya sa akon ang gulo at ang sakit ng ari niya. Sabi niya, kaya daw siya nagkakasakit dahil sa akin. Minsan nga parang wala siya sa sarili niya dahil pati ang gulo at putukan binibintang niya sa akin. Grabe na galit niya sa ‘kin. Kung inaaway niya ako, hinahayaan ko lang dahil nawawala lang man ang galit niya sa akin ‘pag nawala na ang sakit. (Every time my husband’s penis would cause him pain, he would readily pick a fight with me. He would be angry with me. The real cause was his fear of gunfire. This is what happened- a week after we evacuated, he developed a fever in the evacuation center. His fear of gunfire resulted in a fever, When the fever subsided, pus oozed out of his penis, and he compalined of pain when urinating. Every time there was gunfire, he would be greatly agitated, after which his penis would be painful, and he would quarrel with me. Sometimes, when there was gunfire, he would blame me for the trouble and the pain in his penis. He said he was sick because of me. At times, he would not be himself, attributing the trouble and the firefight to me. He believed I was the cause of it all. He would be very furios with me. When he was angry with me, I just let him be because his anger would pass when the pain subsided.)
Samra sent her husband to the Pikit Health Center for Checkup, but there were no finsings.
Pinainom lang nila ng Cotrimoxazole. (They gave him Cotrimoxazole.)
The couple stayed in a small tent in an evacuation center for one year. Samira reported to experience abdominal pain while in the evacuation center. She said that was because.
Kasi ang inot sa evacuation center. Tapos sa lupa lang kami nakahiga. Maglagay lang kami ng banig, minsan karton lang. (It was hot in the evacuation center. We slept on the ground. We laid a mat, or sometimes just a [flattened] cardboard box.
Maybe the water
Mariam Ali, 45, is a resident of Sitio Lower Inug-ug. She has six children. Her community experiences many armed conflicts, but she considers the 2000 episode to have been the most intense. She said
May mga sundalong nag-operation doon- mga rebelde at sundalo. (Soldiers conducted operations there- both the rebels and the soldiers).
The were forced to evacuate to the Pikit Town Plaza. After a few weeks, they were transferred to the Amanah dryer where they pitched their tents. It was there that she got pregnant. After she had given birth, she experienced some problems with postpartum recovery:
Pagkatapos ko nanganak, umihi ako sa baba namin. Tapos ilang araw ang lumipas, sumasakit ang pag-ihi ko, siguro dahil sa singaw ng tubig na hinugas ko. Pero isang buwan lang ang pananakit, nawala din. Uminom ako ng antibiotic at butong. (After I had given birth, I urinated downstairs. A few days later, I experienced painful urination, perhaps because of the water I used to wash myself. After a month, the pains subsided. I took antibiotics and drank coconut juice).
Marital relations in the evacuation center
Noria, 28, is a resident of Sitio Palestine, Barangay Rajahmuda. She is married to a barangay councilman and they have four children. Their main source of income is farming.
Noria and her family had experienced many armed conflicts in their community, but the most intense was in 2003 when the Islamic Center was bombed. Many people died. Noria and her family had to stay in an evacuation center. She shared that,
Kahit nasa evacuation, nangyayaya ang asawa ko na makipagtalik. Kasi lalaki, hindi ‘yan sila makatiis. Tatlong araw lang ang pinakamatagal na hindi makipagtalik. Ang lalaki kasi para din nagpa-fasting ‘yan, kung hindi magalaw ang babae, nauuhaw sila. Meron man din dibisyon ang aming tinutulugan bawat pamilya sa loob ng evacuation center kaya, okey lang. Kapag hindi mo kasi pagbibigyan, mag-init ang ulo niya. (Although we were at the evacuation center, my husband would like to have sex. Men are really like that, they can’t stand not having sex for more than three days. It’s like they are fasting. If they can’t touch the woman, they get thirsty. The sleeping quarters in the evacuation center had dividers, so it was all right. If I didn’t give in to the advances [of my husband], he would surely be bad-tempered.)
Access to RH Services and Assistance Extended to IDP’s
Many displaced families were relucant to return to their communities of origin, mainly because of the destruction of their houses, some of which had been burned during the conflict episodes. Others who had been away too long knew that their neglected houses would not be habitable anymore. Thus, they would have nowhere to stay if they did go back to their communties. Some women cited risk factors, claiming that the presence of combatants- either of the AFP or the MILF- presented the possibility of harm or damage to life and limb were they to return to their communities immediately after a firefight. Caught in this quandary, they had to endure the difficult life conditions at evacuation centers.
In the first few months of their displacement, they received relief goods in the form of food, canned goods, used clothing, and medicines. They got aid and support from various government agencies, particularly the DSWD, DOH, DILG, Regional Disaster Coordinating Council (RDCC), Office of Civil Defense (OCD), and the municipal government. There were also NGOs that extended relief and rehabilitation assistance to the displaced families (MSWDO Pikit, 2003).
During the massive displacements of 2000 and 2003, national line agencies and local government units were supported by many civil society organizations, local NGOs, and church organizations that provided food and health services. Both the DOH and the Municipal Health Office (MHO) served the health needs of the evacuees. However, most of those interviewed said they resorted to herbal medication or sought the help of the midwife in healing themselves or their sick family members. Their immediate source of medicines for colds, fever, diarrhea, skin disease, and other illnesses was the Poblacion Health Center and the Barangay Health Stations. Their supply of medicines however, was limited to over-the-counter drugs that generally provided temporary relief. Emergency cases had to be referred to the nearer hospitals. Because this required transportation and money that most evacuees did not have, the cases resulted in death in some instances.
The United Nations Multi-Donor Program (UNMDP) also supported the DSWD through food-for-work programs and the health and medical needs of the evacuees. Government organizations, such as DSWD, DOH, DILG, National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), and Local Government Units (LGUs), and NGOs, such as Oxford Foundation Against Famine (OXFAM), Community and Family Services International (CFSI), Medicines Sans Frontier (MSF), Movimondo, Accion Contra El Hambre (ACH), and others provided assistance, such as food and medicines, shelter, and latrines and water system (Cotabato Province Annual Report 2003). They also extended livelihood assistance and conducted psychosocial and trauma management sessions, and capability-building trainings and interventions. The municipal government also conducted disaster preparedness and response training for the internally displaced families.
[Refer to the Original Copy]
Coping Mechanisms of Women Evacuees
Women affected by armed conflict demonstrated to be very resourceful and resilient in the face of such insurmountable difficulties. In the case of those displaced by armed conflict in the early 2000s, the support of the government organizations such as the DSWD, DOH, OCD, POs, and NGOs was crucial for their survival while they were at the evacuation centers (Daylusan-Fiesta, 2005). The relief assistance provided to them helped lighten the burden and miseries inflicted by displacements.
Despite the suffering and inconvenience at the evacuation centers, they obviously lived through these. When asked how they coped, they said they (a) prayed together with the family, (b) encouraged and advised each other, (c) shared their feelings and experiences with each other, (d) simply ignored or convinced themselves that the deplorable conditions at the evacuation center were just temporary (e) unloaded their pain to their relatives and neighbors.
They tried to be productive by helping their husbands earn a livelihood for the family. Others engaged in backyard gardening and raising livestock. There were some NGOs who provided the displaced persons with livestock, garden tools, and seedlings for this purpose. Those who were unable to find work had to attend to the family members and maintain the health and sanitation at the evacuation centers.
Other factors that helped the women cope with the situation included the support given by their relatives who also extend provisions for them at the evacuation centers. Psychosocial interventions provided by the DSWD and some NGOs, such as play centers for children and trauma healing sessions with children and women, helped relieve some of the tension that the IDPs felt.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Congestion and crowding in Pikit evacuation centers deprived women of privacy, adversely affecting their personal hygiene and their marital sexual needs. There were women who had to give birth at the evacuation centers under conditions that did not allow them privacy and dignity. Moreover, such experience exposed both the mother and the newborn to health hazards, some of which resulted in loss of lives. The displaced women were predisposed to illnesses, such as frequent and painful urination and vaginal itchiness, which they attributed primarily to too much heat and the lack of clean water for drinking and washing.
Access to health services was limited to the services provided by the midwife stationed at the barangay. Mostly, women resorted to self-help and traditional practices and used herbal medicine when there was sickness in the family.
Relief assistance given to displaced persons was generally limited, short-term, and temporary. Moreover, these basically addressed survival needs for food and shelter. Health and reproductive health conditions were the least addressed, even though the displaced families lived in evacuation centers for extended periods of time. Program interventions on reproductive health and rights were seldom part of the assistance provided during the conflict situation.
The coping mechanisms employed by women were mainly about accessing kin and community support system. While they also engaged government offices, these efforts only allowed them to access limited help. They had little influence in determining for support agencies the kind of emergency relief that they were to receive.
Interviews with displaced women who suffered and lived a miserable life at the evacuation centers due to armed conflict have presented some policy implications that need to be addressed by the Philippine Government to protect them and their children. Disaster preparedness management systems of municipal and barangay units that host IDPs must be strengthened. Broad reproductive health programs that shall effectively reach displaced women and children need to be implemented. Most critical in the resolution of these displacement problems in Central Mindanao is the urgent need for the national government to prioritize addressing the peace issues involving the Bangsamoro people.
North Cotabato Rural Enterprise Development Program II
A Terminal Review
Introduction
Of the 60.5 million Filipinos, approximately 36 million or 60 percent live in the rural areas and are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. Sixty-five percent of the rural population live in the lowlands and coastal areas while the rest are in the uplands.
While various development policies and programs of the Philippine government since the postwar years have stressed overall income and growth throughout the country, these have been mainly concentrated in Metro Manila. The rural population is at a relative disadvantage when compared to their urban counterparts. Various studies have revealed that more than half of the rural families live below the poverty line (compared to only one-fifth of urban families).
Analyzing the nature, extent, and trends of rural poverty within the context of development, Sison and Varela thus concluded that “a great proportion of the poorest of the poor is found in the rural sector” , citing both “the Inherent and persistent socio-economic and political structures which exclude the poorest segment of the rural population from participating in productive economic activity”, including government policies in support of the postwar development strategy which was generally biased against agriculture.
Such scenarios have thus sent the appropriate signals to both the public and private sector to address the needs of these marginal members of Philippine society caught in the vicious cycle of poverty and low productivity, lack of access to resources, and subsequently inequality.
As with other government and non-government organizations which have recognized the need to improve the farmers’ access to necessary resources, the Diocese of Kidapawan in North Cotabato launched the North Cotabato Rural Enterprise Development Program (NCREDP) in 1989 to improve the income and living conditions of the population through five self-help community cooperatives.
The primary goals of the program consisted of increasing farmers’ income through the provision of non-collateral, low interest loans, and developing self-sustaining cooperatives that could serve the credit and marketing needs of the members, including the upgrading of farmers’ skills through more productive farming technology and strengthening the cooperatives’ technical and managerial skills.
The objectives of the program were:
1. to extend financial and technical assistance to at least five self-help cooperatives.
2. to extend assistance to at least 550 farmers from the five self-help cooperatives and thus enable them to realize increases in income by at least P1,910 per hectare per cropping.
3. to assist at least 72 percent (or 400) of the beneficiaries to generate a capital build-up of at least P4,500 each out of individual share capital contributions.
4. to generate at least P690,000 capital build-up out of the members’ share capital contributions.
5. to train 550 farmers on appropriate/productive farm technologies and management skills, including value
6. to train at least 10 leaders from the 5 self-help groups on organizational and basic cooperative management, enterprise management, leadership, community organizing, financial management, and credit and marketing operations.
7. to assist farmer-beneficiaries in avoiding at least two layers of exploitative traders or middlemen through marketing assistance.
8. to assist these self-help groups to develop into full-fl cooperatives, each with a legal personality and able to undertake socio-economic activities, and
9. to assist at least 5 cooperatives to organize into a federation, with goals to serve and undertake activities addressing the needs of the member cooperatives.
In an endeavor to increase the income of the farmer beneficiaries of the five (5) self-help and self-sustaining cooperatives through loans, training and technical assistance, the following schematic framework has evolved:
INPUTS OUTPUTS
Loans Increased income of the farmer beneficiaries
Training Development of self-sustaining cooperatives
As indicated in the diagram, program inputs (loans, training and technical assistance) will facilitate increasing the income of the farmer-beneficiaries and subsequently develop self-sustaining cooperatives. The loans will provide the farmer -beneficiaries the necessary financial assistance to increase their income, consequently contributing to the development of self-sustaining cooperatives. Training and technical assistance will equip the farmer-beneficiaries with the appropriate knowledge, attitudes and skills in increasing farm income and helping in the development of self-sustaining cooperatives.
Given the above, the present report hopes to provide the necessary feedback information for the Diocese of Kidapawan, by assessing over-all program-goals vis-a-vis results, particularly in increasing income of farmer-beneficiaries and developing self-sustaining cooperatives.
On the whole, the study seeks to determine the nature and extent of attainment of objectives of the North Cotabato Enterprise Development Program. Specifically it aims to:
1. identify indicators necessary in evaluating and maintaining the progress, results and impact of the program.
2. identify and assess the project’s accomplishments vis-a-vis objectives set, including its strengths and weaknesses.
3. assess the effectivity of the strategies and approaches used in the program.
4. determine the program’s impact in capital build-up, participation of beneficiaries in the program decision-making and planning process, and in their respective organization of cooperatives.
5. determine other factors affecting program performance.
6. formulate recommendations to improve the project scheme.
As in any systematically organized program or project, the assessment or evaluation of program goals and results is regarded as on integral program-component. At its terminal stage, the importance of any evaluation activity is underscored by the following considerations:
1. As a cost-saving measure, evaluation helps to determine whether the time, money and effort expended for the project are justifiable and merit continuance or possible expansion in other areas.
2. Evaluation similarly identifies strengths and weaknesses of the project so that appropriate corrective measures can be formulated by program-planners. Likewise, feedback from the beneficiaries will provide significant guidelines in the development of similar projects in the future.
The pretest-posttest research design was used in this study. This design facilitated the determination of changes introduced by the NCREDP among the farmer-members of the five (5) self-help cooperatives, particularly the changes effected by the loans, training and technical assistance provided by the program.
The present terminal study was conducted in five (5) of the 14 areas where the Diocese of Kidapawan has organized cooperatives. The study-sites consisted of New Cebu in President Roxas, Antipas, Magpet, Matalam and M’lang, selected on the basis of their management potentials, good leadership, desire to improve economically, and willingness to abide by the project’s policies and guidelines
Cooperative managers and the farmer-beneficiaries served as the respondents of the study. The five cooperative managers provided information on the mechanics of coordination, the facilitating factors/problems encountered in the coordinative efforts, and the actual bottlenecks experienced in the implementation of the program. The farmer-beneficiaries, on the other hand, served as the source of assessment of the program’s financial assistance, training and technical assistance.
The purposive sampling design was used in this study. Prior to the field interview, a list of beneficiaries was secured fr m the five (5) self-help cooperatives through the CRS Mindanao Regional Office, after which elimination of beneficiaries not covered during the 1989 baseline survey was done. Baseline interviewee who, however, were not program beneficiaries were likewise considered in the terminal evaluation. This was to facilitate comparison of changes among the farmer-beneficiaries of the program. Of the baseline interviewees, a total of 329 respondents (i.e. 159 farmer-beneficiaries and 170 non-beneficiaries) were interviewed for the 1992 terminal study. This was due to the deaths, transfer of residence, or refusal of the other baseline interviewees to be interviewed.
Three methods were employed in the collection of data. These included (1) a review of secondary data-sources (i.e. annual reports, financial reports, and other pertinent reports of the NCREDP), (2) interviews of the managers of the five (5) self-help cooperatives, and, (3) interviews of both program-beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
A study guide was used for the records review, including the interviews of the five (5) cooperative managers. A structured interview schedule, translated into Cebuano was used for the farmer-beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
The interview schedule included the following main topics:
I. Personal Data
II. Farm Data
III. Farm Practices
IV. Production
V. Post-harvest Facilities
VI. Marketing
VII. Trainings Attended
VIII. Technical Assistance (Hands On)
IX. Loan Assistance
X. Participation
XI. Comments and Recommendations for the Cooperative
XII. Income and Savings.
Univariate and bivariate tables were used to analyze and compare baseline and terminal data. Simple frequency and percentage distributions, including central tendency measures, were also used.
Accomplishments of the Five Self-Help Cooperatives
A total of P6,102,861.99 worth of loans was extended to 1,924 individual farmers from Phases I to V, with New Cebu (P1,646,450.75) and M’lang (P1,190,041.60) reporting the highest amount of loans received and Magpet, the lowest (P1,028,945.60). As a whole, the average collection rate of loans released from Phases Ito V was 76.6 percent (or P4,672,907.59), with M’lang and New Cebu reporting the highest rate of repayments (92.4% or P1,099,994.74 and 80.9% or P133,315.75, respectively), and with Magpet (61.2% or P630,143.92) and Matalam (64.7% or P728,284.14), the lowest. Such loans incurred an interest of P526,455.30. M’lang registered the highest loan-interest collected (101.5%), and Antipas, the lowest (64%).
The total capital build-up generated from Phases I to V was P1,846,005.80, of which a little over one fourth (26.4% or P487,500) was contributed by New Cebu farmer-beneficiaries. Antipas contributed the lowest (16.4% or P303,750). However, more than a third of the total capital build-up generated (38.5% or P710,150.84) was collected, with New Cebu registering the highest amount (40.1% or P195,561.25) and Magpet, the lowest (23.5% or P83,940.85).
