This essay concerns one of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s enigmatic masterpiece Philosophical investigation into the essence of human freedom and matters conencted therewith (Of human freedom) that is now recognized as an indispensable work in German Idealism, particularly after the publication of Martin Heidegger’s elaboration of Schelling’s work. Along with the serious works in the form of notable evaluation of the works of Schelling as a whole, which are written by prominent thinkers such as Walter Schulz, Manfred Frank, and Slavoj Zizek, Heidegger’s exposition of Schelling’s Of human freedom has gradually restored its authority and claimed a special place in the corpus of Schelling’s entire works (Love and Schmidt 2006, ix). The purpose of this present essay is to provide an introduction to Schelling’s notoriously difficult text. Far from being pretentious, this essay is not intended to be an exhaustive introduction to the work. Its main focus is to carefully uncover the deduction of the possibility and actuality of evil in Schelling’s Of human freedom.

I will begin by outlining the general underlying arguments of Schelling’s Of human freedom. Then, I will present how the possibility and the actuality of evil can be deduced by presenting God in terms of ground and existence and his self-manifestation as such. I will eventually end this paper with some concluding remarks.

The General Arguments

Schelling’s consideration of the concept of freedom is based on his conviction that its investigation must always coincide with the investigation of its relation to a system as a whole. The true meaning of a concept, for Schelling (1936, 7), can only be revealed in terms of its “systematic completion,” which appears through a “demonstration of its connections with the whole.” This simply means that an adequate definition of a concept must take into account its connections with all concepts preserved in the system. Schelling himself counters the common belief that the unity and completeness in every philosophy presupposes a thorough system rendering no place for anything indeterminate, for example, freedom. This view is based on a false thesis that a system is characterized by restrictedness and determinateness,’ leaving no room for a harmonious connection between system and freedom.

Rejecting this account will bring us to the true understanding of Schelling’s task purported to be developed in Of human freedom. For Schelling, knowledge on the reconciliation of system and freedom is not an insurmountable problem. One can attain such knowledge, and as such, one can clarify decisively the principle through which one attains it (Schelling 1936, 8). The assumption that such knowledge can be reached is based on the ancient doctrine of “like is recognized by like.” The idea is that because human beings are free, then they can have knowledge of how their freedom can be reconciled with a system. Such doctrine similarly allows one to maintain knowledge of the divine because “he alone comprehends the god outside himself through the god within himself by keeping his mind pure and unclouded by evil” (Schelling 1936, 8). According to Schelling (1936, 9), the reconciliation of system and freedom should alone occupy all philosophy as “a subject of an inevitable problem;” otherwise, all philosophy will have no value at all. Such reconciliation, then, is the utmost knowledge worth striving for. So what appears in Of human freedom is nothing more than the expression of Schelling’s strife, reconciling system and freedom, a self-set task framing together his efforts in the treatise.

This task has to be understood in line with Schelling’s philosophical craving for setting forth an entire system, the unity of the “real” and the “ideal.” Such relation can be gleaned in his reinterpretation of Baruch Spinoza’s pantheism that at the same time demonstrates his own understanding of the law of identity. Schelling points to three generally considered interpretations of pantheism against which his objection and reinterpretation are raised: 1) A total identification of God; 2) an annihilation of all individuality: Everything else is as naught; and 3) a denial of freedom (Brown 1977, 121).

With regard to the first interpretation, Schelling maintains that the teachings of Spinoza render a more complete differentiation of things from God than any other tenet. He reiterates Spinoza’s tenet: “God is that which is in itself and is conceived solely through itself; whereas the finite necessarily exists in another being and can only be conceived with reference to it” (Schelling 1936, 12). By this, we consequently find that things and God are not only different in degree but also completely different in kind. Rejecting completely this total identification of God, Schelling further emphasizes that things, in whatever their relation to God may be, are absolutely different from God. They merely exist in or by virtue of being dependent upon another being, that is, God himself. Conversely, God exists in, by, and through himself. He is alone “independent and primary and self-affirming, all else being related to it only as what is affirmed, or as the consequence to the antecedent” (Schelling 1936, 12).