Reviewing the trends, however, the rate of collection for loan releases, loan-interests and capital build-up generally decreased from Phase I to Phase V. Such patterns were indicative somehow of the capacity and type of monitoring tools, including the policies which the project management has installed.
A review of records revealed that a total of 2,086 farmer-members were provided financial assistance from Phases I to VI. The number of farmer-members who provided financial assistance increased continuously from Phase I (286) to Phase III (467) then decreased to 462 in Phase VI. New Cebu reported the highest number of farmer-beneficiaries (547) and Antipas, the lowest (326).
An analysis of the names of the reported 2,086 beneficiaries showed a total of 802 farmer-members actually provided financial assistance, with the lowest number of farmer-members in M’lang (110) and the highest in New Cebu (228). The data further revealed that four (4) out of five (5) self-help cooperatives had assisted more than the targeted 110 farmer-members that should have been provided financial assistance by the end of the three-year program. M’lang provided assistance to the required number of 110 farmer-members.
Further analysis of the status of the listed beneficiaries revealed the following categories:
1. Continuing Beneficiaries
1a – availed of the loan from the first phase to the last phase.
1b – availed of the loan from any one of the phases (2,3,4 and 5) to the last phase.
2. Drop-outs
2a availed of loan in the first phase then dropped.
2b availed of loan in two consecutive phases then dropped.
2c – availed of loan in three consecutive phases then dropped.
2d – availed of loan in four consecutive phases then dropped.
2e – availed of loan in five consecutive phases then dropped
2f – availed of loan in five phases, returned, then dropped.
3. Last phase beneficiaries (availed of the last phase only)
4. Return-beneficiaries
4a availed of loan in an earlier phase, dropped, then returned at a later phase up to the last phase.
4b – availed of loan at an earlier phase/s, dropped, then returned in the last phase
4c availed of loan in an earlier phase/s, dropped, returned, dropped, then returned in the last phase
The highest percentages were drop-out beneficiaries (61.7% or 495 ), followed by the continuing beneficiaries (21.9% or 219 farmer-beneficiaries), “last phase beneficiaries” (8.7% or 70) and return-beneficiaries (7.6% or 61 farmer-beneficiaries). The case of the drop-out beneficiaries was explained by the cooperative managers as caused mainly by the beneficiaries’ failure to repay their loans, transfer of residence, or the pawning of farm inputs to other farmers.
By the end of the program, a capital build-up of P690,000 per cooperative was projected. However, records reported that only M’lang attained such an objective with a capital build-up of P707,643.36, an amount higher by PI7,643.36 than the projected capital build-up. New Cebu reported more than half (55.8% or P385,129.54) of the projected P690,000. Matalam indicated the lowest capital build-up (26.2%).
Though only M’lang attained the P690,000 capital build-up which each cooperative-beneficiary should have generated at the end of the three-year program, it is commendable to note that all of the cooperative-beneficiaries exerted efforts to attain the set capital build-up as evidenced by the increases in capital build-up from their baseline to terminal figures. The initial capital build-up of the five self-help cooperatives increased more than three times G63.8%) by the end of the three-year program, with New Cebu indicating the highest increase (906.8%) and Antipas, the lowest (134.8%).
At the end of the three-year program, it was envisioned that each farmer-beneficiary should have generated a capital build-up of P4,500 through the financial assistance program. The records show that a total of 802 out of 1,891 farmer-members were extended financial assistance, resulting in a total of P1 ,067,205.72 or an average of P1,330.70 per beneficiary capital share. The non- beneficiaries, on the other hand, generated a total capital spare of 692,356.46 or an average of P635.55 per non-beneficiary; ai figure nearly half of the mean capital share per beneficiary.
The data further revealed that while the New Cebu farmer- beneficiaries generated the highest amount of capital build-up (P455,082.79) and the Matalam farmer-beneficiaries, the lowest (Pi55,850.95), the M’lang non-beneficiaries reported the highest amount of capital build-up generated (P429,781.23) and those from New Cebu, the lowest (P92,211.37).
Given the targeted amount of capital build-up each farmer- beneficiary should have generated by the end of the three-year program, data revealed that there were more farmer-beneficiaries (n=32) who had generated an amount equal to or greater than the P4,500 from the four survey sites (Antipas, Matalam, M’lang and New Cebu) compared to non-beneficiaries (n=17). This seems to imply that the financial assistance provided was truly helpful in generating the capital build-up for some farmer-beneficiaries as forced savings.
Trainings
The three-year program likewise addressed the need for institutional development, i.e. through various training activities for both cooperative leaders and farmer-clients.
As insurance for the effective management of the activities designed for the program, program implementors outlined various trainings for the leaders of the cooperatives. At least eight types of trainings were conducted for the cooperative leaders. These (included the “Trainors’ Training”, “Financial-related”, “Marketing Management”, “Basic Management Course”, “Consumer Management”, “Skills Development-related”, ‘Technical-related” and “Cooperative Development Agenda”.
The most frequently mentioned trainings conducted for the cooperative leaders were “Financial-related” (28 sessions) followed by “Skills Development Training (12 sessions), ‘Trainors’ Training” (8 sessions), and “Marketing Management” (6 sessions).
Antipas indicated the most varied number of trainings conduct^ for the cooperative leaders (7 types), with M’lang and New Cebu the lowest number of trainings conducted for the cooperative leaders.
The number of cooperative leader-participants attending the different sessions conducted ranged from one to 59 participants. Training related to financial management had a total of 59 participants, followed by ‘Trainers’ Training” (35 participants), and “Skills Development Training” (17 participants). Two participants mentioned attending the session on “Cooperative Development Agenda”.
On the part of the program beneficiaries, the training program hoped to provide them the necessary information relative to the acquisition of various skills to enhance farming strategies and consequently to help increase their farm income. The records indicated at least 16 types of trainings provided the farmer- beneficiaries, with “Pre-membership Seminars (PMS)” being most mentioned (31 sessions), followed by the “PMS and Refresher Course” (21 sessions), and those related to “Farm Management and Budgeting” (15 sessions).
Matalam cooperatives conducted the greatest variety pf trainings for the beneficiaries (11 types of trainings), with Antipas, the lowest (6 types of trainings).
The ‘Pre-membership Seminar” was reported to be the most attended cooperative-training, not only among the beneficiaries but the non-beneficiaries as well (737 participants), followed by the “Pre-membership Seminars and Refresher Course” (615 participants) and those on “Farm Management and Budgeting” (374 participants).
The GKK-KFI Terminal Report, dated October 5,1992, revealed that the farmers had successfully minimized establishing credit and marketing relationships with exploitative traders. This could perhaps be due to the marketing linkages the five self-help cooperatives had established in response to the marketing needs of the members. An interview with the manage of the Antipas cooperative confirmed that a direct marketing linkage with Manila-based buyers had been explored for their com produce.
all five self-help cooperatives have successfully acquired a legal personality, i.e. they have been officially registered with the Cooperative Development Authority. The Magpet cooperative was registered in the Rural Cooperative Development Administration Office (RCDAG) at the time the program was implemented.
The program envisioned that the five self-help cooperatives would form into a federation to effectively serve the needs of the members. However, an interview with four cooperative managers^ revealed that the formation of a federation for the five self-help cooperatives did not materialize inasmuch as a federation of the cooperatives in Davao del Sur and Cotabato was already in existence. As a result of the discussions held among the NCREDP- based cooperative managers, the five self-help cooperatives are now part of the Cotabato-Davao del Sur Federation of Cooperatives (CDSFC).
Membership of the cooperatives increased significantly from its baseline status of 764 individual members and 22 group- members. Individual members increased more than two-fold (i.e., by 1,127 or 147.5%), while group-membership almost doubled in the New Cebu cooperative. M’lang reported the highest increase in individual membership (449%), and New Cebu, the lowest (37.5%).
By the end of the three-year program all the . cooperatives reported increases in the total capital share of the members (Pi,844,977.04) from its baseline figures (P339,651). This may be attributed to the increasing membership in the five self-help cooperatives. The cooperative in New Cebu reported a significant increase in the total capital share of the members, increasing at least 9 times (906.8%) from its baseline level of P38,260 by the end of the three-year program
The reported current assets of the cooperatives likewise revealed significant increases. New Cebu increased 35 times (3,511.2%) in current assets (P2,482,074.19) from its baseline level of P68,733.30. Matalam showed the lowest increase in current assets (187.8%).
Except for Antipas and Matalam, all the other cooperatives registered positive net incomes. Antipas and Matalam indicated deficits (91.8% and 171.3%, respectively) from their baseline net income (P31,234 and P241,350.12, respectively).
The positive net income earners showed New Cebu earning a net income 96 times higher (9610.1% or P275,506.18) compared to its baseline net income of P2,866.85, with M’lang the lowest (54.2%).
It is interesting to note that by the end of the three-year program, the cooperatives generally had not reported any new operational activities other than those established during the mid term review. Production credit appeared to be the only additional operational activity among the cooperatives.
M’lang did not report any specific regular marketing linkages at the time of the survey. Any accumulated farm produce was directly sold to those offering higher farm-gate prices.s Over and above their local (e.g. AMC in Kidapawan) and Davao City-based marketing linkages, the other four cooperatives (i.e. Antipas, Magpet, Matalam and New Cebu) had linked with a specific group, the so-called “Big Seven”, in the interest of increasing the volume of farm produce necessary to meet the demands of the established marketing outfits in Manila. Their first shipment of 11 vans of corn (with 250 sacks per van) to Manila was made on October 5, 1992. 6 Such efforts of the four cooperatives suggest a certain level of business-oriented management capabilities among the cooperative managers, including a strong sense of service and commitment not only to the individual cooperative members per se but to their respective cooperative-organizations as well.
Various literature on cooperatives report that one compounding factor in the low return of investment of the farmers in farm production is the non-availability of post-harvest facilities ( F). The availability of post-harvest facilities somehow determine the extent of marketing assistance needed by the farmers in the interest of increasing their incomes. Access to PHF may thus develop among the farmers various marketing skills, e.g. deciding when and where to sell their farm produce to ensure high income returns.
Among the cooperatives, Matalam and Magpet appeared to have limited post-harvest facilities. Matalam maintains a warehouse while Magpet just recently purchased a “three-fourths” mini hauler-truck. The rest reported owning more post-harvest facilities. M’lang has a warehouse under construction, a solar drier with a capacity of 100 bags of either rice or corn, one 10-wheeler hauler-truck purchased through a loan from the Land Bank, one 6-wheeler truck, a one-ton truck and a jitney. Antipas, likewise reported a 6-wheeler hauler-truck, a “three-fourths” type hauler, a drier with a capacity of 60 sacks, a corn sheller, and a warehouse which can store 1,800 sacks of corn or palay. New Cebu was able to acquire the following post-harvest facilities: one thresher, one drier that can accommodate 180 sacks of palay or corn, a 6-wheeler hauler-truck, a “three-fourths” type of hauler, two motorcycles, a sheller, and a warehouse with a capacity of 3,000 bags of farm produce.
In the absence of the records on “Farmers’ Income Analysis Sheets” from Phases I to VI, Phase VI income analysis was used instead to present the interplay of farm expenses, gross and net incomes. The gross expenses per hectare ranged from the lowest, P3,816, (Magpet) to as high as P9,541 (M’lang). The total gross farming income per hectare for the Phase Di period was established at P9,399.97 or P2,344.50 a month, with M’lang the highest (P19,543.38), followed by New Cebu (P7,577.93). Antipas reported the lowest total gross farming income per hectare (P4,820.23). The mean net income per hectare was P3,471.31 or P867.83 monthly. Again, M’lang appeared to have earned the highest mean net farming income per hectare (P7,723.13) while Antipas indicated the lowest (P886.75).
Generally, the terminal review revealed that the average gross farming income per hectare decreased compared to the baseline data, with only M’lang showing an increase in average gross farming income per hectare from its baseline level. However, the average net farming income showed an increase (P3,471.31) from its baseline level of P2,916 per hectare or a 19 percent (19%) increase during the three year period. New Cebu and M’lang showed an increase in mean net farming income per hectare compared to their baseline performance.
The low performance relative to the gross and net farming income per hectare may be attributed to the long dry spell experienced by the farmers from 1991 to 1992, particularly in those survey sites where the main farm produce is corn. The drought-period discouraged corn-farmers to plant and harvest their farm produce. The majority of the individual farmers from these areas thus reported having negative gross and net farming income, with the different suggesting the amount of farm inputs utilized in anticipation of rainy season which never came.
More than half (58.2% or 237 farmers) of those who received financial assistance reported income decreases from the previous cropping (Phase III). Specifically, more than half of those loan-beneficiaries revealed lower farm incomes in Antipas and Matalam compared to their baseline income.
Among those reporting farm income increases, a 140.3 percent increase per hectare was indicated, with Magpet (108.7%), M’lang (152.5%) and New Cebu (199.7%) reporting larger increases from their respective baseline level. Those reporting decreases in farming income from the previous income generally revealed a 70.5 percent decrease. Magpet farmer-beneficiaries showed the highest decrease (115.9%) from previous income and M’lang, the lowest (36.1%).
The Five-Self Help Cooperatives
San Vicente Ferrer Consumers Cooperative, Inc. (Antipas).
Having organized four cooperative satellites, this coop has started the construction of a canteen that’ will serve b staff and the students from the nearby school, including residents interested in availing of the canteen services. three barrio-based cooperatives have identified this cooper that with which they want to be affiliated. These cope have been provided marketing assistance, i.e. purchase of commodities from Davao City with corresponding charges, as service fees and transportation costs, ranging from P5 to P10 per box or the like. It has purchased 400 square meters of land for P20,000 and increased its staff to 19.
San Jose Katilingban Consumers Cooperative, Inc. (Magpet).
During the first quarter of 1992, this cooperative transferred to a new location (near the market) from the original office provided by the Catholic rectory, making their services more available and accessible to the members. A newly-hired driver handles the hauler-truck. It has since organized 17 seldas.
M’lang Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc.
This cooperative has also transferred to a new location, i.e. to a site 10-meters distance from its previous site. It has likewise organized 25 satellite-cooperatives.
Farmers’ Service Cooperative, Inc. (New Cebu).
The New Cebu cooperative has acquired a new name, i.e. “New Cebu Farmers’ Multi-purpose Cooperative”. It now holds office in the Samaria house of the parish.
Matalam Sto. Niño Consumers Coop, Inc. (Matalam). Matalam
Cooperative has hired a technician who also acts as the cooperatives collector. It has since acquired two sets of hand held radios and a motorbike for monitoring and collection purposes. It has established a credit-line with Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) for its palsy procurement activities and acquired a commodity loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines. It has facilitated the involvement of 80 farmer-members in cattle-fattening activities through the Land Bank of the Philippines.
The main source of credit for the five self-help cooperatives was the Land Bank of the Philippines through its commodity loan assistance program. The M’lang cooperative was able to obtain loans through tie-ups with the Land Bank and the National Irrigation Administration, over and above the commodity loans availed of directly from the Land Bank of the Philippines. Antipas, Magpet, Matalam and New Cebu likewise availed of commodity loans from the Land Bank. Other sources of credit were likewise identified, such as the Oblates of Mary Immaculate and the provincial government of North Cotabato, among others.
Specific Problem Areas
Focusing on the problems encountered by the five self-help cooperatives relative to their involvement with the NCREDP, the following were identified:
Antipas. The manager noted that the credit committee is ineffective in making the necessary changes in the weakness of its’ members despite being reprimanded by the manager. They readily recognized their faults but always failed to change for the better. Except for one active member, the audit committee was perceived, to be inactive. Other problems cited included the manager’s inability to terminate the cooperative members hired as contractual-, staff, given the lesser work-demands of the cooperative, for fear ofi being misinterpreted (i.e. these individuals may outrightly claimi that the cooperative is also theirs). The low repayment rates of loans acquired from the GKK-KFI and Land Bank of the Philippines by the beneficiaries were likewise cited despite the restructuring schemes implemented, with some beneficiaries discontinuing their transactions and instead availing of the services of the traders. The manager also cited the insufficient working capital. A problem with attitudes was likewise mentioned, given the general perception of the members that the cooperative is their “savior”, i.e. there to provide for such emergency needs as sickness, immediate cash-need, and others.
New Cebu. New Cebu likewise reported low loan repayment) rates, including those loans availed of from various sources.
Magpet. The cooperative manager, Mr. Quijote, mentioned the insufficient funds for cooperative operation and lack of post-harvest facilities. The lack of regular market for the members’ farm products was likewise cited causing members to sell to those offering higher farm-gate buyers. Seventy eight farmer-beneficiaries have stopped their loan-repayments, with some borrowers either selling or hocking their farm inputs to other farmers. Finally, the absence of any clear criteria, based on Cooperative by-laws, for eliminating non-patronizing members was cited.
M’lang. Constraints on the strict implementation of the policies by the marketing staff were reported by the manager. Other problems cited included the low loan-repayment rates, absence of regulated marketing linkages, and the direct-selling of farm produce to traders by those beneficiaries residing in far-flung areas of the municipality.
Matalam. The problems of the Matalam cooperative focused on the limited cooperative working capital and the absence of a hauler-truck to compete with the local traders plying the Kidapawan-Kabacan route.
The Gagmay’ng Kristohanong Katilingban-Kidapawan Foundation, Inc.
The North Cotabato Rural Enterprise Development Program (NCREDP), which started mid-1989, was originally managed by the Social Action Center of the Diocese of Kidapawan. However, because of the program’s expanding operations, the Gagmay’ng Kristohanong Katilingban Kidapawan Foundation, Inc. (GKK-KFI) was subsequently established to allow the proper program-focused activities.
The GKK-KFI has seven board members and an operational staff composed of an executive director, an administrative officer, who likewise acts as the secretary and cashier, a bookkeeper, an organization related problems expert, and three community organizers.
While the GKK-KFI appears to have met the program’s expectations, it is likewise worth noting the following:
a. There is a need to establish a proper and effic4t Management Information System, evidenced by the contents of the reports and the forms of reports submitted to the Foundation by the five self-help cooperatives. Financial-statement reports vary from one cooperative the other and there is no clear monitoring system for he tit periodic review and assessment of the five cooperatives
b. An accurate, regular and appropriate record-keeping sys em must be installed. The available files do not include periodic reports on the actual status of the programs, particularly on the cooperative-level, whether on the quantitative or qualitative aspects of the programs.
c. Coordination between the Foundation and the five cooperatives and among the cooperatives themselves was installed through regular monthly meetings with the cooperative managers. These activities provided opportunities for discussing the status of the program on the cooperative level, including the provision of organizational development assistance and training usually identified through a consultative process between the two cooperative leaders and members. However, the cooperative managers noted the constant monitoring and supervision of the cooperatives in the first two phase of the production loans by Mr. Francisco Magnifico and r. Jun Obello.
The Effects of the Program on GKK-KFI, Five Self-help Cooperatives, Beneficiaries and Community
The following part of this report presents the effects of the program on the program-implementor organization (GKK-KFI), five self-help cooperatives, beneficiaries and the community.
On GKK-KFI. From its initial activity as program implementor of the production loan program funded by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the GKK-KFI has grown into a multi-sectoral non-government organization. Recognizing the sectoral needs of the various residents of the Diocese of Kidapawan, it has developed various programs for women, Muslims and other tribal groups. It has proven its bankability partially through the track records instituted by the CRS-funded credit assistance program, and support from the Diocese of Kidapawan. Such bankability has likewise been supported by the various forms of financial assistance received for its programs, from the Department of Trade and Industry-Region XII, Cardinal Leger, OXFAM UK-Ireland, the Canadian Government, the Sweet Catholic Lenten Fund, the Department of Labor and Employment and the Italian Bishops’ Conference. This has enabled the Diocese to adapt to the emerging realities and opportunities for organizational development and effectively deliver services to the residents of the Diocese.
The program has developed the five self-help cooperatives from a “uni-cooperative” operation of consumer-goods trading to a “multi-cooperative”, i.e. expanding operations to marketing and credit and saving institutions. Likewise, the self-sustaining directed cooperatives have established various linkages with locally-based entities. Land Bank of the Philippines has been tapped for the acquisition of post-harvest facilities, specifically hauler-trucks and marketing capital, not to mention commodity and production loans. Training needs, on the other hand, have been provided by the CCDSMC. Marketing linkages (whether local, Davao City-based or Manila-based) have likewise been explored. Furthermore, the five self-help cooperatives have become socially and politically involved in the activities initiated by the Diocese.
The program, though minimal, has facilitated increases in the farm income of the beneficiaries through trainings, technical assistance and production loans. The minimal effect on income of the program has been attributed to the long dry spell experienced in the areas. The program likewise developed among the farmer-beneficiaries a sense of the value of savings, of the responsibilities of being a cooperative patron, and of the need to avoid exploitative relationships with middlemen or traders. This has been achieved through concerted efforts and the political will to promote collective responsibility for change. This explains the positive support of the beneficiaries to the program.
The capabilities of the farmer-members who have since organized into a cooperative have begun to build inroads into the once trader-dominated economy of the community. As a result of the CRS-funded production loan program, exploitative local traders were threatened by the growing solidarity of the cooperative members to support their respective cooperatives. Some traders (e.g. in M’lang) have discontinued their activities while others hive successfully established a link by lending their post-harvest facilities to the cooperatives (e.g. warehouses, driers and hauler-trucks ). Still others refuse to extend agricultural development-related services to the cooperative members: , Likewise, the cooperate es, including the GKK-KFI, have gained the trust and recognition of the local government which has invited them to sit in the provincial and municipal councils.
Study Findings From the Membership
This section presents data collected from the respond members of the five self-help cooperatives. On the whole, tie members were further classified into beneficiaries and no beneficiaries of the production loans during the three-year perio The production loans served as one mechanism to increase farme income and subsequently develop self-sustaining cooperatives.
The respondents reported a total of 730.91 hectares present cultivated, with M’lang farmers indicating the highest number hectares cultivated (365.8 has.) and Matalam, the lowest (72.3 has). They cultivated an average of 2.22 hectares, with Magpet havin the highest (3.1 has.) and Matalam and M’lang, the lowest (2 has.)
The majority of the respondents did not expand their farms from 1989 to 1992. Slightly over a tenth (14%) of the respondents did expand farm size during the same period from less than one hectare (M’lang) to 2.875 hectares (Magpet).
Those who reported non-expansion of their farm-areas were further asked whether they had reduced their farm area from 1989 to 1992. Data findings indicated that more than three-fourths (86.6%) had not reduced their areas. Only 13.4 percent did, ranging from an average of less than one hectare (Antipas) to as high as 2.17 hectares (Magpet).
The crops planted in the cultivated areas were varied, with palay being the most popular (56.8%). Survey sites varied in the main crops planted. The majority of the respondents from M’lang (86.7%) were planting palay while those in Matalam had planted palay and corn (55.9%). The Magpet crops were more varied, i.e. palay, corn, and other crops. The farmers from Antipas and New Cebu, on the other hand, planted mostly rice and corn which were occasionally intercropped with other crops. On the average, 1.6 hectares were cultivated for palay, 1.5 hectares for corn and bananas, 1.4 hectares for rubber, 2.1 hectares for coconut, 1 hectare for peanuts and coffee, and less than one hectare for fruit trees.
Data regarding the farm practices of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries included use of farm inputs (fertilizers and chemicals), sources of farm inputs, and reasons for buying from the sources, and problems encountered and actions taken to solve such problems. The use of farm inputs (fertilizers and chemicals), as a built-in requirement for availing of production loans, was one strategy used to increase farm-incomes.
The extent of fertilizer-use among the respondents was significantly high, i.e., 99.4 percent for the beneficiaries and 86.5 percent for the non-beneficiaries. A comparison across the survey sites revealed that, except for Magpet, all the beneficiaries used fertilizers. It is interesting to note, however, that the four non-beneficiaries from Antipas were fertilizer-users as well. The three most widely used fertilizers by the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were urea, ammonium phosphate, and ammonium sulfate. (The same fertilizer-types were mentioned by the respondents in the baseline data.)
The cooperatives were cited as the major source of fertilizers for beneficiaries (90.6%) and non-beneficiaries (70.1%) alike. Such findings suggest a major shift in the respondents, relationship with local traders who have otherwise been perceived to be exploiting the cash-strapped local farmers. Baseline results revealed that fertilizers were then mainly procured from the traders, i.e. 96 percent of the respondents.
For the beneficiaries, the fertilizers were procured from the cooperative, primarily because it was part of the production loan program (66.8%). On the other hand, the findings that fertilizers were similarly procured from the cooperative by the non-beneficiaries (58.3%) were even more interesting. Those beneficiaries who availed of fertilizers from the traders did so mainly because these were not available from the cooperative.
Approximately two-thirds of the non-beneficiaries (65.3%) across all the survey-sites described their land as “irrigated” farms. However, all the non-beneficiaries from Antipas reported having rainfed farms. The beneficiaries, on the other hand, were almost equally divided into two main types, i.e. irrigated (503%) and rainfed (49.6%).
Research findings revealed a total of 119 and 143 rice farmer-beneficiaries, and non-beneficiaries, respectively. (Howe er, none of the non-beneficiary respondents from Antipas were planting rice at the time of the survey.) The rice farmers planted a total of 405.7 hectares, 186.6 hectares (46%) of which were plant by the beneficiaries while the other 219.1 hectares (54%) were cultivated by non-beneficiaries. Comparing the two groups, the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries planted an average of 1.6 hectare and 1.5 hectares, respectively.
Among the beneficiaries, respondents fro New Cebu reported the highest average number of hectares planted with rice (1.8 hectares per respondent), with Magpet reporting the lo est (1.2 hectares per respondent). The non-beneficiaries from N w Cebu reported an average of 3 hectares planted with rice’ while those from Magpet and Matalam reported the lowest (1 hectare each).
The corn farmers, on the other hand, planted a total of 173.55 hectares, i.e. 135.85 hectares for the beneficiaries and 37.7 hectares for non-beneficiaries. Beneficiaries from Magpet indicated the highest average number of hectares planted with corn (3.4 hectares) and New Cebu, the lowest (0.9 hectares). The non-beneficiaries from Antipas reported the highest number of hectares planted with corn (2.1 hectares) while Magpet and M’lang indicated the lowest (0.9 hectares each).
To facilitate analysis of the volume of production and considering the long dry spell in 1992, the respondents were asked whether they were able to harvest any farm produce within the first eight months of 1992 rather than focusing solely on the last cropping.
The data revealed that only a few of the rice farmer-respondents (70 beneficiaries and 49 non-beneficiaries) were able to harvest farm produce for the first eight months of 1992. The corn-farmer respondents similarly reported fewer harvests for the first eight months of 1992.
The respondents reported having one or two harvests for both rice and corn for the first eight months of 1992. However, the majority of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries reported having a single harvest within the eight-month period (97.1% and 93.9%, respectively). Similarly, corn was harvested only once by the majority of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries during the period (98.4% and 95.2%, respectively).
Some exceptions, however, were reported. Two beneficiaries from M’lang, one non-beneficiary from Magpet, and two non-beneficiaries from M’lang reported harvesting palay twice for the first eight months of 1992. On the other hand, one beneficiary from Matalam and one non-beneficiary from Antipas reported two corn-harvests during the same period.
The volume of production per hectare for rice and corn appeared to be low for both beneficiaries (41.3 sacks of rice per hectare and 32.2 sacks of non-shelled corn per hectare) and non-beneficiaries (66.2 sacks of rice per hectare and 40.8 sacks of non-shelled corn per hectare) compared to the average figures established in the 1989 baseline, i.e. 75.67 sacks of rice per hectare and 65.1 sacks of non-shelled corn per hectare. As indicated earlier, such findings may be attributed to the long drought period experienced by the respondents in 1992.
Upon closer investigation of the data, the average rice and corn harvest per hectare appeared to be higher among the non-beneficiaries compared to the beneficiaries. Rice harvest per hectare was comparatively higher among the M’lang beneficiaries (62.8 sacks per hectare) and non-beneficiaries (72.3%) than those in the other survey sites. Such differences may be attributed to differences in water source, i.e. M’lang being a widely irrigated area vis-a-vis the other survey sites.
Corn harvest per hectare, on the other hand, was relatively high among New Cebu respondents (58.8 sacks of non-shelled corn per hectare for the non-beneficiaries). This could perhaps be due to the greater number of corn-farmers (39 farm rs) in New Cebu with an average of 1.5 hectares for corn production compared to the other survey areas, including the relatively plain corn areas it has.
Farmer beneficiaries were generally a rice-eating group (50.4%) while the non-beneficiaries preferred corn (62.1 %). The data revealed high proportion of rice-consumption among the beneficiaries from Antipas (75.3%) and Matalam (85.5%) and the non-beneficiaries from Magpet (81.4%) and Matalam (. 3.3%). On the other hand, except for the beneficiaries from Magpet, the majority of the non-beneficiaries from all the survey sit s generally consumed more than half of their corn produce.
Post-harvest facilities play a very important role in he farming activities of the farmers. They facilitate the processing o the harvest and will develop the capabilities of farmers to store fa produce whenever necessary so as to avail of higher prices. The following section discuss the respondents’ knowledge and awareness of the post-harvest facilities, namely the various services offered by their respective cooperatives, the type of post-harvest -facilities known, and the mechanism for making respondents aware of the existence of such facilities. A related discussion will focus on the utilization of post-harvest facilities (including the reasons for non-use), the fees or charges made for the use of such facilities (including the reasons for their free use, if appropriate), the problems encountered in their use and the solutions undertaken to solve such problems.
The survey results revealed a high awareness among the respondents (79.9% for beneficiaries and 67.6% for non-beneficiaries) regarding the existence of post-harvest facilities in their respective cooperatives. All the beneficiaries from Antipas and New Cebu and non-beneficiaries from Antipas were aware of such facilities in their cooperatives.
On the whole, six types of post-harvest facilities were mentioned. Among the beneficiaries, the most frequently mentioned were the warehouses (87.4%), hauler-trucks (86.6%), and driers (85.8%). The non-beneficiaries, on the other hand, reported mainly warehouses and driers.
M’lang beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries indicated the greatest number of known post-harvest facilities offered by their cooperatives (six types), while the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Magpet reported the fewest types of post-harvest facilities known to be offered by their cooperatives.
Research findings indicated at least five strategies utilized in informing the respondents about the post-harvest facilities in their cooperatives., The beneficiaries were usually informed during training activities (40.9%) while the non-beneficiaries mainly learned about such facilities from other cooperative members (40%).
Among those respondents aware of the post-harvest facilities, a high proportion has actually used these facilities (89.8% of the beneficiaries and 66.9% of the non-beneficiaries). None of the respondents from Magpet reported having used any post-harvest facility, given their inaccessible farm-areas and direct-selling practices of fresh farm produce.
Among the respondents, the post-harvest facilities most widely used were the hauler-trucks (78.1% of the beneficiaries and 76.6% of the non-beneficiaries) and driers (47.4% of the beneficiaries and 33.8% of the non-beneficiaries).
On the other hand, the beneficiaries who failed to use any of the post-harvest facilities said mainly that they did not need them, i.e. either they were “not storing farm produce” (46.2%) or they “they had (their) own drier(s)” (23.1%). The beneficiaries gave similar reasons for not using such facilities. To a lesser extent, other reasons cited by the beneficiaries included “the limited access to or inappropriateness of such post-harvest facilities” among others. The non-beneficiaries cited mainly the distant location of their farms from such post-harvest facilities, and their practice of selling their fresh farm produce directly.
Those who claimed using the post-harvest facilities of their cooperatives were asked about the fees or charges made on their use. A significant majority of the beneficiaries (85.1 % claimed that there were corresponding fees paid, while a smaller proportion of the non-beneficiaries (58.4%) reported similar charges. All the beneficiaries from Antipas and New Cebu (including’ the non-beneficiaries of the latter) reported making such ,payments. Forty-nine respondents (17 beneficiaries and 32 non-beneficiaries) reported the free use of the facilities.
Those respondents who paid for the use of such facilities reported various arrangements. The charges for the hauler-trucks were computed on a “per-kilo” basis while those for the driers and warehouses were computed on a “per-sack’ basis. The respondents (both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) were usually charged from P0.05 to P0.25 per kilo for hauler-trucks while those using the warehouses and driers were usually charged from P1 to P2 per sack. The beneficiaries who used, the warehouses were usually charged from P1 to P2 per sack while the non-beneficiaries were charged less than P1.
More than half (57.9%) of the beneficiaries and over three-fourths of the non-beneficiaries (76.7%) did not meet any problems in using the post-harvest facilities of their cooperatives. Those who did mentioned mainly the insufficient number of facilities to serve all the cooperative members. Specifically, all the non-beneficiaries from Antipas, Matalam and New Cebu (including the beneficiaries from Matalam) reported that no problems were encountered in using such facilities.
Of the 66 respondents (48 beneficiaries and 18 non-beneficiaries) asked about the solutions used in response to the problems met, 35 respondents (53%) were generally passive, i.e. they solved their problems by “just waiting until the desired post-harvest facilities were available.” Twenty others, appeared to have been more resourceful either renting other privately owned post-harvesting facilities or using their neighbors’ facilities.
Marketing
This section contains various marketing-related data, namely, sales practices,- reasons for not selling all of their farm produce, the usual buyers of their farm produce, reasons for selling farm produce to the usual buyer, when farm produce is usually sold, preferred buyer of farm produce, reasons for preference of certain buyers, perceived advantages of selling farm produce to the cooperatives, marketing problems encountered, and solutions undertaken to solve such marketing problems.
A significant majority of the beneficiaries (76.1%) and non-beneficiaries (88.8%) did not sell all their farm produce. Similar patterns were observed across all survey sites for both types of respondents. It is interesting to note that none of the non-beneficiaries from Matalam sold any of their farm produce. For both types of respondents, the single most-mentioned reason cited for not selling all their produce was their family consumption.
To whom did these respondents sell their farm produce? Who were their direct buyers? Data findings revealed that more than three-fourths (78.9%) of the beneficiaries sold their farm produce to the cooperatives while close to half (47.4%) of the non-beneficiaries sold their produce to the traders. Except for the respondents from Magpet, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike in all survey sites generally sold their farm produce to cooperatives. All Magpet respondents, in contrast to the others, reported selling their produce to the traders rather than to the cooperatives.
Among the beneficiaries, selling farm produce to the cooperatives was motivated mainly by their desire to patronize their cooperative (94.1%), since such sales were considered as “payments for the loans availed of” (94.1 %). The non-beneficiaries, on the other hand, were motivated in selling their farm produce to the cooperative because of the “high buying price” (90%). As cooperative members themselves, they likewise considered it as one way of patronizing the cooperative (70%). In the same vein, those beneficiaries selling their produce to the traders were motivated by the “immediate need for cash” (71.4%). Non-beneficiaries, meanwhile, cited the purchasing strategies employed by the traders, i.e. directly picking up their farm products (81.8%).