With respect to the second interpretation, Schelling (1936, 16) argues that it seems to be in contradiction with the first. If a pantheistic view of God annihilates all individuality, then it is meaningless to think of God as a total identification of all—as a whole. There would be no parts at all toward which God would be the whole.

As to the third interpretation, Schelling observes that freedom and pantheism are quite different from each other. The true understanding of the law of identity, he says, grants freedom its utmost revelation. The reason is that, in the law of identity, the unity of subject and predicate is of an “intrinsically creative kind,” instead of being a merely mechanical and abstract relation as maintained in Spinoza’s pantheism. Furthermore, Schelling argues that while the consequence is dependent upon the ground it does not necessarily mean that the latter determines the nature of the former. The unity of the ground and the consequence manifests the dependency of the consequence upon the ground, and not what the consequence is or is not (Schelling 1936, 18). That is to say, in the law of identity, the identity of things as different from and dependent upon God without being determined by God is preserved. Obviously, the use of the law of identity for exploring the unity of God and things maintains the nature of freedom in both. God does not determine things. As a result, the latter remain free and distinct.

From his discussion of the denial of freedom as not necessarily connected to pantheism, Schelling proceeds to reinterpret Spinoza’s pantheism. For him, Spinoza’s pantheism holds some grain of truth insofar as it unfolds the main characteristic of pantheism, namely the immanence of things in God. However, it is guilty of fatalism due to the fact that things are merely regarded as a “thing” in God, that they are conceived in terms of “deterministic causality” (Schelling 1936, 22). Deterministic causality means that the relation between God and things is based on a causal relation in which God causes things to exist as a consequence, and as such, God determines all things. This fatalism arises because of an abstract conception of all creatures. In contrast, Schelling (1936, 22) affirms a vital and dynamic conception of nature. He proposes that the abstractness and lifelessness of Spinoza’s pantheism has to be spiritualised by idealism as a vital basis (Schelling 1936, 22). A vital basis is a new state achieved: 1) Through a more elevated way of comprehending nature as opposed to regarding nature simply as “thing” in God; and 2) through the lively and dynamic unity of God and things, instead of the mechanistic and lifeless form of unity presented in Spinoza’s.

Schelling believes that from this newly transfigured pantheism a real philosophy of nature can be developed, that is, a whole system in which the “real” and the “ideal” are united. He tries to establish a lively and creative account of the unity of God and things (the real part) through giving an account of freedom (the ideal part). In developing an account of freedom, Schelling is actually conceptualizing or systematizing freedom. This is not an effort to reduce freedom into an abstract concept or system but to identify it with the constitution of God as well as man’s being—the constitution of life. Through this system of freedom, Schelling seeks to unify freedom and necessity, the “ideal” and the “real.”

After presenting an outline of the general arguments of Of human freedom, let me proceed to a discussion of its specific contents. Heidegger (1985, 104) captures very well the true meaning of Schelling’s investigation in Of human freedom: “The key question of the main investigation is the question of the inner possibility and of the kind of reality of evil. The intention of this investigation is to provide a full and live concept of human freedom. Thus the right center for the plan of the system of freedom is to be gained.” For Heidegger (1985, 97), the question of the possibility and the actuality of evil, or in his terms “a metaphysics of evil,” is the question of the ground of the system of freedom, the question of being. It is with this background in mind that I proceed in the next sections.