The beneficiaries generally observed two schedules in selling their farm products, i.e. either selling farm produce right after threshing (47.2%) or after drying (46.5%). The non-beneficiaries mainly sold their farm produce right after threshing activities (66.5%). The respondents were further asked about the buyers they preferred. The majority of both groups (81.1% of the beneficiaries and 70.6% of the non-beneficiaries) cited selling to the cooperatives as one strategy for patronizing them.
Those who preferred to sell their farm produce to the cooperatives were further asked about the perceived advantages in selling to such associations. Research findings revealed that the beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries alike cited mainly increased savings as one perceived advantage. Other advantages mentioned included the chance of availing of low-cost credits, th high buying price of cooperatives, and access to the post-h6rve t facilities of the cooperatives.
Those who reported selling their farm pr duce to the cooperatives were likewise asked about ‘any problem encountered in doing so. At least 17 out of 34 beneficiaries and fur out of ten non-beneficiaries admitted having encountered problems in selling their produce to the cooperative. Both groups cite the limited funds available to pay for the produced livered to the cooperative. Still others mentioned the limited number of hauler-trucks, the poor roads and the low buying price.
The solutions mentioned suggest Other a certain degree of passivity or sense of powerlessness among the respondents, being content mainly with “waiting till the cooperative has the money to pay for the produce delivered”. While the respondents may have wanted to do something about such problems, the situation may simply have been perceived to be beyond their control.
Trainings
Trainings have been considered as one major component of the NCREDP, i.e. as a way to ensure that member-beneficiaries are provided the necessary inputs and skills, both in farming techniques and in non-farming related activities. This section thus presents the level of attendance of the respondents at trainings sponsored by the cooperatives, trainings actually attended, the perceived usefulness of the trainings attended, and the reasons for considering such trainings useful (or otherwise).
There were more beneficiaries (81.1%) attending the cooperative sponsored trainings relative to the non-beneficiaries (54.1%). Interestingly, all the non-beneficiaries from Antipas and Matalam reported having attended such cooperative trainings.
The respondents attended at least 18 types of cooperative trainings. Both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries mentioned mainly the “pre-membership” seminar and trainings in farming techniques. Beneficiaries from Antipas were involved in the largest variety of trainings (13 types), while Magpet beneficiaries had the least varied (3 types). Among the non-beneficiaries, M’lang respondents reported the most varied trainings (9 types), while New Cebu indicated the least (2 types).
A significant number of beneficiaries (89.1%) and non-beneficiaries (93.5%) considered such trainings useful. On the other hand, some beneficiaries from Antipas (9%), Matalam (4.5%), M’lang (12.1%) and New Cebu (4.3%) and some non-beneficiaries from Antipas (50%) and M’lang (2.9%) claimed otherwise.
Those respondents who regarded the trainings useful were further asked how these trainings were found to be useful. The respondents cited mainly their improved understanding of cooperatives and the additional knowledge gained. Still others mentioned improvements in their savings-habits and in their personalities, and the “practical farming knowledge” gained, among others.
Those who did not consider such trainings useful, on the other hand, were likewise asked to explain their perceptions. Among the nine beneficiaries concerned, five claimed that the knowledge gained was never applied. The four non-beneficiaries who similarly did not find the trainings useful complained about the cumbersome preparation of organic fertilizers and the limited supply of materials necessary in preparing the latter.
Field Assistance
To supplement the trainings provided by the cooperatives for their members, hands-on technical assistance was likewise envisioned to guide the members appropriately in’ their actual application of the knowledge and skills derived either from trainings attended or from other sources. This section presents the respondents’ level of awareness of the technical assistance provided by the cooperatives, and the types of technical assistance received. Related questions focused on whether the technical assistance received was found to be useful, and the reasons for considering such technical assistance as useful (or otherwise). Respondents were likewise asked about the field visits conducted any of the cooperative staff and about the farming techniques taught during such visits. Finally, the results of using such farming techniques were likewise investigated, i.e. the manner in which fanning techniques had improved production (and the reasons or believing otherwise), the problems encountered in availing of the hands-on technical assistance, and the solutions undertaken to solve the problems met.
The respondents were generally aware 484. % for the beneficiaries and 70% for the non-beneficiaries) of hands-on technical assistance provided by the cooperatives to its members. All the non-beneficiaries from Antipas and Matala reported knowing about the technical assistance provided by their cooperatives.
Those aware of the technical assistance offered by the cooperatives (135 beneficiaries and 119 non-beneficiaries) were further asked about the technical assistance availed of (if any). More than two-thirds (70%) of the beneficiaries and close to half of the non-beneficiaries claimed to have received some forms of technical assistance.
While 10 types of technical services were received by the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike, the most mentioned was the proper application of fertilizers and chemicals (46.8% and 45.5%, respectively). The non-beneficiaries from M’lang received the most varied technical assistance (8 types) while both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries from Magpet reported only one type. The other forms of technical assistance received by the respondents were related to “organic farming”, “proper planting system”, and “corn technology”.
The technical assistance received was found to be useful by a significant majority of both beneficiaries (75.5%) and non-beneficiaries (74.5%). All beneficiaries from Magpet, including the non-beneficiaries from Matalam and New Cebu, had similar responses. Those who regarded the technical assistance useful cited mainly the knowledge gained (42.2% and 36.6% of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, respectively), and the practical application of these techniques (31% and 29.3% of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, respectively). On the other hand, those who did not find the technical assistance useful singularly cited the non-application of knowledge gained.
More than three-fourths (79.2%) of the beneficiaries reported having been visited in their farms by the cooperative staff to discuss farming techniques. On the whole, more than half (53.5%) of the non-beneficiaries claimed otherwise. At the same time, one notes with interest that all the non-beneficiaries from Matalam reported such visits.
At least eight types of farming techniques were taught, the most mentioned being the proper use of fertilizers and chemicals (57.9% of the beneficiaries and 58.2% of the non-beneficiaries). New Cebu beneficiaries reported the widest variety of farming techniques (8 types) followed by the non-beneficiaries from M’lang (7 types). The non-beneficiaries from Antipas mentioned only a single farming technique.
Those taught farming techniques by the cooperative staff were further asked whether their farming techniques had improved or not. A significant majority of the beneficiaries (79.4%) and non-beneficiaries (75.9%) responded positively, as evidenced by their claims of improved farm production, applied knowledge and skills, and pest control.
On the other hand, 45 respondents reported that there were no perceived improvements in their farming techniques. The reasons cited were the crop-failures experienced as a result of the drought period, even as others claimed not having applied their karning or not having learned anything new.
Twenty-seven respondents (23 beneficiaries and 4 non-beneficiaries) admitted having some problems in availing of the technical assistance offered by the cooperatives to their members. The most-cited problem (20 respondents) concerned the non-availability of a technician and consequently, the delayed response to their farming problems by the technicians (6 respondents).
Ten respondents (8 beneficiaries and 2 non-beneficiaries) failed to do anything about their problems while six others (4 beneficiaries and 2 non-beneficiaries) simply waited for the technician. Two beneficiaries, however, claimed having solved their own problems.
Loan Assistance
This section on loan assistance focuses on the receipt (Or non-receipt) of such assistance by the respondents, including their knowledge and awareness of the specific requirements of the program.
Receipt of Loan for the Last Twelve Months. Nearly all (93;7%) of the beneficiaries have availed of loans for the last 12 month. The other 6.3 percent did not renew their loan application during the last Phase (VI) of the production loan program. Likewise, it is interesting to note cases of non-beneficiaries (58.2%) availing of loans for the last 12 months, the last phase of the Production Loan Program. This is due to members of the cooperative.
Awareness of the Requirements of Cooperative Loans. The majority of the beneficiaries (88.7%) and non-beneficiaries (60.6%) were aware of the requirements of the cooperative loans. All the non-beneficiaries from Matalam likewise reported being aware of the cooperative loan requirements. Understandably, more non-beneficiaries from Magpet claimed not having any knowledge of the requirements on loans offered by their cooperative.
Requirement Known for the Cooperative Loans. Asked about the requirements in applying for the cooperative loans, the respondents mentioned at least 10 requirements for members to qualify for such loans, the most mentioned (101 respondents) being the “completed and approved loan papers”. To a lesser extent, 68 respondents mentioned that one should be “a member in good standing (MIGS)” while 53 cited “one’s membership in the cooperative”. Thirty-seven respondents mentioned that “one must have a capital share of at least P5,000”, while 23 others indicated one’s attendance in the pre-membership seminar.
Participation in the Cooperative Activities
Participation refers to the active involvement of the cooperative members in the activities of the cooperatives. The extent of participation of the members in such activities is indicative of the extent that cooperativism has been promoted by the cooperatives. Thus, this section discusses the respondents, participation (or non-participation) in cooperative activities, their reasons for not participating in such activities, the cooperative activities participated in, and their self-ratings regarding participation in cooperative activities.
Survey findings showed a significantly high level of participation in cooperative activities – both for the beneficiaries (95%) and non-beneficiaries (76.5%). All the beneficiaries from Antipas, Magpet and New Cebu and the non-beneficiaries from Antipas and Matalam claimed having participated in such activities. failed to participate in cooperative activities. Asked regarding their non-participation, twenty non-beneficiaries cited their distant residences while 11 others simply described themselves as inactive members. Similarly, the beneficiaries noted their inactive membership in the cooperatives due to their distant residences.
The cooperative activities mainly participated in by 151 beneficiaries and 130 non-beneficiaries were the cooperative general assemblies, meetings, and cooperative-trainings. To a much lesser extent, respondents were involved with dagyaw (bayanihan or communal labor), field trips, and Board of Directors meetings . When asked to rate their participation in cooperative activities, more than half of the beneficiaries (63.6%) and non-beneficiaries (51.5%) rated their participation as “active”.
Other Assistance Received by the Respondents
Recognizing the role of other agencies relative to the development of the marginal members of society, one underlying assumption in the study was that the respondents would most likely avail of the services offered by these agencies. This portion of the report thus looks into the assistance received by the respondents from agencies other than the cooperatives.
Survey results showed that less than a fourth (23%) of the total respondents received assistance from other agencies. All the six non-beneficiaries from New Cebu claimed that they had not received any type of agency-based assistance.
Those who claimed to have received some form of, assistance from other agencies (45 beneficiaries and 31 non-beneficiarie0 were likewise asked on the specific assistance received. At least 14 types of assistance were reported, with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries together mentioning mainly fertilizers (25 respondents) and production loans (14 respondents). M’lang respondents reported the most varied types of assistance received Worn 7 to 8 types). To a limited extent, other forms of assistance received from the other agencies were commodity loans, calamity funds, rice-assistance, and others.
Most of the assistance received by the respondents were provided by government agencies (e.g. Department of Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources and Environment, and National Food Authority), individuals (e.g. local officials, Governor Diaz and chemical dealers), and non-government organizations (e.g. women’s groups, farmers organizations, and GKK-KFI).
Comments and Recommendations
To determine the strengths and weaknesses of the cooperatives, the respondents were asked to comment on the cooperatives, specifically in terms of management, technical assistance, loan assistance, post-harvest facilities, trainings, and cooperative technicians.
On the whole, more than half of the respondents (56% of the beneficiaries and 63.6% of the non-beneficiaries) failed to comment on the cooperative management. Those who did cited mainly its “good management” (47 beneficiaries and 33 non-beneficiaries). On the other hand, 21 respondents perceived that the staff had limited management skills, while 13 others noted “unclear management policies”.
A total of 147 respondents (44.7%) failed to give their insights on the technical assistance received from the cooperative. At least 35 beneficiaries, along with 56 non-beneficiaries, recommended that the current technical assistance program be continued. Twelve respondents cited the additional knowledge gained. Negative insights were likewise given. While forty-eight respondents believed that no technical assistance was provided, 46 others described such assistance as limited.
The loan assistance program was received positively by many of the respondents, who cited the financial assistance given for their farm inputs and the low interest-charges. At least 54 respondents recommended that the loan assistance be continued. However, nearly half (42%) of the respondents failed to comment on the cooperative loan assistance program.
Close to half (43%) of the respondents likewise failed to give any insights regarding post-harvest facilities. The comments given, however, focused on the limited number of facilities ( 23%) and the absence of post-harvest facilities in the barrios (17%). At least 39 respondents (12%) considered them useful.
More than half (55%) failed to comment on the cooperative-trainings given. At least 55 respondents (17%) considered such trainings useful, while others (21%) found them limited. Approximately a third (32%) of the respondents did not give any insights regarding the cooperative technicians. Those who did gave mainly positive responses, i.e. finding them “active” (20%) and “good” (19%) and regularly visiting the farms (14%). Negative responses were likewise given, e.g. considering their service A. (19%) and number (10%) limited.
Noting the comments discussed earlier, what recommendations were given by the respondents so as to improve their cooperatives? On the part of the management, the respondents recommended mainly that more management trainings be given, along with more technical services. Other recommendations were that loans be increased from P3,000 to P5,000 per hectare, and that shellers and driers be provided to improve post-harvest facilities. More trainings for members were similarly recommended, as well as for technicians, and an increase in the number of the latter.
Savings
The savings-related variables consisted of engaging in non-cooperative-based savings and depositories, utilization of such savings, crop-sharing arrangements with the cooperative as payment for their capital build-up, and reasons for not observing such arrangements.
Survey results revealed that except for 36 respondent (22 beneficiaries and 14 non-beneficiaries), all the respondents (representing 89%) were engaged solely in cooperative-savings. Such findings reflect the extent of the “forced savings” behavior among the respondents, i.e. their compliance with cooperative regulations without which such savings might not even cooperative regulations without which such savings might not even be possible.
Twenty-one respondents said that they had deposited their savings in the bank, showing their level of exposure to the formal banking system, and their readiness to avail of the bank’s safe-keeping services. However, ten other respondents said they were engaged in informal savings, and simply maintained their savings in their homes. Finally, some beneficiaries from New Cebu reported that they were engaged in various forms of savings outside the cooperative, e.g. in banks, homes, credit-unions, and other cooperatives. Household savings were reportedly practiced by ten respondents because of the distance of banks or other savings-institutions from their residences. Another beneficiary in M’lang reported that he had “deposited” (invested) money in a local lending activity (locally known as the “5-6” system wherein a borrower pays P1 for every P5 borrowed).
The 36 respondents having non-cooperative savings reported varied uses for such funds. While 15 respondents (10 beneficiaries and 5 non-beneficiaries) simply maintained their savings as such, others considered these as either contingency funds (10 respondents) or funds for the education of their children (8 respondents). Two others reported having used their savings for farm production.
A related measure of the respondents’ saving capacity was manifested in the form of post-harvest crop-sharing arrangements with the cooperative as part of their capital build-up shares. Data revealed that nearly two-thirds (62.6%) of the respondents (specifically 77% of the beneficiaries and 47% of the non-beneficiaries) were involved in such arrangements while the rest (126 respondents representing 32% of the total) were not.
Asked why no crop-sharing arrangements were made by these 126 respondents, they cited mainly their low farm yields. To a lesser extent, other reasons given were the “failure in farm produce due to drought” (26%), or the fact that their “farm produce was just enough for the family” (20%).
Income
Utilizing income-related variables, the respondents assessed their incomes by comparing such incomes with household expenses. Questions were also raised about their coping mechanisms in the face of inadequate income and any perceived changes in farm income between 1989 and 1992. They were asked what the specific changes in income were, what specific lifestyle changes occurred, how their 1989 income compared with that in 1992, and finally, what their perceptions were on whether their incomes had improved as a result of their membership tin the cooperative or not and the reasons for such perceptions.
Comparing their farm income with their family expenses during the given period, more than three-fourths (79%) of the respondents (consisting of 120 beneficiaries and 139 non-beneficiaries) revealed that their farm income was not enough to meet family expenses. Forty respondents (12%) considered their incomes adequate, while ten others (3%) regarded their incomes in excess of expenses. How did those respondents with inadequate farm income handle their family expenses? What mechanisms were undertaken so as to bridge the gap between income and expenses? To cope with such difficulties, the respondents generally borrowed from money lenders (26.7% of the beneficiaries and 36% of the non-beneficiaries). Others either sought assistance from relatives and friends (11%) or simply “sold farm produce” (10%). Nine respondents mentioned using their past savings.
Approximately three-fourths of the respondents (80.5% of the beneficiaries and 68.2% of the non-beneficiaries) perceived changes in farm incomes from 1989 to 1992. Asked about the specific income changes, however, nearly two-thirds (61%) o these respondents reported negative changes while the rest (36%) perceived positive income changes.
Those reporting positive changes in their incomes were further asked about any perceived changes in their lifestyles due to such income increases. The majority of the beneficiaries (73.2%) and Asked about specific perceived changes in their lifestyles as a result of the increase in farming income, most of those claiming a change (33.3% of the beneficiaries and 54.4% of the non-beneficiaries) reported using the additional income for the education of their children. Other changes mentioned included providing credit to individuals, bank-savings, cooperative-savings, purchase of appliances, and payment of outstanding loans/credits, among others.
To determine the effects of the NCREDP production loans and other loans of program-assistance on the incomes of the targeted recipients of the program, the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were asked to compare their 1992 farming income with their 1989 farming income. A 10-point ladder scale was utilized where “10” indicated the “most affluent” stage and “1” “the worst”. Research findings revealed that most of the beneficiaries rated both 1989 and 1992 incomes on ladder step number “5”. On the other hand, most of the non-beneficiaries rated their 1989 income on ladder step number “5” and their 1992 income on step number “6”. Such results suggest that the non-beneficiaries perceived themselves to be earning relatively higher incomes in 1992 compared to 1989, while the beneficiaries did not perceive any income changes at all.