On God as Ground and Existence: A Philosophy of the Will

Schelling (1936, 31-32) clearly asserts that his investigation is based on the distinction between “[b]eing insofar as it exists, and being insofar as it is the mere basis of existence.” Schelling (1936, 32) proceeds to apply this distinction to God: “As there is nothing before and outside of God he must contain within himself the ground of his existence.” According to Schelling, the truth of this duality of being—ground and existence—is vulnerable to being reduced into a mere concept. But this must not be the case. He insists that it should be regarded instead as “real and actual,” meaning, it is the movement of life rather than a system (Schelling 1936, 88). Although the ground is within God himself, it is not God from the perspective of God as existence, or God as the absolute. The ground is merely, Schelling (1936, 32) explains, “the basis of his existence, it is nature-in God, inseparable from him, to be sure, but nevertheless distinguishable from him.” As he proceeds to apply this distinction to things, Schelling arrives at the stance that things, as totally different from God, share with God the same basis out of which they can carry on their own process of becoming. This basis, which is within God but which is not God himself, is nothing other than the ground of God’s existence. God’s existence is what emerges from that which is within him, which is not God himself, and in emerging, ultimately reveals itself (Heidegger 1985, 104). This means that God’s existence is his self-revelation, his self-manifestation.

Schelling uses the analogy of gravity and light in nature to explain the principles of ground and existence. In this analogy, he says that the precedence of gravity, which is analogous to ground, over light, which is analogous to existence, is neither the “precedence in time” nor the “priority of essence” (Schelling 1936, 33). There is no first and later or even last as to the distinction between ground and existence. Neither of the two is more important than the other. Both imply each other. Neither of them is without the other.

Schelling further seeks to explain the ground in anthropomorphic terms. He calls the ground as “the longing in which God feels to give birth to himself,” a yearning to bear himself in a unity of life with his existence which, to this extent, “is not yet the unity in its own self.” Rather, it is “co-eternal” within God, that the ground of God is an inseparable part of his existence. One part cannot exist without another part and that both are two eternal beginnings of God in his absolute existence and creation (Schelling 1936, 34 and 89). As a mere longing, the ground is “not yet” a conscious will but a prescient will, a will without understanding. It therefore refers to darkness, obscurity, and unruliness. Given the fact that this ground is dark, obscure and unruly, Schelling (1936, 34) calls it as “the incomprehensible basis of reality.” Since it is before understanding, this initial will is comparable to “desire or passion;” it is “the lovely urge of a developing being striving to unfold itself, whose inner actions are undeliberate” (Schelling 1936, 75). The will refers to a kind of anticipation toward some thing or object which is not fully determined. Schelling (1936, 88) uses the anthropomorphic term “will” as a key to understand ground and existence, the “twofoldness of the principles.”

According to Schelling, there are two different wills, the will of ground, one that is always striving toward the ground, and the will of love, which is God’s own will to manifest himself. These two wills exist by themselves and become one because they, in their very beginning, function in themselves (Schelling 1936, 52 and 74-75). By this, God becomes himself insofar as he exists. Only through God’s will of love, which is active, as opposed to the reaction of the will of ground, that God is in his absolute existence. The will of ground always returns to itself such that “a basis of being might ever remain” (Schelling 1936, 36). In this lively contradiction of the two wills, we can properly understand the true meaning of ground and existence as the two principles of being according to which the being of God and creation is revealed. This is therefore essentially a philosophy of will, since the essential meaning of God’s being can only be grasped appropriately by presenting the two principles of the will of ground and the will of love. This account of the two principles is the main basis for comprehending God’s self-manifestation, making the creation of all creatures intelligible.

On God’s Self-Manifestation: A Theory of Creation

In the foregoing section, we conceive of God’s being in terms of ground and existence. the existence of God is the fulfillment of his own longing to give birth to himself, which is the ground, one that is within God yet is not God. God cannot simply relinquish the ground since it is the condition of his own dynamic impetus to be himself. This dynamic impetus inevitably terminates in God’s self-manifestation. As the united principles that reveal God’s being, ground and existence are thus the constitution of the inner structure of God.