However, mean ratings showed a downtrend in 1992 farming income relative to 1989 for both beneficiaries (from 4.8 in 1989 to 4.6 in 1992) and non-beneficiaries (from 4.7 in 1989 to 4.2 in 1992). While the beneficiaries registered below the mid-point, 5, they were still relatively better off, given the relatively lower 0.2 decrease in their mean rating from 1989 to 1992. Non-beneficiaries, on the other hand, indicated a decrease of 0.5 in their 1992 farm income compared to the 1989 mean ratings. These decreases in farming income could perhaps have been due to the long dry spell experienced by both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
Across the survey sites, only Magpet non-beneficiaries (from 4.1 in 1989 to 5 in 1992) and beneficiaries from New Cebu (from 4.2 in 1989 and 4.8 in 1992) indicated increases in their farming income between 1989 and 1992. Increases in farming income among Magpet non-beneficiaries may be explained by their participation in the production of table-bananas (specifically the “Lacatan” species), coconut, rubber and coffee since 1991.
A significant majority of the respondents (60% of the beneficiaries and 44% of the non-beneficiaries) perceived some improvements in their income since their membership in the cooperatives. On the other hand, 95 non-beneficiaries claimed otherwise. Interestingly, three non-beneficiaries from Matalam similarly perceived improvements in their incomes. Asked about their perceived improvements in income, the respondents noted mainly their “increased farm income” (39%), their savings (20%) “debt-payments” (19%), and access to cheaper consumer goods (18%). To a lesser extent, others cited the lower-interest loans, cheaper farm-inputs and potentials for farm-expansions.
For the 158 respondents (63 beneficiaries and 95 non-beneficiaries) who did not perceive any improvements in their income, the singular most important reason cited was their crop-failures as a result of the drought (49%). Thirty-four respondents simply felt “no change” in their incomes. Eighteen others cited the high cost of ‘farm-inputs and the low buying-price for their produce while sixteen respondents explained that their “produce (was) just enough for the(ir) family”. To a lesser extent, other reasons cited were the poor technical assistance, non-cooperative credit, and the fact that “farm produce (was) just enough to pay (for one’s) debts.”
Summary of Findings and Recommendations
This was a terminal study on the North ,Co Enterprise Development Program (NCREDP) which indicators necessary in evaluating and monitoring results, and impact of the program. Related research focused on identifying and assessing the project’s accomplishments vis-a-vis objectives, including its strengths and weak of the questions asked were: How effective were the strategies and approaches used in the program? What was the program on capital build-up and the participation of beneficiaries respective cooperatives? What factors affected th performance? As with similar studies of this nature, the final section deals with the formulation of recommendations to improve the project scheme in the hope of providing some basis for future program planners to design strategies and approaches that will better ensure the project’s success.
The findings were as follows:
1. A total of 1,924 individual farmers were reported to have been provided P6,102,811.99 worth of loans from Phases I-V, earning an interest of P526,455.30 and generating a total capital build-up of P1,846,005.80.
2. The collection rate for the loans released to the farmers was 76.6 percent, with 81.9 percent of the loan-interest and 38.5 percent, of the capital build-up generated being collected.
3. A close analysis of the names of individual farmers provided with loan assistance from Phases Ito VI revealed a total of 802 actual farmers extended financial assistance.
4. Except for M’lang, all the five self-help cooperatives exceeded the target of 110 farmer-members that should have been provided financial assistance. M’lang has just met the standards set of 110 farmer-members.
5. The majority (61.7%) of the 802 farmer-beneficiaries were invariably drop-outs of the financial assistance program. Only 21.9 percent or 219 beneficiaries were continuing production loan recipients.
6. Only the M’lang cooperative generated a capital build-up more than the targeted P690,000 by the end of the three-year program.
7. The capital build-up generated by the five self-help cooperatives increased more than three times (363.8%) from its baseline figure of P377,721.
8. Around 4 percent (32 members) of the 802 farmer-beneficiaries reported a capital build-up equal to or greater than the assumed capital build-up a beneficiary should have generated by the end of the three-year program.
9. There were more leaders (i.e. ranging from 1 to 59, indicating a figure more than the projected 10 leaders per cooperative) that were provided cooperative management-related training, usually related to financial management and skills development.
10. More than 550 farmer-members were recipients of cooperative-sponsored trainings.
11. Farmer-beneficiaries successfully minimized establishing credit and marketing relationships with local traders.
12. All the five self-help cooperatives were duly registered, thus acquiring legal personality.
13. Rather than establishing a separate federation, the five self-help cooperatives instead acquired membership in the Cotabato-Davao del Sur Federation of Cooperatives.
14. Cooperative membership almost doubled (147:8%) by the end of the three-year program from its baseline figure.
15. Members’ capital share increased by at least five times (443.2%) by the end of the three-year program, compared to its baseline figure.
16. Current assets of the five self-help cooperatives in reared by at least seven times (607.85%) from its baseline status.
17. Total current assets of the five self-help cooperatives increased by at least eight times (700.4%) from its baseline status.
18. Net income of the five self-help cooperatives decreased by at least 31.8 percent from its baseline status by the end of the three-year program. This is due to the negative net income of the Matalam cooperative.
19. The mean gross farm expenses per hectare per cropping were computed at P5,521.
20. The mean gross farm income per hectare per cropping was P9,377.97 or P2,344.50 per month.
21. The mean net farm income per hectare per cropping was P3,471.31 or P867.83 per month.
Beneficiaries vis-a-vis Non-beneficiaries
1. The respondents cultivated an average of 2.22 hectares of land.
2. The majority of the respondents (86%) reported non-expansion of farm-size from 1989 to 1992; those who did, expanded their farm size by an average of 1.23 hectares.
3. The majority of the respondents (86.6%) did not reduce their farm-size; those who did reduced their farm size by an average of 1.22 hectares.
4. A variety of crops have been reported planted by the respondents, with rice as the most popular (56.8%).
5. An average of 1.6 and 1.5 hectares per respondent were planted with rice and corn, respectively.
6. There was a high rate fertilizer usage among the beneficiaries (99.4%) and non-beneficiaries (86.5%), usually urea, ammonium sulfate, and ammonium phosphate.
7. Cooperatives were the major source of fertilizers for both beneficiaries (90.6%) and non-beneficiaries (70.1%) compared to the baseline data where traders served as the main source of fertilizers.
8. Beneficiaries mentioned that sourcing of fertilizers from the cooperatives was but part of the production loan program while the non-beneficiaries did so as regular patrons of the cooperative.
9. Chemical-usage was likewise high among the respondents (74.8% of the beneficiaries and 85.3% of the mon-beneficiaries), with cooperatives serving as the main sogrce. Beneficiaries explained this situation as being part of the production loan program while the non-beneficiaries said that they did so as part of their membership-role.
10. Hostathion, Thiodan, Trebon and Nuvacron were the four most frequently mentioned chemicals used.
11. Unavailability of fertilizers and chemicals from the cooperative forced some respondents to avail of such from the traders.
12. “Delayed release” and “limited/no stocks” were the two most frequently mentioned farm-input procurement problems of the beneficiaries (43.8% and 40.3%) and the non-beneficiaries (22.5% and 29%), with those concerned simply requesting cash from the cooperative to buy the farm inputs outside the cooperative (60.4% of the beneficiaries and 69.9% of the non-beneficiaries).
13. The beneficiaries’ type of farm was almost equally div between “irrigated” (50.3%) and “rainfed”(49.7%) the majority of the non-beneficiaries reported ha “irrigated” farms.
14. Rice-farmer beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries plant average of 1.6 and 1.5 hectares, respectively.
15. Corn-farmer beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries planted an average of 1.5 and 1.1 hectares, respectively.
16. A limited number of rice-farmer respondents (70 beneficiaries and 49 non-beneficiaries) reported any harvest for the first eight months of 1992., so with the corn-farmer respondents (62 beneficiaries and 21 non-beneficiaries).
17. The volume of rice and corn production for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries appeared to be low compared to the baseline figures due to the long dry spell.
18. Beneficiaries were generally rice-consumers (50.4%) while non-beneficiaries mainly preferred corn (62.1%).
19. There was a high level of awareness among the respondents regarding the existence of the post-harvest facilities in their cooperatives, with the beneficiaries usually being informed through cooperative training activities and the non-beneficiaries learning about these through their co-members.
20. Warehouses (87.4%), hauler-trucks (86.6%), and driers (85.8%) were the three most frequently mentioned post-harvest facilities which the beneficiaries were aware of, while the non-beneficiaries were mostly aware of the warehouses and driers.
21. Use of the post-harvest facilities (usually the hauler-trucks and driers) was high for both the beneficiaries (89.8%) and non-beneficiaries (66.9%).
22. Those who did not use the post-harvest facilities explained that these were not needed, either because they were not storing farm produce (direct-selling) or they had their own driers.
23. A high proportion of the beneficiaries (85.1%) and non-beneficiaries (58.4%) reported that corresponding charges were made for the use of the post-harvest facilities.
24. Some respondents reported the free use of the post-harvest facilities, particularly in M’lang and Matalam.
25. The amount of charges for the use of the post-harvest facilities varied with the type of facility, i.e. the use of hauler-trucks was paid for on a per-kilo-basis (usually from P0.05 to P0.25 per kilo for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) while use of warehouses and driers was paid for on a per-sack-basis.
26. The limited number of post-harvest facilities was cited by the respondents as a major problem regarding the use of the facilities with no definite solutions undertaken.
27. The majority of the beneficiaries (75.5%) and non-beneficiaries (88.8%) did not sell their entire farm produce, as some portions were used for household consumption.
28. The majority of the beneficiaries (78.9%) sold their produce to the cooperatives while close to half of the non-beneficiaries (47.3%) sold to traders.
29. The sale of farm produce to traders was justified by ; the beneficiaries in terms of their “immediate need for cash’ while the non-beneficiaries cited the advantage of the traders’ picking up their farm produce directly from their farms.
30. Beneficiaries sold their farm produce either right after threshing or drying while the non-beneficiaries did so right after threshing. 31. Both beneficiaries (81.1%) and non-beneficiaries (70.5%) preferred to sell their produce to the cooperatives by way of patronizing the cooperative.
32. The main advantage cited by the respondents in selling their produce to the cooperatives was the increase in savings.
33. The basic problem encountered by the respondent in marketing their produce to the cooperative was the limited funds available to pay for their farm produce; these Were met with passive indifference.
34. Attendance in cooperative-sponsored trainings was high among the beneficiaries (81.1%) compared to the non-beneficiaries (54.1%); usually they attended the ” re-membership”trainings and farming-techniques training
35. A significant majority of the beneficiaries (89.1%) and non-beneficiaries (93.4%) cited the usefulness of the trainings, usually noting the improved understanding of cooperatives and the additional knowledge gained as the main benefits .
36. The failure to apply knowledge gained from the trainings was cited as the primary reason for perceiving trainings as not useful.
37. There was .a high level of awareness among the beneficiaries (84.9%) and non-beneficiaries (70%) regarding the hands-on technical assistance provided by the cooperatives, with more than two-thirds (70%) of the beneficiaries and close to half (46%) of the non-beneficiaries reporting actual use of such services.
38. The usefulness of the field technical assistance provided was noted by the majority of the beneficiaries (75.5%) and non-beneficiaries (74.5%), usually in terms of knowledge accumulation and practical application of these techniques.
39. Non-usefulness of the field technical assistance, on the other hand, was related to the non-application of knowledge gained.
40. A high proportion of the beneficiaries (79.2%) and non-beneficiaries (53.5%) reported that their farms were visited by the cooperative staff in order to discuss the proper use of fertilizers and chemicals.
41. The majority of those who were visited (79.4% of the beneficiaries and 75.9% of the non-beneficiaries) reported improvements in their farm techniques, as evidenced by their improved farm production, applied knowledge and skills, and pest control.
42. Non-availability of the technician and the delayed response of the technician regarding their farm-related problems were the two most frequently mentioned problems relative to availing of the hands-on technical assistance.
43. Nearly all (93.7670) of the beneficiaries availed of the last Phase (VI) of the CRS production loans. 44. Non-beneficiaries of the CRS production loans, however, availed of similar assistance provided by the Land Bank for all cooperative members.
45. Cooperative loan-requirements were widely known to the beneficiaries (88.7%) and non-beneficiaries (60.6%).
46. Participation in cooperative activities was high among the beneficiaries (95%) and non-beneficiaries (76.5%), usually in general assemblies, meetings, and cooperative-sponsored trainings.
47. Participation of some members in cooperative activities was constrained by their being inactive members and living in distant areas.
48. The respondents’ self-rating on participation in cooperative activities was generally “active”.
49. Only a few respondents were recipients of assistance from other agencies, usually fertilizers and production loans which were provided mainly by government agencies such as the Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and National Food Authority (NFA).
50. White some respondents recognized the “good cooperative management” of their respective cooperatives, some noted the limited skills of the staff and the ,unclear management policies.
51. One recommendation was to contini4e providing assistance.
technical assistance.
52. The “production-loan program” was significantly st4Torted by the respondents.
53. The limited number or total absence of the post -harvest facilities were commonly/ frequently reported by the respondents.
54. Some respondents considered the trainings as limited.
55. Cooperative technicians were observed to be “active”, “good”, and regular in their visits to the farmers’ farms.
56. Still other recommendations focused on the need for management to undergo trainings on cooperative management, for more technical services, for an increase of loan ceilings from P3,000 to P5,000 per hectare, for an increase in the number of driers and shellers, for trainings to be conducted, for the number of cooperative technicians to be increased, and for more trainings for these technicians.
57. Only a few of the respondents (36 individuals) reported that they were engaging in non-cooperative-based savings, usually at the bank 21 respondents for contingency purposes and for the education of their children.
58. Crop-sharing arrangements as part of the capital build-up scheme were made by more than three-fourths (77%) of the beneficiaries and close to half (47%) of the non-beneficiaries.
59. The low farm-yield prevented the respondents from actually practicing crop-sharing arrangements as envisioned.
60. Inadequate income relative to expenses was experienced by 120 beneficiaries and 139 non-beneficiaries. This was mainly solved by availing of informal credit, i.e. by borrowing from local money lenders.
61. Almost three-fourths (74.2%) of the respondents (128 beneficiaries and 116 non-beneficiaries) perceived changes in their farm income from 1989 to 1992. These were generally negative changes.
62. The majority of the beneficiaries (73.2%) and non-beneficiaries (67.4%) reported changes in their lifestyle caused by increase in farm income, mainly using such increases as tuition-payments for their children.
63. Based on an income-ladder scale, the data showed that farm income decreased between 1989 and 1992 for both beneficiaries (i.e. from a mean of 4.8 in 1989 to 4.6 in 1992) and non-beneficiaries (i.e. mean of 4.7 in 1989 to 4.2 in 1992).
64. Sixty percent of the beneficiaries and 44 percent of the non-beneficiaries perceived improvements in their incomes as a result of cooperative membership, claiming increases in farm income, savings, debt-reductions, and access to cheaper consumer goods.
65. Crop-failures due to the drought-period were cited as the major reason for not perceiving any income improvements since availing of cooperative membership.
Recommendations
1. On the basis of the findings recorded above, it can be that at least six out of nine program objectives have been attained, to wit:
a). extending financial and technical assistance to at least five self-help cooperatives;
b). extending financial assistance to more than farmer-members;
c). training more than 550 farmer-members on farming techniques and related trainings;
d). training more than 10 leaders per cooperative cooperative management
e). facilitating avoidance of the exploitative claws of the local traders; and
f). acquisition of legal personality for the five self-help cooperatives.
Such findings suggest a significant level of effectivity and efficiency in the primary strategies and approaches employed in program implementation. At the same time, the data show that the strategies and approaches utilized. produced only a minimal optimum effect on the farm-income per hectare that was expected in order to generate the capital build-up of the beneficiaries. This was due mainly, however, to the drought experienced by the farmers between 1989 and 1992.
These findings would seem to indicate the advisability of maintaining the current strategies and approaches and also the need for some modification for better results.
2. As a built-in mechanism for influencing farmer-beneficiaries, the capital build-up formation required under the production loan program appeared to be successful in making the beneficiaries gradually recognize the value of savings. While they may have failed to appreciate its value in the short-run, a close analysis of the long-range capital build-up highlights its role and importance in laying the basis for the ability of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike to avail of the services provided by the cooperative. To appropriately increase the capital build-up, not only for the individual beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries but for the five self-help cooperatives as well, the project management, together with the five cooperatives, are encouraged to be creative and resourceful in facilitating other economic activities through which members can earn additional income. The cattle fattening program, facilitated by the Matalam cooperative through its link with the Land Bank of the Philippines, is one example.
3. Participation of the beneficiaries in the program’s decision-making and planning process appears to be limited, mainly to reviewing and criticizing the prepared plans submitted by the officers and key staff-members. This suggests a “top-down” rather than a participative management style. However, at the cooperative level, the survey results show that the members are actively participating in other activities. This situation will most likely occur in any organization with many members considering the time, effort, and money the organization will spend. This level of participation indicates the level of cohesion among members. The decision to maintain or modify this situation should be reviewed, based on the prioritized management style of the cooperatives. Likewise consideration c/ the reasons for non-participation of members in cooperative activities must also be included in the review.
4. The number of staff-members implementing the program will likewise affect the performance of the program. At the project management and even in the cooperative level, istaff-members played multiple roles. Such multiple troles resulted in job-related dysfunctions such as half-faked service delivery, unclear decision-making processes and delayed and sometimes disorganized reports. This do4notes the type of conceptualization and planning that the program has undergone, suggesting .the need for proper project planning, development and review, i.e. furnishing appropriate guidelines for staffing-patterns, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
5. The type of management information system installed in the program will most likely affect the program’s performance. Record keeping of the project management and the cooperatives indicated unclear entries including various forms used in financial statement reports. A carefully designed management information system will provide the necessary directions and development o1 tools for periodic monitoring of data relative to the successful program performance. A training program may be organized on the installation of a management information system, including financial management, where collective accountabilities are strongly promoted. A well-designed program is equated with sound financial management reflected in proper financial status reporting.
6. Survey findings show a downtrend in collection rates of loan releases, loan-interests, and capital build-up generated from Phase 1 to Phase 5. Collection rates appeared to be high in Phase 1 and gradually decreasing up to Phase 5, a situation due perhaps to the long dry spell affecting the farm-yield level of the farmers.
This affects not only the regularity of loan repayments of the beneficiaries, but likewise the type of management information system, the level of policy implementation, and the level of accountabilities of the project management and the cooperatives in program implementation. Thus, the installation of an appropriate management information system is imperative. This will not only strengthen the monitoring capabilities of the project management and the cooperatives but likewise periodically inform the project management and the cooperatives about the program status for appropriate decisions and corollary actions.
7. The records show a total of 2,086 farmer-members provided financial assistance from Phase 1 to Phase 5. However, a close analysis of the names recorded reveal only 802 farmer-beneficiaries from the five self-help cooperatives. This reflects the type of recording system the project management has installed. Thus, it is suggested that the project management should provide the form to the cooperatives to clearly monitor the extent of spread of the program services among the farmer-members.
Similar problems are indicated in the records of the number of cooperative leaders provided cooperative management- related trainings. Only numbers are reported minus the names. This does not clearly provide information on the extent of leadership-development activities of these cooperatives. A specific interest is to monitor whether the 10 cooperative leaders have been continually provided trainings, as envisioned, up to the end of the three-year program.
8. Research findings reveal that the credit assistance has been effective in promoting the use of inorganic fertilizers and chemicals to the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries as well a program strategy provided for farmer-members so as to avoid dealing with exploitative local traders. However, such positive effects notwithstanding, the other “hidden” of the beneficiaries and their household members, on soil fertility, and on the environment should have been monitored as well. Certain research findings have revealed that Endosulfan, classified by the World Health Organization (WHO) as moderately hazardous is marketed in the Philippines as Thiodan, Contra 35 EC, Endox 15 EC, Atlas Endosulfan 35 EC, and Endosulfan 35 EC (Philippine Daily Inquirer: 1993, 10). Perhaps this is an opportune time to suggest that agricultural development-related project proposals should be analyzed on the basis of being environment-friendly, over and above the other criteria considered. Likewise, use of inorganic farm inputs should be coupled with a massive educational campaign regarding their application and safe use or, perhaps, organic farming should be implemented instead. The latter will promote not only sustainable but also environment-friendly rural agricultural development
9. While the cooperative-sponsored trainings and technical assistance provided were reported as “useful”, these were, however, usually on the level of knowledge acquisition only with just a minimal number applying the skills learned due to cumbersome activities involved in their application. A more effective indicator of usefulness would be the number of respondents actually applying the skills learned. Thus, it is suggested that trainings conducted should include actual demonstration. A constant monitoring in this regard should be installed through the use of re-entry plans proposed by training-participants and submitted after the training indicating the manner the skills learned will be integrated into their farming activities.
10. To more effectively attain the objectives of the pro ram, it is recommended that the comments and recommendations of the respondents regarding the cooperative management should be reviewed and made part of the program directions.
11. Given the capabilities of the cooperatives, a group among the cooperative members may be formed to review the existing agricultural policies that hinder maximum growth of the farmers so that appropriate cooperative advocacy activities, relative to farmer’s welfare might be undertaken.
12. One suggestion of the respondents about the loan assistance was to increase the amount of loan from P3,000 to P5,000 per hectare. To effectively meet the financial assistance needed by the farmers on a hectare-basis, an inflationary-based computation should be made on an annual basis.
13. As a whole, the program was successful in increasing the income of the farmer-beneficiaries, albeit minimally, mainly through the loan assistance, training and technical assistance given so as to gradually develop self-sustaining cooperatives. The indicators outlined earlier appear to have been successfully met, suggesting the feasible replication of the program. However, a careful analysis of the NCREDP experience is a must in order to clearly spell out the other indicators that merit replication.
14. Other indicators worth including, over and above those explicitly identified by the program, for monitoring and evaluation might well include the number of drop-outs and their reasons; the number of continuing beneficiaries; the presence and absence of organizational structure; efficient record keeping; and the quality of services/assistance rendered in terms of timeliness, relevance, adequacy, equity, progressiveness, continuity and demeanor.
The North Cotabato Rural Enterprise Development Program (NCREDP)
Introduction
In response to the need to improve the quality of life of people in general and the parish-members in particular, the Diocese of Kidapawan (North Cotabato) has launched a three-year development. program for five self-help community cooperatives, Formally launched in mid-1989, the North Cotabato Rural Enterprise Development Program (NCREDP) focuses on such specific thrusts as capability-building, self-reliance and self-determination through organizing, financial/credit assistance, technical assistance, crop insurance and marketing assistance.
As part of its three-year program design, the Diocese has identified the need for a mid-term evaluation, i.e. after one-and-a-half years of implementation as a gauge of the performance and status of the program relative to the objectives defined earlier; hence this study.
Objectives of the Study
The study has the following objectives:
1. to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the project vis-a-vis objectives set,
2. to identify and assess the effectivity of the strategies and approaches used in the program,
3. to determine the program’s impact on capital build up, participation of beneficiaries in program decision-making and planning processes, and beneficiaries’ participation in their respective organization/cooperative,
4. to determine other factors affecting program performance (e.g. effectiveness of delivery structure vis-a-vis the receiving structure), and
5. to formulate recommendations to improve the project schemes.
Significance of the Study
The results of the study hope to provide development planners and workers of the agency-implementor knowledge on the status of the development program. Such information would likewise serve as a guide for the program workers to improve, strengthen or modify certain aspects of their performance to effectively deliver services to the beneficiaries. This will also provide the basis for reviewing existing policies, procedures and strategies so that appropriate changes or modifications may be made to improve program-implementation for the remainder of the grant-period and even beyond.
Methodology
The data collection activities consist of two distinct components. The first involves secondary data-collection, i.e. review of the records of the agency-implementor and the five self-help cooperatives. This provides information on the performance of the cooperatives relative to the program objectives. The second component includes the interviews of 150 farmer-beneficiaries (i.e. a quota of 30 beneficiaries per cooperative), which is deemed necessary as a feedback-mechanism on the strategies of the program implementation.
A structured survey instrument was used in data collection focusing on the following main variables:
I. Farm Data
II. Farm Practices
III. Production Data
IV. Post harvest facilities
V. Participation
VI. Income and Savings
VII. Comments and Recommendations for the Cooperatives
Data Analysis
The descriptive research adopted univariate tables, percentage analysis and measures of central tendency such as means and modes in the data analysis.
Accomplishments of the Five Self-Help Cooperatives Vis-a-Vis the Program Objectives
Financial Assistance
The program has extended loan assistance to farmer-beneficiaries in the five self-help cooperatives under the Diocese of Kidapawan. A total of 391 and 458 farmer-beneficiaries received production loans during the program’s Phase H (April 1900 to September 1900) and Phase III (September 1990 to December 1990) cropping periods, respectively.
Based on a review of records submitted to the Social Action Office of the Diocese of Kidapawan, a total of P1,113,276.38 worth of loans was extended to the farmer-beneficiaries, with 94 percent (P1,046,422.31) of this amount collected during Phase II. Such a total incurred an interest of P92,850.75, of which 89.4 percent (P82,676.76), representing interest-payments, has been collected (Table 2).
All the M’lang farmer-beneficiaries have paid back their loans, along with the interest incurred. Matalam beneficiaries ranked second with an 89 percent collection rate, while New Cebu registered the lowest interest collection (72.2%).
During Phase III of the Project-cycle (September 1990 – December 1990), the number of farmer-beneficiaries increased by 17.1 percent (or an addition of 67 farmer-beneficiaries) from Phase II. Likewise, the amount of loans extended and the interest-payments increased. However, the collection performance appeared to be lower than that of Phase II. Of the total amount of loans (P1,599,598.46) extended to the beneficiaries, post-harvest collections were recorded at 77 percent (P1,239,789.07). The total amount of P109,780.56 (79.8%) was collected from from the aggregate loan interest due (P137,632.51). The M’lang cooperative indicated the highest amount of loan-collections (96% or P31 8,870.1 6) and interest-payments (98% or P32,930.13) with Antipas the lowest in the collection of loans (62%) and in interest-payments (46%).
Reviewing the targets identified prior to the start of the program, it was envisioned that assistance would be extended to 550 farmer-beneficiaries at the end of the three-year grant-period. After one-and-a-half years of the program, the mid-term review revealed that the cooperatives had already extended financial assistance to 458 farmers, representing 83.3 percent of the targeted 550 farmer-beneficiaries at the end of three years. Given the target of 110 farm-beneficiaries per cooperative, Magpet and New Cebu revealed the highest number of farmer-beneficiaries extended financial assistance (89.1 % each) with Antipas the lowest (67.3%).
Five Self-Help Cooperatives. The program envisioned that each of the five self-help cooperatives would generate at least a capital build-up (CBU) of P690,000 at the end of the three-year period. Given such an amount, it was assumed that each of the five self-help cooperatives should have generated at least P345,000 halfway through the program implementation. However, the records review proved otherwise. Given the assumed CBU of P345,000 that should have been generated after one-and-a-half years, New Cebu indicated the highest amount of capital build-up generated (67.5% or P232,763.66) with Matalam, the lowest (17.6% or P60,737.93). The CBU generated by the five self-help cooperatives increased two-fold, i.e. approximately 109.45 percent from the baseline level. New Cebu showed the highest increase (508.57%) with Matalam, the lowest (2.95%).
Given the financial assistance to individual farmers, the program likewise envisioned that at the end of the program, each farmer-beneficiary would have generated a CBU of at least P4,500 or approximately P2,250 as of the mid-term review, i.e. after 1.5 years of the program. The records indicated a total of 458 farmer-beneficiaries who had been extended financial assistance. However, 55.7 percent (or 255 farmer-beneficiaries) have contributed a total of P189,924.01 (or an average of P744.80 per beneficiary) out of the CBU due (P393,750). The data likewise revealed that Magpet collected the highest amount of CBU (P65,829.07) with Antipas, the least (P4,350).
Given the assumed amount of CBU of P2,250.00 that should have been generated after one-and-a-half years of program implementation, the records revealed that 13 out of 255 farmers indicated payment of CBUs equal to or greater than P2,250.00. Among these 13 beneficiaries, 8 were farmers from Magpet, 3 from New Cebu, 1 each from Matalam and M’lang. The rest (242 out of 255 farmer beneficiaries) have a CBU of less than P2,250.00. The minimal amount of CBU collected could perhaps be attributed to the low production (and correspondingly minimal harvests) as a result of the long drought period in Southeastern Mindanao from late 1990 to the second quarter of 1991.
Trainings
To appropriately equip the coop leaders with management skills for their cooperatives, various training activities were conducted by the implementing agency with the assistance of Consortium for the Development of Southeastern Mindanao Cooperatives, Inc. (CDSMC) and Gagmay’ng Kristohanong Katilingban-Kidapawan Foundation, Inc. (GKK-KFI). These include, among others, programs focusing on “Organizational and Basic Cooperative Management”, “Enterprise Management”, “Leadership”, “Community Organizing”, “Financial Management”, and “Credit and Marketing Operations”. Based on the available records, findings indicated that the trainings conducted for the coop leaders included sessions on “Bookkeeping”, “Basic Management”, “Consumer Management”, “Marketing Management”, “Financial Management”, “Savings and Credit Management”, “Trainor’s Trainings”, “Audit and Inventory”, and “Basic Accounting”. The trainings conducted most often (7 sessions) for the coop leaders were on bookkeeping skills, followed by those on “Marketing Management”, “Financial Management”, “Trainor’s Trainings” and “Audit and Inventory” (5 sessions each). The “Basic Management”, “Consumer Management”, and “Savings and Credit Management” were conducted four times.
The cooperatives in Matalam and Antipas reported having undergone training on bookkeeping twice while those in the other survey sites indicated having participated in all other training activities at least once.
The number of coop leader-participants ranged from 3 to 28 participants during the different training-sessions conducted. The “Trainor’s Training Activity” had a total of 28 participants, followed by bookkeeping (17 participants) and financial management (12 participants). The session on “Basic Accounting” registered the lowest number of participants, mainly in Antipas (3 participants). Almost all the trainings were conducted in the cooperatives in all the survey sites. To insure proper farm management and increased production among the farmer-beneficiaries, several trainings were likewise designed under the Program, specifically focusing on “Appropriate/Production Farm Technologies and Management”, “Value Formation”, “Budgeting”, “Cooperatives”, and “Small Business Enterprise”. The records reviewed revealed that at least 11 trainings were conducted among the farmer-beneficiaries, with those on “Farm Management and Family Budgeting” being the two most widely conducted (15 sessions), followed by “Rapid Composting”, including demonstration, (10 sessions). “Rice Culture Management and Health Seminars” and “Biospray Sessions” appeared to be the least often conducted (once each). The cooperative in Matalam conducted the highest number of trainings (9 types of trainings) with Antipas, the lowest (4 types of trainings).
The number of farmer-beneficiaries participating in the different training activities varied widely, from as low as 7 to as high as 374 farmer-participants. “Farm Management and Family Budgeting” had the highest number of participants (374), with “Rice Culture Management and Health Seminar”, the least (7).
Health related seminars were integrated in the various training sessions. The production loan schemes under the program primarily reduced the opportunities for exploitation of these farmers by unscrupulous traders. The scheme provided a maximum cash loan of P3,000 per hectare per cropping at 8 percent interest-rate (or a monthly average of 2 percent). Such an interest was much lower vis-a-vis the interest charged by the local traders which, as revealed in the 1989 baseline survey, ranged from 11.95 percent to 25.41 percent per month.
However, it is interesting to note the comments of the coop managers, during the focus group discussion, that most of the farmers deliver only the required number of kilos of their produce representing their loan-payments and the required forced savings to the cooperative. The remaining portion of their produce was subsequently delivered to the traders as payment for their outstanding loans, e.g. cash-advances for educational purposes and purchase of consumer-items during the cropping period. The baseline survey revealed that only the Magpet coop has been registered with RCDAO. As of the mid-term program review, the number of registered cooperatives increased to four, with Matalam, M’lang and Antipas likewise acquiring their “legal personalities”. The application of the New Cebu cooperative is currently being processed.
As of the mid-term program review, two meetings have been conducted to discuss the possibility of establishing a federation among the five self-help cooperatives. The first meeting focused on explaining the “Federation” concept and clarifying their various expectations from such a federation. The members present likewise drafted the proposed name of the federation, i.e. “Mindanao Inter-trading for Coop” which was subsequently changed to “Cotabato-Davao Sur Federation of Coop, Inc.” during the second meeting. To facilitate the operation of the federation, the five self-help cooperatives agreed to provide financial contributions.
Number of “Seldas” (Cells) Organized. As part of the program objectives, the coop-beneficiaries organized the farmer-members into seldas (cells). These were suppose to endorse the loan applications of its members to the coop loan officer and serve as a mechanism for the collection of loan payments. However, these functions were never realized for the seldas were mainly utilized as venues for training.
Except for M’lang, a total of 51 “seldas” were organized with Magpet having organized the highest number (19) and Matalam, the lowest (10).
*During the focus group discussion conducted by the research team with the five coop managers in July 13, 1992, M’lang mentioned that in the first year of the program they had organized the farmer-workers into seldas, however, these were later organized into Gagmayang Kristolianong Katitingban (otherwise known as the GKK).
Coop membership was generally of two types, i.e. individual and group membership. Except for M’lang, which reported membership by groups, the cooperatives from Matalam, Magpet, Antipas and New Cebu had primarily individual members. The mid-term program review indicated an over-all increase in the coop membership, both among individuals and groups. Magpet indicated the highest increase in individual membership (230.2%), while New Cebu, the lowest (14.9%). M’lang showed a 9.9 times increase (990.079) in their group membership. Generally, the individual and group members increased by 44.9 percent and 10.04 times increase (1,004.5%) from the baseline level, respectively.
All the cooperatives reported increases in the capital shares of their members. Generally, the members’ capital shares increased nearly four times (P331,450.72). New Cebu revealed the highest increase (674.32%) in members’ capital share and Matalam, the lowest (179.55%) from the baseline level.
The current assets likewise revealed significant increases. New Cebu showed 28 times increase (2750.5%) in current assets (P1,959,237.59) compared to its baseline level (P68,733.30%). M’lang showed the lowest increase in current assets (49.9%). (The change in Matalam’s current assets could not be determined as it was not clear in the financial statements submitted. Likewise, the financial statement of Matalam followed a different format from those of the other four cooperatives).
Similar trends in the current assets were observed in the total assets of the five self-help cooperatives. New Cebu indicated the highest, a 17 times increase (1654.1% or P1,771,482.45) from the baseline level (P100,989.57), with M’lang, the lowest (P37%). Matalam had no available records on total assets.