Schelling (1936, 78 and 84) asserts that the unity of the two principles, insofar as it determines the being of God, should be conceived on the basis of the concept of life: “[Uri the divine understanding there is a system; God himself, however, is not a system but a life.” Werner Marx accentuates the interpretation of God’s being in terms of the notion of life. He explains: “Life is that which is capable of developing itself on its own and which thus manifest itself by producing luminosity, spirituality, and regularity out of darkness, obscurity, and unruliness” (Marx 1984, 66). Since it reveals itself on its own, life is causa sui. In revealing itself, life presupposes a contradiction out of which it gains its true manifestation. Luminosity, spirituality, and regularity need their counter-condition—darkness, obscurity, and unruliness—to reveal themselves. In this sense, the constitution of life is comprised of two contradictory powers. Both must always be in tension so as to sustain life, yet compose a sheer unity in which life attains its true revelation. The indispensable significance of the contradiction for understanding life is clearly stated in Of human freedom: “[W]here there is no battle there is no life” (Schelling 1936, 80). Schelling (1936, 84) further emphasizes: “All life…is subject to suffering and development….For being is only aware of itself in becoming… there is in being no becoming; in the latter, being is itself rather posited as in eternity; but in actuali[z]ation, there is necessarily a becoming.” Life itself should be understood as becoming since it entails the process of becoming toward its actuality, in its full meaning insofar as it is that which emerges from its counter-condition—the condition of darkness.

With respect to God’s being, its process of becoming is conceivable under the notion of “a leap” or “spontaneity.” It reveals the immediacy of God’s self-manifestation, a perfect unity of ground and existence unwrapping divine life such as freedom (Marx 1984, 68).5 This divine life acquires its full meaning in God’s will to manifest himself and, at the same time, to create. Therefore, to speak of God’s self-manifestation is to speak of the creation.

Before presenting his theory of creation, Schelling (1963, 35) first indicates what he calls “an inward, imaginative response, corresponding to this longing,” which is the first response of God toward the operation of the ground. In this first response, in line with his self-manifestation, God “sees himself in his own image” (Schelling 1936, 35). This image is already in God and occurs in God himself. God has his own first imagination of himself as his own image. Schelling (1936, 35) identifies this self-image of God as “God–begotten God himself.” In this identification, Schelling makes references to the process of giving birth. God gives birth to himself, that is, the begotten–God. However, to the extent that the begotten–God is a result of a process of giving birth, he is different from God, although he is actually God himself. Because the begotten–God is different from God, the process of giving birth is then a process of differentiation—God’s self-differentiation. This first response of God is distinct from the process of creation although both arise from God’s desire for self-manifestation.

The process of creation has to be understood in terms of the eternal contradiction of God’s inner structure, namely ground and existence. The role of this eternal contradiction is the imperative link in apprehending the relation between the identity of God and creation (Pfau in Schelling 1994, 43). The ground never remains settled in a perfect unity with existence, but keeps struggling in accordance with its will, the will of ground (Schelling 1994, 34 and 36). Schelling (1994, 38 and 39) explicitly declares that every being that “has risen in nature” contains the two principles of being—ground and existence—as a unity.6 He also figures that the principle of darkness (the ground, since it resides in depth) excites “the self-will of creatures” that always stands opposed to the universal will (Schelling 1994, 38 and 58). He refers to this as the process of creation of all creatures, save the human being. The process of creation is characterized by the fact that as God wills his self-revelation, he lets the ground operate against existence. On the one hand, this operation of the ground excites the self-will, which then struggles against the universal will. On the other hand, the universal will keeps determining the self-will in that it makes use of the self-will and subordinates it into itself by treating it as a mere tool. The self-will performs a service for the universal will insofar as the latter wills this creation through the self-will. Thus, in and among creatures except the human being, the unity of the two principles manifests a kind of “despotic relationship.”

The case of the human being is different. The struggle of the self-will to go back to the ground corresponds to its elevation to a unity with the universal will. In the human being, the very deep ground and the purest understanding reside together as one whole: “In [man], there are both centers–the deepest pit and the highest heaven” (Schelling 1994, 38). In the human being, the power of the two principles collides with each other as a dynamic unity and where the two principles mutually excite each other toward their own fulfillment. The self-will is elevated toward unity with the universal will, which is spirit; at the same time, it reaches the inmost domain of the ground, which is also spirit. This spiritualized self-will is the self hood in the human being (Schelling 1994, 39), suggesting that the self-will is not merely a tool and subordinated to the universal will.

Moreover, Schelling (1994, 38) uses the term “Word” to clarify the difference between the human being and other creatures: “[T]he (real) Word, pronounced, exists only in the unity of light and darkness (vowel and consonant)…Only in man, then, is the Word completely articulate, which in all other creatures was held back and left unfinished.”‘ Because the two principles are united in the human being, he is raised to a higher level than other creatures. However, Schelling (1994, 38) cautions: “[T] hat unity which is indissoluble in God must be dissoluble in man.” If the unity of the principles of being in the individual were inseparable, then by necessity man would be the same as God. If this were the case, there would have been no self-manifestation of God by which the process of creation is explicable. This dissolubility of the unity of the two principles in the human being constitutes the condition of his essence.

The Deduction of the Possibility of Evil

From the foregoing section, we know that the process of creation has to be understood in terms of God’s self-manifestation consisting of a threefold process.’ First is God’s first response to the operation of the ground in which God gives birth to his own image, that is, the begotten—God. This is God’s self-differentiation. He is differentiated from himself yet in himself through the begetting of his own image. Second is the uttering of the “Word” to create all creatures—the process of creation. There are two modes of the creature—the human being and all other creatures. The human being is lifted up beyond other creatures because in his selfhood (the spiritualized self-will) the two principles of being—ground and existence—are united. Each of them collides with its opposite, according to Zaek (1996, 64), as “its opposite’s inherent constituent.” Neither of them can have its power in disposing of its opposite. And the third is the underlying ground, which is always in rebellion against the light. This is the condition of God’s self-manifestation: That God must keep the ground striving against the light so as to manifest himself.

Now, how can we apprehend the possibility of evil in terms of this threefold process of God’s self-manifestation? Since the self-will is spiritualized by its grasping of the innermost ground and its elevation to the universal will, then the two principles of ground and existence in the human being reach their full power and are united in a separable unity. From this dissoluble unity, the possibility and the capability of the human being to dwell in darkness and in light can be derived. Schelling, however, does not explain the meaning of his claim that the two principles reach their full power. Rather, he simply posits this as constituting the dissolubility of their unity in the human being, constituting the possibility of good (dwelling in light) and evil (dwelling in darkness) (Schelling 1936, 39).

Schelling (1936, 39) says that the account of the possibility of evil is pursued insofar as it makes comprehensible the divisibility of the unity of the two principles. He begins by simply reiterating his initial concept pertaining to the self-will which wants to be a particular will in the human being as long as it is in unity with the universal will. He tries to express it in the terms of periphery and center: “[Self-will] may seek to be at the periphery that which it is only insofar as it remains as the center” (Schelling 1936, 40). The center here is analogous to the unity with the universal will while the periphery is analogous to the dwelling in the ground. Schelling stresses the indispensability of the self-will to remain at the periphery. Otherwise, there would be no dissolubility of the unity of the two principles, meaning that there would be no human being or creation in general: “[H]ardly does self-will move from the center which is its station, then the nexus of forces is also dissolved” (Schelling 1936, 41).

Schelling proceeds to deal with the concept of evil by explaining the divisibility of the unity of the two principles. Here, he makes use of the metaphor of disease (Schelling 1936, 41-42). The human being experiences disease as something very real, a “feeling” that makes us gloomy. However, there is nothing essential in it. Disease is nothing else than a kind of illusion or an arbitrary appearance in his life. As such, it has no meaning in the least because life remains, if only transfigured in a disordered appearance. Schelling (1936, 41-42) describes the condition of disease with regard to the activation of the ground: “Disease of the whole organism can never exist without the hidden forces of the depths being unloosed; it occurs when the irritable principle which ought to rule the innermost tie of forces in the quite deep, activates himself” While being healthy means “the restoration of separate and individual life to the inner light of the being, whence there recurs the division (crisis)” (Schelling 1936, 42). This shows that the state of being healthy in the human being is achieved as a result of the process of going back to the state of life wherein he becomes ill due to a disease. In the context of the unity of the two principles, this state refers to the divisibility of their unity, constituting the possibility of goodness and evil. If the possibility of goodness and evil is derived from this divisible unity attaining their full power in the human being, then the ground that excites the self-will in him cannot be made of “insufficiency” or “deprivation.