Of the five self-help cooperatives, M’lang and New Cebu indicated positive change in net income from the baseline level. M’lang indicated nearly a 500-fold increase (49,859.9% or P35,875,416) from the baseline level (P71,809.75), while New Cebu increased 8.5 times (786.3%) from the baseline level (P2,866.85).
Among those with negative changes in net income from the baseline level to mid-term review, Antipas registered the highest decrease at P28,197.69 (88.2%) from baseline level (P31,234) with Magpet, the lowest (8.7% or P692.32).
Cooperative Operational Activities. The five self-help cooperatives indicated expansions in their operations, relative to what had been stated in the baseline survey. These expansions could perhaps be due to the financial assistance provided by the program. The financial assistance made it possible for the cooperatives to increase their capital output, thus expanding their operations. Matalam started as a consumer coop and eventually expanded to merchandising, marketing, and production credit while Magpet initially engaged in merchandising, marketing and consumers credit and subsequently provided savings and production credit. New Cebu concentrated on consumers credit and savings and production credit while M’lang engaged in production credit and livestock-marketing. Antipas focused solely on loan-assistance.
Marketing linkages. To reduce the “exploitative clout” wielded by the local traders on the farmers, the cooperatives provided marketing assistance for the farmers’ produce. All the self-help cooperatives have thus established marketing linkages with the National Food Authority. Matalam, on the other hand, likewise established marketing linkages with big traders in Digos (Davao del Sur) and Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Antipas has similarly established such linkages with the Sta. Catalina Multipurpose Cooperative, Inc. (SCMPC) and Chinese traders in Davao City.
The role of post-harvest facilities is deemed crucial in uplifting the income-status of farmer-members, as the presence or absence of such facilities affects their decisions on “where” and “when” to sell their farm produce. The focus group discussion *revealed that four of the five self-help cooperatives have post-harvest facilities. M’lang has acquired a jeepney, two hauler-trucks (one “three-fourths” type and a 10-wheeler truck) and a solar dryer. Antipas reported having a hauler-truck (a “three-fourths” type). The Magpet and New Cebu cooperatives utilized the existing facilities of their parishes, i.e. the seminar house serves as a warehouse in Magpet, and the basketball court as “dryer” and the parish jeep as “hauler” in New Cebu. Matalam has sold its hauler-truck which was acquired in 1989 curing the baseline survey period.
Crop insurance was one form of governmental assistance extended to farmers whose crops were damaged as a result of natural calamities. This helped the farmers recuperate from their financial losses on the crops planted. At the start of the program, i.e. the “first cropping”, the number of farmer-beneficiaries applying ‘or the insurance ranged from 5 percent
*Conducted with the managers of the 5 self-help cooperatives and the project manager and two project technicians on July 13, 1991 at De Mezenod Seminar House, Kidapawan, North Cotabato. (Magpet) to 100 percent (New Cebu, Antipas and M’lang), with 85 percent of Matalam farmer-beneficiaries insured. However, on the succeeding cropping schedules, the farmer-beneficiaries from Matalam, Magpet, New Cebu and Antipas did not insure their crops, given their previous experience on delayed payment-releases of the insurance agency.
The results of the focus group discussion revealed that three of the five self-help cooperatives reported savings deposits of their members over and above the forced savings required by the program. Such savings deposits were true for Antipas, Matalam and New Cebu. Matalam had 10 depositors; New Cebu, 9; and Antipas,8.
The savings deposits ranged from as low as P50.00 to as high as P26,287.59. The total amount of savings deposits was P70,432 or an average of P2,608.60 per depositor. Matalam reported the highest savings deposits (P41,848.68 or an average of P4,1 88.4 7 per depositor) and New Cebu, the lowest (P9,798.06 or an average of P1,088.67 per depositor). Antipas has a total of P18,749.40 worth of savings deposits.
Mean Gross Farming Income Per Hectare Per Cropping. The total mean gross farming income per hectare during the Phase III cropping under the project was P8,827.73 or P2,106.93 monthly. M’lang revealed the highest mean gross farming income (P15,797.93) with Matalam, the lowest (P5,585). The mean total figure generally decreased when compared to baseline findings (P10,664). Only M’lang showed an increase in mean gross farming income (P15,797.93 or P3,949.48 a month) vis-a-vis the baseline figure of P10,476 or P2,691 a month. The total mean net farming income per hectare was P3,422.24 with M’lang the highest (P7,481.57) and Matalam, the lowest (P2,165.49).
Generally, the mid-term review revealed that the total mean net farming income per hectare (P3,422.24 or P855.56 a month) was slightly higher than the baseline figure (P2,91 6). Only M’lang (P7,481.57) and New Cebu (P3,112.25) showed increases relative the baseline data (P1,169 and P1,784, respectively).
The low income performance of the cooperatives in gross mean farming income and mean net farming income could be due to the long hot season during the Phase III cropping period, i.e. from September 1990 to the early part of the second quarter of 1991. This situation likewise increased farming expenses of the farmers, resulting in greater operational expenses than the projected income by the farmers for that season. More than half (165 out of 365) of the farmers who received financial assistance indicated decreases in their incomes from the previous cropping (Phase II). Generally, the total decrease in income from the previous cropping was 101.4 percent. Antipas and Matalam (117.9%) showed the largest amount of decrease in net farming income vis-a-vis the baseline data. Magpet (49.5%) had the lowest mean net farming income per hectare. All the farmer-beneficiaries from Antipas indicated decreases in mean net farming income.
Status of the Five Cooperatives
San Vicente Ferrer Consumers Cooperative, Inc. (Antipas). It has transferred to a new location given its newly-constructed building in November 1990 which serves as its office, store and warehouse. It has likewise purchased a hauling truck and hired seven additional staff members.
San Jose Katilingban Consumers Cooperative, Inc. (Magpet). Under a new manager, it has hired a posting clerk who assists in the financial recording requirements of the coop. Its merchandise and farm inputs are secured from Kidapawan. Marketing activity is hampered due to the delayed payments of the National Food Authority (NFA) for the farmers’ produce. This partly explains the tendency of farmers to sell some of their produce to local traders.
Matalam Sto. Nino Consumers Cooperative, Inc. (Matalain). It has transferred to its new location at the public market in response to the members’ demand to make the coop accessible to the public, i.e. near transportation facilities. However, the buying station for the farmers’ produce, i.e. the parish, is approximately less than a kilometer away from the coop itself. Local traders remain the sole source of the coop’s merchandise goods. A fast turn-over of staff was likewise noted due to the limited cooperation and internal conflicts arising among the members. A related observation was the insufficient capital available for the immediate cash requirements of the farmers upon delivery of their produce to the coop. This has subsequently caused the farmers to decide to sell only a portion of their produce to the coop, i.e. just enough to pay the loans availed of and the capital build-up requirements which, in turn, limits the earning capacity of the coop members themselves. The coop likewise acquired a piece of land for its future development.
M’Iang Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc. (M’lang). This coop was noted as the biggest rice supplier to the National Food Authority (NFA). The coop has also availed of financial support from the Quedan Financing Program for its marketing activities, the Land Bank for its production capital and the M’lang Parish for the expansion of the solar dryer constructed within the parish premises. It has also acquired a jeepney as an additional transportation facility for hauling activities, aside from the existing hauling truck. The jeepney was also used for hauling and delivering the coop merchandise goods. An organization of coop outlets has been established on the church-based “GKK-level” which increased the membership and capital build-up funds of the cooperative.
Farmers’ Service Cooperative, Inc. (New Cebu). Though it still has to register with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), its Farmers Organization has been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as of October 3, 1990. It has an additional four staff members, three of whom are involved with the marketing department and the fourth with the production department. Its purchasing capacity and the services provided the members have improved due to additional capital funds secured from the GKK-Kidapawan Foundation, Inc. and the Farmers Organization. To assist farmer-beneficiaries in increasing their capital shares, the coop has initiated a collection of P0.10 per kilo of rice or corn sold to the coop by the members.
Survey of the Beneficiaries
This portion presents the survey findings based on the interviews of 150 beneficiaries as a feedback mechanism on the accomplishments of the cooperatives relative to the implementation plan of the NCREDP. Specifically, it discusses farm data, farm practices, production, post-harvest facilities, marketing, technical assistance received, trainings attended, loan assistance, participation, income and savings, including their comments and recommendations on the cooperatives.
Number of Hectares Presently Cultivated. The average number of hectares cultivated today are generally higher than those in 1989. The number of hectares currently cultivated by the respondents range, on the average, from 1.3 hectares (M’lang) to 2.68 hectares (Antipas), with the over-all average of 2.0 hectares across the five survey sites.
The farmers in four survey-sites generally cultivate medium-sized areas ranging from 1.5 to 2.4 hectares, e.g. in Matalam (60%), in New Cebu (50%), in Antipas (43.3%), and in Magpet (50%). M’lang farmers, on the other hand, work on smaller farm-sizes i.e. with 67 percent cultivating from one-half to one-and-a-half hectares at present.
Number of Hectares Previously Cultivated. The computed average number of hectares previously cultivated ranged from a minimum of 1.3 hectares (in M’lang) to a maximum of 2.28 hectares (in New Cebu), with the over-all average at 1.89 hectares for all survey areas.
However, when asked whether they have expanded the areas they have cultivated between then and now, the majority (82%) replied in the negative, with those saying yes (18%) increasing at an average of 1.2 hectares for all the sites. The lowest averages (1.2 hectares each) were recorded in Matalam and in Magpet, while the highest average (1.7 hectares) was registered in New Cebu.
What crops are presently planted in the five survey-sites relative to those planted in 1989? Are these farmers engaged in mono-cropping or multi-cropping systems? Survey results closely parallel findings in the 1989 baseline survey, with the farmer-respondents engaged in corn (67.3%) and rice (46.7%) production.
The extent of multiple responses given by the respondents in the various survey sites serves as a rough indicator as to the extent of multiple-cropping activities by these farmers. While the majority (6.37%) were engaged in corn, the respondents likewise planted rice and other minor crops (e.g. rubber, coffee, bananas, mangos).
For one, Matalam farmers appeared to be the most varied, i.e. planting corn (87%) and rice (32.3%), not to mention mongo and peanuts. Antipas farmers similarly planted various crops. While all the respondents were engaged in corn production, some of them likewise mentioned rice (23%), coffee and rubber (10% each) and coconut and cacao (3% each). On the other hand, farmers in New Cebu appear to have concentrated mainly on both in corn (60%) and rice (63%), as no other crops were mentioned.
The areas planted to rice, on the other hand, are predominantly small, with 70 percent of the farmer-respondents cultivating from .5 to 1.4 hectares and a limited group (20.3%) working on areas ranging from 1.5 to 2.4 hectares.
Fertilizer Usage. Except for one farmer in M’lang, all the respondents admitted using fertilizers in their farms, mainly urea (92%) and the ammonium sulfate (88%). Other varieties mentioned – though a much lesser extent – were complete (14-14-14) (12.2%), algafer (1.3%), Nuvacron (0.7%), Potash (0.7%), and Agrowell (0.7%). Percentage-wise, the fertilizer usage was higher (99.3%) than the baseline findings (91.3%). This situation could be due to the production loan scheme where the farmer-beneficiaries were obliged to avail of the fertilizers from the cooperatives.
Survey findings revealed the high level of assistance extended by the cooperative for the fertilizer users, with 93 percent of the respondents availing of fertilizers from the cooperatives. Ten farmer-respondents reported securing their fertilizers solely from traders with one availing from both. These data reversed the baseline findings where fertilizers were usually sourced from the local traders.
The fertilizer purchases from the coop were mainly made due to the members’ existing loan-arrangements (65%). Some respondents simply noted that they were “coop members” while others cited the low prices for fertilizers offered (25% each). On the other hand, those who purchased from traders (11 respondents) explained that they did so inasmuch as the fertilizers were not readily available in the coop (8 respondents). Other reasons mentioned included the purchases “being endorsed by the coop itself” and the lower prices offered by the traders (2 responses each).
The predominant problems cited by the respondents were primarily supply-related, i.e. irregular fertilizer stocks (25.2%) and delayed deliveries (8.6%). Others cited high prices (10.8%) and high transportation costs (9.4%). How did the members solve these problems? What options or alternatives were available to them? How did they cope, given such constraints? The solutions mentioned suggested a general sense of helplessness among these respondents (50%), i.e. that they could “only wait till the stocks are available” (44.6%) or “to follow-up coop stocks” (11%), not to mention being powerless with regards to the high transport and fertilizer costs (7 respondents).
Some respondents took more drastic steps over the lack of fertilizers, e.g. borrowing fertilizers from other traders at 20 percent interest (8 respondents or 12.3%) and “borrowing money to buy fertilizers” or “borrowing fertilizers from other members” (4 respondents each). Such behavior courses such as “Management and Educator’s Training”, “Consumer Management”, “Marketing and Financial Management”, and “Savings and Credit Management”. Other seminars conducted were: “Trainors Training”, “Farm Management Sessions”, and “Basic He eh and Nutrition Seminars”, including “Agricultural Training”, specifically on the technology of seed production and rapid composting for organic fertilizer production. Most of these trainings were held in the five area sites, except for the agricultural trainings, which were held only in Matalam, M’lang and New Cebu. Plans to cover the other areas are being made.
The Social Action Center (SAC) reports have been validated by asking respondents about their attendance in such trainings. About 90 percent claimed to have attended the trainings conducted by the cooperatives. Antipas had the best attendance (100%), followed by Matalam (86.7%). The “pre-membership seminars” were the most attended (70.4%), followed by farm management (37%), soil analysis (14.1%), production (11.1%), and rapid composting (8.1%).
One interesting thing to note is that while most of the trainings were on management skills, such activities were not mentioned by the farmer-respondents in the present study. (This might be explained by the possibility that such trainings were provided only for the staff and officers of the cooperatives). The trainings were perceived to be useful by most respondents (96.3%) because many of them learned about farm management (52.6%), the importance of the cooperatives (31.1%) and techniques in soil-analysis (14.8%).
Production Loan
Recognizing the financial constraints of the small-scale farmer-beneficiaries, the cooperatives have provided credit arrangements to help solve their farm-related problems. A loan of p3,000 per hectare per beneficiary could be availed of by the coop-members upon compliance with the various requirements of the cooperatives for such loans. This scheme, likewise aimed at minimizing the usual exploitative relationships between the usually cash-strapped farmers and the usurious traders. This section thus presents the beneficiaries’ knowledge of the requirements of the cooperatives relative to loan assistance.
All the respondents were aware of the requirements for availing of the production loan from their cooperatives. While 14 different loan requirements were identified, foremost mentioned was the “accomplishment of forms” (40.7%). The second most mentioned requirement (30%) was the P500 minimum capital-share per member (particularly by those in M’lang and New Cebu). Approximately a fifth (20.7%) recognized the need to attend the “pre-membership seminars” (PMS). The need to deposit at least five sacks of the produce, representing “forced savings”, was similarly mentioned (16.7%).
The respondents were subsequently asked to rate their participation in the cooperative activities, i.e. whether they were “active”, “very active” or not active”. The majority rated themselves positively, i.e. either “active” (68.7%) or “very active” (29.3%).
The respondents claimed to have participated in 15 different coop activities though in varying degrees. Among those popularly mentioned activities, based on free recall, were attendance in general assemblies (57.3%), meetings (55.3%), and pre-membership seminars (30.7%). (One notes, however, that specific activities related to decision-making and other more active forms of participation were not mentioned).
Assistance from Other Groups/Agencies
More than two-thirds (68.7%) of the respondents claimed that they had not received any assistance from other groups or agencies. Those who did (47 respondents) represented less than a third (31.1%) of the farmers covered for the study. M’lang respondents (66.7%) had the highest number receiving assistance from other agencies, while those from Antipas, the least (3.3%).
The majority, (44 out of 47 respondents) had availed of assistance under the “Rice Production Enrichment Program (otherwise known as RPEP) of the Department of Agriculture in the form of seeds and fertilizers. The same trends hold true for Matalam, M’lang, New Cebu and Magpet. (The influence of such extraneous forces or other intervening factors would have to be considered in evaluating the program at the end of the grant-period. Other types of assistance received included loans (4.3%), “Bigay ng Bayan” (2.1 %), water management (2.1%) and PRRM assistance (2.1%).
Income and Savings
This section presents the data on income and savings of the respondents, specifically: their savings, an analysis of farm income relative to family expenses, coping mechanisms for any losses in family income, changes in family income, utilization of any additional income, and perceptions about past and present incomes received.
“Savings” here refers to personal savings of the respondents other than the “forced” savings in the cooperatives. On the whole, only a few of the respondents (10%) engaged in any form of savings, with New Cebu indicating the highest number (16.7%) and both Antipas and Magpet, the lowest (6.7 each). Those who saved generally kept their savings in their houses (12 out of 15 respondents) with only 3 respondents (2 in Matalam and one in Antipas) having made bank-deposits.
Farm Income Relative to Family Expenditures. Asked about the adequacy of their income vis-a-vis family expenditures, more than two-thirds of the respondents (73.3%) reported that their farm income was not enough to cover family expenditures. On the other hand, close to one-fourth (23%) reported otherwise, with at least five respondents (3%) claiming that their farm income exceeded expenses (3.3%).
Those who noted that income was not enough to cover family expenses (110 respondents) mainly resorted to borrowing money from money lenders/friends/relatives (48.2%), selling backyard poultry and livestocks (45.5%), and selling backyard farm produce (19.1%). Borrowing money appeared to be the most popular alternative among the farmer-beneficiaries in Antipas (66.7%) and Magpet (56.5%) while those in New Cebu (70.8%) and M’lang (59.1%) mainly sold backyard livestock and poultry. The Matalam farmers either sold farm products. (45%) and animals (40%) or borrowed money (40%).