Schelling proposes a way of explaining the dissolubility of the two principles’ unity in terms of matter and form. He says that in the context of evil (as the possibility of evil becomes real) the matter of the two principles is the same, namely ground and existence that collide with each other in the spiritualized self-will. But their form is different here because the power of the ground overwhelms existence in the spiritualized self-will. This explanation will be used to clarify goodness and evil as they are actualized in the human being’s essence.

The Deduction of the Actuality of Evil

As we have seen, the possibility of evil is derived from the dissolubility of the unity of the two principles—ground and existence—in the human being. This separable unity is the essential condition of his essence who cannot remain in indecision (Schelling 1936, 50). It is an essential condition since the power of darkness collides with the power of light, allowing the human being the possibility of making a primordial decision. This decision constitutes his essence.

What we are to explore now is the actuality of evil which is, according to Schelling (1936, 49), the “chief subject in question.” In this respect, Schelling demands that there are three things to be explored, namely 1) the universal effectiveness of evil, 2) the process of how it comes to be real in the human being, and 3) the process of how it could have burst forth from creation as “an unmistakable principle” (1936, 49-50). These will be discussed below along with Schelling’s description of the nature of God in view of evil, thereby reaching “the highest point of the whole inquiry,” the love beyond God.

According to Schelling (1936, 58):

There is…a universal evil, even if it is not active from the beginning but is only aroused in God’s revelation…. Only after recognising evil in its universal character is it possible to comprehend good and evil in man too. For if evil was already aroused in the first creation and was finally developed into a general principle through the self-cent[ere]d operation of the basis, then man’s natural inclination to evil seems at once explicable.

Evil becomes possible in the human being because the unity of the principles is separable. This possibility of evil is a faculty insofar as it is a capability in him by which he can make his primordial decision. However, the capability of making a decision becomes a real decision as it follows the inclination or solicitation to that which makes a decision possible. Thus, there has to be an inclination to evil, an inclination through which the human being can decide upon evil. Since evil has been aroused in the first creation, and will always solicit him throughout his history in accordance with the relentless operation of the ground, there is a universal solicitation to evil. This universal evil is not yet a real evil as such, but a possible evil pervasive in all human history.

Schelling (1936, 54-55) seeks to pursue universal evil as he uncovers the stages of creation in the history if the human being. According to him, the human being’s stages of creation have to be understood in accordance with this following pattern: “It is God’s will to universalize everything to live it to unity with light or to preserve it therein; but the will of the deep is to particularize everything or to make it creature-like” Schelling 1936, 58). This tells us that the only condition of the creation of the human being is nothing other than the never-ending craving of the ground toward itself, the domain of darkness. Since the operation of the ground is essentially necessary to the process creation and to God’s self-revelation, the universal evil that is aroused through this being to decide upon evil as part of the constitution of his essence.

Meanwhile, with regard to the process of how evil comes to be real in teh human being, Schelling (1936, 63)has this to say: “But just inner necessity itself freedom; man’s being is essentially his own deed. Necessity and freedom interpenetrates as one being, which appears as the one or the other only as regarded from various aspects; in itself it is freedom, but formally regarded, necessity.” The human being’s essence is his own deed. This means that every human being is essentially has to determine himself so as to become an actual individual. This then is a primal as well as primordial determination of the human being, since  it is pertaining  to his existence or non-existence as an individual. He must, out of necessity, decide upon these primordial choices, namely “to be” or “not to be”. Only by making this decision can become an actual individual living in this world. To become an actual individual is to have for himself an essence which determined him as a living being in this world. Hence, what he has to decide on is his own essence in order to be an actual — not potential — individual. This decision has to be regarded as his own deed. Because the primordial decision constituting the essence of the human being is necessarily to be determined, then his essence is necessity. Necessity here, however, is not a compulsion since his essence is his own decision ans as such freedom. Therefore, from the perspective of the essence is his own decision and as such freedom. Therefore, from the perspective ofthe essence of the human being, freedom is necessity and vice versa.

Furthermore, Schelling (1936, 66) argues: “[A]s man at here of he has acted since eternity and already in the beginning of creation.” Man’s primordial act of decision constituting his own essence  cannot be understood in terms of a particular juncture in the order of time; rather as something “already” made from all eternity. Every individual thus experiences himself at his birth as he who has determined himself to be who he is (Heidegger 1985, 155). As an eternal act, the primordial decision exceeds his consciousness (Schelling 1936, 64). This eternal act is a precondition for his something that is “already” made in eternity. Only by this act can he become conscious of his essence. Because the eternal act does not occur in the human being’s consciousness, Schelling (1936, 65) says that this act of decision remains the responsibility of every individual.

By now, it is clear that goodness and evil are actualized in the human being’s essence, which is necessarily constituted by his own primordial decision — the freedom we fondness can be understood in terms of the united but separable two principles of ground and existence. In our discussion of the dissolubility of the unity of the two principles, we have seen that each principle can become dominant over the other. From this, the possibility of goodness and evil is derived. But, how it the actuality of goodness and evil with respect to the separable unity of the principles explained? This can be shown in two ways —- qualitatively and formally.

Qualitatively speaking, as the self-will which is excited in the human being through the operation of ground dominates he universal will, evil surpasses goodness in the realm of his essence. Conversely, as the universal will subdues the self-will, goodness encompasses evil. Thus the unity of the two principles of ground and existence in accordance with actual goodness and evil, is regarded in terms of a difference in degree between the two principles. One is therefore dominant over the other. Formally speaking, the essence of the human being is actually a perverted configuration of the two principles in that one is overwhelming another. If an individual decides to be essentially evil, meaning that evil dominated over goodness, the configuration of the two principles i then perverted since found subsumes existence into its realm. Conversely, when an individual decides to be essentially good, then existence subsumes ground. In the human being, evil and goodness always appear concomitantly. The appearance of evil in him means that evil dominates goodness, while the appearance of goodness in him means goodness dominates evil. His essence is never the freedom to goodness OR evil, but it is always the freedom to goodness AND evil. This is so because evil needs goodness as its essential opponent for it to be actualized. So, too, goodness needs evil. In this sense, evil becomes an “unmistakable principle;” it is an indispensable constituent of the human being’s essence.

After showing that the possibility and the actuality of evil are actually dependent on God’s self-manifestation, Schelling goes back to the investigation of the nature of God. This he explains in two parts: 1) The justification of God’s nature in view of evil ; and 2) the consideration of the ultimate unity of everything. Without going into the details, let me present the arguments.

As to the first part, Schelling formulates the problem as follows: The process of creation arises from God’s free and conscious act to manifest himself by letting the ground strive toward itself. If God is free and conscious, he has to foresee the consequence of his act, particularly the arousal of evil from the operation of the ground. Because evil arises in the human being, God is this the originator of evil. Schelling rejects this argument. He contents that God’s decision to let the ground incessantly strive against the light is essential to the absolute existence of God. God would not be who he is unless the ground keeps striving. Thus this decision for letting the ground strive is a necessity to God’s self-manifestation, and therefore to the process of creation. Schelling (1936, 79) says: “[I]t cannot be said either, that evil comes from the depths or that the will of the depths is its primal cause. For evil can only arise in the innermost will of one’s own heart, and is never achieved without one’s own deed.” With respect to the second part, Schelling considers the origin of the two principles of ground and existence. This is, Schelling declares, the highest point of the whole inquiry. According to him, this origin has to be designated as a “primal ground” or as groundless,” which is “before all basis and before all existence, that is, before any duality at all” (Schelling 1936, 87). Since this groundless precedes all, it does not contain any antitheses. Thus, any antithesis can by no means be present, explicable, or differentiable from it. The groundless is indifferent to all antitheses  rather than designating their identity. Hence, it is an “absolute indifference.”