The majority (77.3%) of the respondents felt that there were changes in their income from 1989 to the present. The single biggest group who perceived such changes were the respondents from Matalam (76.7%). However, such changes were primarily decreases in income (63%), with less than a third (31 %) reporting gains in income. On the average, incomes increased by 38.6 percent, with the highest increases registered in M’lang (67.7%) and the lowest in New Cebu (19.1 %). Decreases in income, on the other hand, were computed at an average of 39.6 percent, with Antipas having the highest (53.6%) and Magpet, the lowest (29.3%). Generally, these figures confirmed the findings in chapter 2 regarding the increases and decreases in income of the farmer-members.
As noted earlier, 36 respondents reported income increases from 1989 to 1990. How did these farmers utilize such additional income? What were their immediate needs and priorities? Education appeared to be the highest priority, with close to half of the group (41.7%) using the money to pay for the tuition of their children. Similar trends can be observed in all the survey sites.
A final concern was to solicit these farmers’ perceptions about the status of their present farm income (as of 1990), relative to that received in 1989, by using a ten-point Cantrill ladder-scale. Step “1” in that scale signifies the lowest income possible while Step “10” signified the highest possible income they could attain. The respondents were asked to choose the appropriate step which would best describe their present income status relative to 1989. Considering the various changes in their farm income since 1989, the respondents generally perceived themselves to be on Step “4.4” on the ladder-scale as of 1990. Respondents from M’lang rated themselves the highest at Step “4.9” while those in Magpet on the average, rated themselves the lowest at Step “3.3”.
Comments and Recommendations for the Cooperatives
The comments and recommendations of the respondents for the cooperatives focused on the management, technical assistance, loan assistance, post-harvest facilities, training and technicians of the cooperatives.
Generally, the respondents believed in the proper management of the cooperatives (35.5%), that the technical assistance received helped them manage their farms properly (29.3%), and that the credit assistance helped reduce farm expenses (28%). At the same time, more than a third (36.7%) noted the absence of post harvest facilities like shellers, dryers, threshers, and warehouses. The trainings attended, on the other hand, were perceived to provide additional knowledge on proper farm management (24.7%). Please see Table 63 and Appendix A for the specific details in the survey sites.
Consistent with their perceptions, the respondents recommended that the cooperatives be continually managed properly (16.4%), that the provision of technical assistance should be sustained (41.8%), that the amount of loans available be increased (23.2%), and that more trainings be given to the members (71.4%). Not surprisingly, it was also recommended that cooperatives must have post-harvest facilities such as driers, haulers, shellers and warehouses (50.5%), that the cooperatives must have the proper technicians (37.3%), including an increase in their number (26.5%). Please see Table 64 and Appendix B for the specific detail in the survey sites.
Survey Findings
The farmer-respondents are currently cultivating an average of two hectares, a little bit higher than the land area previously cultivated (1.8 has.) Less than a fifth (18%) expanded land area cultivated at an average of 1..2 hectares. Corn (67.3%) and rice (46.7%) are the two most mentioned crops planted in 1.79 hectares and 1.38 hectares, respectively.
Almost all of the respondents claimed that they were using fertilizers (99.3%), primarily urea (92%) and ammonium sulfate (88%), from the cooperatives (92.6%). Such procurements were made under their coop loan arrangements (64.7%), aside from being coop members (24.5%). A significant number (60.4%) did not encounter any problem regarding their fertilizer supplies from cooperatives while those who did mentioned mainly irregular fertilizer stocks (25.2%).
There were fewer chemical-users among the respondents (52%), using mostly Azodrin (28.2%). Again, these were procured from the cooperatives (65.4%) because of their loan requirements (51.7%).
On the whole, close to two-thirds of the respondents (62.7%) were dependent on rainfall. The average farm-size cultivated was 1.88 hectares of rainfed corn areas. Rice-lands, on the other hand, were approximately 1.53 hectares (irrigated) and 1.02 hectares rainfed – on the average. They experienced at least two harvest seasons from October 1989 to December 1990 at an average of 56.64 sacks per harvest, with a computed. average of 52.83 kilos a sack. Corn was harvested approximately 2.02 times in the same period, at an average of 40.12 sacks of shelled corn per hectare, with a computed average of 70.98 kilos per sack.
More than half (51.3%) of the respondents were aware of the post-harvest facilities of the cooperatives through their general assemblies (64.9%). More than three-fourths (85.7%) of these used the facilities, mainly the trucks for hauling farm produce (98.5%). A little over three-fourths (75.8%) claimed that payments were made for using these facilities, particularly the trucks (98%). More than half (52%) noted problems regarding the use of these facilities, specifically the inadequate number of hauler trucks given the number of coop members to be served (46%). Again, the members concerned failed to do anything other than “just wait for the hauler” (52.8%).
The farm produce sold to the cooperatives (94%) represented their loan payments (63.3%). More than half (59.2%) of the corn farmers sold all their corn produce, while most of the rice farmers (45.0%) sold half of their rice produce. More than half of the respondents (60%) reported having encountered problems in selling their farm produce to cooperatives, foremost of which being the delayed remittance of payment (48.3%). The members appear to have had no other recourse except “to wait till the payment is released” (65.5%).
More than three-fourths (87%) of the respondents received technical assistance from the cooperatives, predominantly related to farm management (60.5%). Almost all (98.2%) considered the technical assistance useful, particularly with regard to farm management, which resulted in their improved production (50.9%). Less than a fifth (19.3%) claimed to have encountered problems related to technical assistance received – notably, the lack of technicians (68.2%). To solve the latter, a number of farmers (63.6%) sought the assistance of their peers.
The majority (90%) attended the seminars conducted by the cooperatives, particularly the “pre-membership seminars” (70.4%). These trainings were considered useful (96.3%), inasmuch as they were taught skills in proper farm management (52.6%).
All were aware of the cooperative loan requirements, mainly the accomplishment of forms (40.7%).
All the respondents claimed to have participated in the activities of the cooperatives, with more than half (68.7%) rating themselves “active” in such activities. The activities mostly participated in were general assemblies (57.3%) and meetings (55.3%).
Less than a third (31.3%) of the respondents claimed that they received assistance from other agencies, particularly the “Rice Production Enrichment Program” (RPEP) of the Department of Agriculture (93.6%).
A limited group (10%) reported having some form of personal savings, over and above the forced savings and savings deposits in the cooperative. Those who did, usually keep their savings at home.
Almost three-fourths (73.3%) of the respondents perceived their income as inadequate to cover family expenses. Such limitations were solved either by borrowing money from money lenders/ relatives/friends (48.2%) or by selling farm animals (45.5%).
More than three-fourths (77.3%) noted changes in their income from 1989 to 1990. More than half (69%) of those who did report noted income-decreases (at approximately 39.6%) while 31 percent perceived gains in income (roughly 38.6%). Those farmers whose incomes increased used the additional funds mainly for tuition (41.1%) and payment of outstanding loans (36.1%). Based on a ten-point ladder scale [from “minimum” to (1) to “maximum” (10)1, they generally perceived their farm income to be on “Step 4.5”.
Asked about their various perceptions on the cooperatives, the respondents commented that the cooperatives were properly managed (35.3%), that technical assistance was “good for it helped the members regarding proper farm management” (29.3%), that the loans helped reduce expenses for farm inputs (28%), that the cooperatives had limited post-harvest facilities (36.7%), and that the trainings provided additional knowledge on proper farm management (36.7%).
Recommendations were likewise solicited from the group. The most frequently cited recommendation focused on human resource development [e.g. more trainings for the members (71.4%), continuing technical assistance (41.8%) and more technicians for the members (37.3%)], more post-harvest facilities (50.5%), continuing loan assistance (36.3%) and the continued proper management of the cooperatives (16.4%).
Summary of Findings and Recommendations
The mid-term review revealed the various accomplishments of the five self-help cooperatives relative to the program objectives and baseline survey results.
The financial assistance provided to farmer-beneficiaries under the program appeared to be a major catalyst for these cooperatives’ achievements. It encouraged increases in coop membership, which, in turn,. increased the cooperatives’ CBU through the members’ share capital, and allowed them to engage in other cooperative-types of activities such as marketing, merchandising and production loans, thus increasing their earning capacity. These achievements likewise helped the cooperatives appreciate the need for building and strengthening linkages, not only for the development of the cooperatives themselves but for that of the individual members as well.
The achievements of the cooperatives vis-a-vis the program objectives were as follows:
1. More than three-fourths (85% or 458 farmer-members) of the targeted 550 farmer-members by the end of the program have been extended financial assistance by the cooperatives through the production loan scheme.
2. The repayment rate of loans availed of by the farmer-members is high, i.e. 89.4 percent and 80 percent in the second (Phase II) and third (Phase III) cropping periods, respectively. This was facilitated by the marketing assistance provided by the cooperatives for their members and the mechanism of deducting the loans and the interest incurred based on the crop-produce delivered to the coop.
3. The cooperatives doubled (109.45%) their capital build-up from the baseline level. This likewise indicated the increase in the capital build-up of the members. However, the CBUs generated by each of the five self-help cooperatives were less than the P345,000 that should have been generated for the coop and the P2,250 per member halfway through the program implementation. This situation could be due, as reported by the farmers, to their minimal production brought about by the long dry season from the last quarter of 1990 to the early part of the second quarter of 1991.
4. Community organizing appeared to be effective as indicated by the number of seldas organized (51 seldas); increases in the number of individual (44.9%) and group (1,004.5%) members from the baseline level, and the type and number of trainings conducted, including the number of coop-leaders and farmer-participants in these trainings. The seldas serve not only as a mechanism through which farmers’ solidarity has been fostered but likewise as a venue for the conceptualization of various viable income-generating projects, such as seed production and compact-farming, as indicated by some coops (e.g. Antipas and New Cebu). Likewise, it is interesting to note the comments of the coop managers that the seldas were not effective in their function as a pressure group for members in loan repayments.
5. The collateral-free and low-interest loan assistance provided for the farmer-beneficiaries appears to have reduced the opportunities for exploitation of the farmers by unscrupulous traders. As indicated by survey results, 94 percent of the respondents sold their produce to the cooperatives, while 92.6 percent acquired fertilizers and 65.4 percent acquired chemicals directly from the cooperatives. However, it is interesting to note that, during the mid-term review period, most of the farmers delivered only the required number of kilos of their produce to the coop, representing loan payments and forced savings. The remaining portion of the farm produce was delivered to the local traders as payment for their outstanding cash-loans. Such practices will hopefully diminish as the coop loan-assistance program is strengthened in the coming years, with corresponding reduced roles of local traders.
6. At least four of the five cooperatives have been duly registered during the review-period. Such requirements are necessary should the cooperatives decide to secure funds from other funding agencies.
7. The federation of the five self-help cooperatives has been conceptualized and is presently accumulating financial capital necessary for its initial marketing activities.
8. The five cooperatives registered varying net-income figures. M’lang and New Cebu revealed a tremendous increase in income (49.859% and 786.3%, respectively) while Matalam, Magpet and
Antipas reported income decreases (72.2%, 8.7% and 88.2%, respectively).
Despite the adverse effects of the long dry season experienced by the farmer-members, M’lang – a lowland, rice-producing and irrigated municipality – reported income increases which could be attributed to the additional financial assistance acquired from the Quedan Financing Program and Land Bank.
On the other hand, the income-increases in New Cebu could perhaps be attributed to their collection of P0.10 per kilo of rice or corn sold by the members to the coop as a marketing service fee. Meanwhile, the upland corn-producing municipality of Antipas, Magpet and Matalam were adversely affected by the drought, resulting in decreases in farmers’ income. This consequently affected the capability of the members to increase farm production and to repay their loans, including the interest incurred from such loans.
The minimal production income discouraged the farmer beneficiaries from availing of crop insurance from Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), aside from the high cost of insurance and the delayed payment-releases for damaged crops by PCIC.
All of these affected the earning capacity of the members.
9. The post harvest facilities made available to the farmer-members were mainly limited to truck-haulers. 10. Only 2.4% (27 out of 1,107 members) are reported to have savings deposits in the cooperative, aside from the forced savings from each beneficiary.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are proposed for the cooperatives, including the program-implementor and the farmer-beneficiaries. 1. The cooperatives indicated significant achievements after one-and-a-half years of program implementation. This should be sustained by continuing the monthly project staff monitoring so that problems relative to improved coop management will be readily addressed.
2. The findings indicated that the collection on loans and loan-interest is generally high in Phase II and a bit lower in Phase HI due to the long drought season during this cropping period. It is then recommended that the current collection procedures be both sustained and improved to attain a 100 percent collection-rate. However, it is likewise necessary to require the “seldas” to plan and design various income-generating activities as secondary income sources for farmers’ households. This will not only provide the members a continuous source of income but will likewise provide additional funds for loan-payments, interests, and capital build-up requirements in case of crop failures caused by natural calamities. Furthermore, focus group discussions among program staff, coop leaders, and members serve as effective venues for sharing experiences, planning, and discussing effective program implementation strategies relative to collection procedures and coop management as a whole.
3. The collected capital build-up, both of the cooperatives and the members, falls below the P345,000 per cooperative and P2,250 per member that should have been generated halfway through the program implementation. This situation could perhaps be resolved if the seldas will be properly motivated to conceptualize and implement income-generating projects, given their existing skills and the available resources in their respective communities. They can venture into handicrafts or the manufacture of novelties and the like. Corresponding “environmental scanning” and “commodity-flow” studies may be undertaken by the cooperatives or federation to determine the feasibility of these industries relative to the availability of resources and marketing channels.
4. The high fertilizers (99.3%) and chemicals (52%) usage among the respondents, usually procured from the cooperatives (92.6% and 65.4%, respectively), are indicative of the effectiveness of the loan-program in re-directing the heretofore established relationships of the farmer-beneficiaries from the local traders to the cooperatives. The loan-assistance scheme should therefore be sustained to allow a fuller appreciation of the value and importance of patronizing the cooperatives by the farmer-beneficiaries. Such interests could likewise be pursued through a series of value-formation sessions among farmer-members and their households, focusing on the i above-mentioned value, to ensure the importance of coop-patronage through actual practice with or without production loans prior to the end of the project grant-period.
5. More than half (51.4%) of the respondents were aware of the post-harvest facilities of the cooperatives, indicating the extent of services offered to the beneficiaries, the type of communication between the coop management and the beneficiaries and the level of participation of the beneficiaries in the activities of the cooperation cooperatives such as meetings or general assemblies. This could be properly addressed by designing a communication scheme through which beneficiaries are well informed on the various developments cooperatives and its programs. This will make them feel more important and most likely provide due respect for and support to the cooperatives. Perhaps this could be done by tapping the seldas to establish periodic meetings with the coop management for updates and dissemination to selda members. A bulletin board in selda-centers is necessary through which information about coop development, important for the improvement of the farmers’ statuses, will be relayed.
6. A little over three-fourths (75.8%) of the respondents reported that corresponding payments or charges were made on the use of the post-harvest facilities. However, the data showed that some of the respondents within the same coop claimed that they were not being charged for the use of such facilities. This situation should be corrected as this might cause possible conflicts among the members and, subsequently, affect the capability and sustainability of the cooperatives. Likewise, the problems of the respondents in the use of the facilities and their respective solutions should be taken into consideration in planning appropriate actions to enhance services provided to coop-members.
7. Though the findings indicate that the majority of the respondents received technical assistance trainings, the program implementors should be conscientious in making these services available to all beneficiaries. This will provide them not only with additional knowledge but eventually develop among them the capability of identifying various opportunities relative to their development.
8. The production loan was found to be useful for the beneficiaries. However, the data showed that more than half (53.3%) of the respondents have either partially paid or not paid the loans as of the survey period. As explained earlier, this might possibly be due to the drought-season. It is at this instance that the program implementors should discuss with the beneficiaries the appropriate re-structuring of the loan requirements. The funding agency should be appropriately informed of whatever changes are agreed upon to avoid miscommunications.
9. The findings revealed that all the respondents are aware of the coop requirements on production loans. This should be sustained through constant communication with the beneficiaries.
10. Except for two respondents, the rest were actively participating in the activities of the cooperatives. However, their participation was limited to attendance in meetings, general assemblies and seminars or trainings. It is recommended that the program implementors design other mechanisms or strategies with the beneficiaries that will enhance not only their attendance but also their capability to think and decide on their own, with the implementors acting as facilitators. This will gradually prepare the members for the eventual phasing out of the program.
11. The program generally developed the value of savings among the respondents through forced savings. This is indicated by the increases in the current capital build-up from initial capital build-up of the respondents. This program should be sustained and strengthened by subsequent discussions on the value and importance of savings. Otherwise, the beneficiaries will not appreciate such requirements, resulting in non-cooperation and lack of support among the members.
12. More than two-thirds (73.3%) of the respondents claimed that their income was not enough to cover family expenses. This suggests the need for the program implementors to design other income generating activities to augment the farm income of the beneficiaries. Such a need might serve as a relevant entry point for the program implementors to utilize the CO-PAR (Community Organizing through Participatory Action Research) approach on the target-communities, wherein cooperative members undertake research, plan, monitor and evaluate the implemented plans. This approach will not only develop the members but also ensure the sustainability of the program even beyond the project-period.
13. Given the review of the records available at the project-office, there is a need to improve the documentary requirements of the program until the end of the project period. It is thus recommended that a seminar-workshop for the implementors, relative to the preparation and submission of standard reports, be undertaken with the program-evaluators. This will subsequently prepare the implementors for the terminal evaluation-phase of the program.
Tables Referred to the PDF