With regard to the two principles, Schelling (1936, 88) states: “[N]othing prevents their being predicated as non-antitheses, that is, in disjunction and each for itself; wherein, however, this duality . . . is established.” Schelling contends that even in the groundless , as an absolute indifference, there is nothing that prevents this. As indifferent to everything, its relation to the two principles is a “relation of total indifference.” As an absolute indifference, it reacts to them neutrally. That is to say, there is no reaction whatsoever to the two principles from the groundless, which as indifferent, is not yet a principle. If it responds to their being posited at all, the response is indifferent. Even if the relation of the groundless tot he two principles is totally indifferent, Schelling (1936, 88) maintains that “instead of undoing the distinction [of the two principles] . . . the groundless rather posits and confirms it.” Only by this positing and confirmation does the real meaning of the opposition and not just its logical meaning, come to the fore.

This foregoing argument, however, seems to be incompatible with the concept of the groundless as an absolute indifference. If the response of the groundless to the positing of the two principles is indifference, and if they are posited as indifferent, there cannot be any form of confirmation of their distinction. Schelling’s argument remains unclean in this respect. However, this groundless has to divide itself into two really opposing principles in order that they can find their unity in the absolute identity, which is God.

Schelling (1936,90) completes his investigation by showing the absolute and general unity of all, that is, love beyond God:

[B]eyond the spirit is the inital ‘groundless’ which is no longer indifference  (neutrality) but nonetheless not the identity of the two principles but rather the general unity, the same towards all but still not partisan to anything, It is now a beneficence which is free from all and which nonetheless works through all, in a word, it is love which is all in all.

As to the love beyond God, Schelling’s explanation is not clear. He initially seems to identify this love also with God whose absolute existence necessitates the operation of the ground. He writes: “[T]his is the secret of love, that it unites such beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can be without the other” (Schelling 1936, 89).

In his final exposition of the groundless, the love beyond God, Schelling reaches the utmost unitary configuration of the principle of the real and the ideal, the so-called system of freedom, the problem that has plagued him throughout his philosophical odyssey. This is why he regards this as the highest point of his inquiry in Of human freedom. Herein, as we have seen, Schelling shows the origin of the two principles, namely: The groundless, the absolute indifference. The two principles reach their own full identity as opposites, yet as a perfect unity in God alone because God is the absolute identity. In God, the necessity of always letting the ground (the principle of the real) struggle against existence (the principle of the ideal) emerges out of his absolute freedom. Therefore, in God, there is a full identification between necessity and freedom, the reconciliation of necessity and freedom. This is the ground of the system of freedom. Schelling completes this reflection with a consideration of the original groundless, which is no longer indifference, but the love that is all in all.

Conclusion

To conclude, let me recall briefly the main themes of this paper: Firstly, Schelling considers God in terms of the two principles of being—ground and existence. In order to reveal himself, which is the will of love, God always lets the ground return to itself ensuing its own will, the will of the ground. Through this organic contradiction of the two wills, Schelling shows the essential meaning of God’s being. Secondly, in his self-manifestation which necessitates the operation of the ground, God utters the “Word” in creation which is the process of creation itself. Thirdly, only from the dissolubility of the unity of the two principles can we deduce the possibility of goodness and evil. This is the condition of the constitution of the essence of the human being. And fourthly, he essentially has to decide for constituting his essence, that is, the freedom to goodness and evil, from which we can derive the actuality of goodness and evil.