The era of globalization has also brought about a counter-pole—global people’s solidarity. One only has to remember the Battle of Seattle (1999), the Siege in Genoa (2001), the Porto Alegre (2002) and Mumbai (2004) social summits that typify this reality. But networking and coalition-building within and among Civil societies have been evolving for quite some time now. And Asia has been host to some of these more dynamic initiatives.
When regional integration efforts in Asia-Pacific under the neo-liberal agenda of globalization created such bodies as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia Free Trade Area (AFTA), and various growth triangles, civil alliances like People’s Plan for the 21th Century (PP21), parallel summits, and people’s networks, also came out.
People’s organizations at the local level in many Asian countries have formed alliances for a multitude of purposes – specific economic livelihood projects, local governance, political and lobby campaigns, cultural awakenings, integrated socio-economic experiments, coalition building, or simply reflection-type gatherings.
There are those who come together in solidarity with or for each other’s burning issues — be it a campaign for self-determination, justice for human rights infringements, a joint engagement for a common problem, or even advocacy for policy change. Most networks and coalitions are usually about campaigns. And campaigns are the kind of work that our organization, the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), has been engaged in since 1988.
In 1994, we helped organize the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor or APCET. That experience was both instructive and edifying. We have since then fod ourselves involved in either organizing or converging _ with similar efforts on Burma, Mindanao, Sri Lanka, Aceh, West Papua, and other Southeast Asian concerns.
There are a few lessons to learn from all of these experiences. Allow me to share them with you, particularly, our experiences with the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET).
Lessons
I have listed at least six lessons which I believe most, if not all of you, are already familiar within your respective campaigns.
First, a network or a coalition must have a common issue to advocate for. These issues may range from a basic demand for a minimum wage or the lofty goal for self-determination of an entire people. The important thing is for all the network members to be clear and have one mind about the issue they are upholding.
Second, each member of the network must clearly know its role within the coalition. Who is the best spokesperson of the group, who is the main researcher, who is the most articulate, who are the diplomats, who has the muscle, who has the easily mobilized constituency, who has the most contacts in other networks, and so on. With this acceptance comes respect for each other, paving the way for complementary and ultimately harmonious efforts. The likelihood of failure starts when the coalition is bedeviled by “turf war” among its members or when jealousy and competition seep into the network.
Third, the network must have a core group of either a few key personalities or organizations dedicated to the coalition’s cause. Usually, the core group is composed of those who initiated the setting-up of the coalition. Related to this is the identification of a public “face” or “faces” of the coalition. This “face” either provides prestige, legitimacy, or voice to the network and the issue it espouses. For purposes of focus and recall, it is sometimes best to have one articulator than a collective one.
Fourth, the coalition must have a secretariat that is creative, independent, and professional in the conduct of its work. The secretariat should also be committed to the cause being advocated by the coalition, and should have the mandate of the entire membership of the network to act as such. It is important that this mandate is periodically affirmed through a regular and formal mechanism such as a conference or an assembly. Not doing so runs the risk of getting isolated from one’s constituency and the network members, making the secretariat unaccountable. Still, the secretariat must be a step ahead of the rest of the network members in terms of accompanying the issue and must be capable of initiating actions aside from just implementing plans resolved by the network en banc. The secretariat must have a point person in charge of the entire network. This person can also double as the “face” depending on her or his capabilities and qualifications. However, the more important task of this person is to run the day-to-day, nitty-gritty part of the campaign of the network.
Fifth, resources must be made available to the network, particularly for the operations of the secretariat. This can come from network members themselves in kind or otherwise, e.g. hosting meetings in their offices, counterpart expenses like transportation to and from meetings, direct actions, and others. Sustainability can best be ensured with this although some seed capital is needed for operations, thus the need for access to donor institutions that resonate with the network’s advocacy.
Sixth, but definitely not the last, the coalition must have media savvy. The coalition should consider media not only as a tool but also as a target of their advocacy. Oftentimes, media is mobilized only when needed to generate mass awareness of an issue thus pressuring the main principals of the advocacy—usually governments, multilateral institutions, or even corporations. Yet a sustained media accompaniment is necessary to effect an impact or for the pressure to be successful. To get decision-makers to our side, we need to recruit as many opinion makers as we can. And the most influential are usually the editorial writers, columnists, writers, anchors, talk-show hosts, reporters, and even photojournalists.
Common Problems
There are also some pitfalls in networking and coalition work. Some of them as culled by other partners in regional-type work are the following:
1. There is some tension between and among regional groups, and between local groups and regional groups. Among regional groups there is the problem of turfing, competition for funds, duplication of work, and others. Similar problems exist between the regional group and the local group on issues of mandate, representation, and participation.
2. There is also tension between the academic and the activist. The academic has many theories but lacks grounding, while the activist has many experiences but lacks context. It is unfortunate that much of the necessary combination between what is academic and what is activist is mostly discarded in favor of one or the other. The task is to use the strengths from both and integrate them in the programs.
3. It is indeed unfortunate that some network secretariats are not equal to the task. Most have small secretariats handling programs, publications, documentation, and even administrative matters. This says much about how much “actual work” gets to be done in ironing out all the paperwork. Coordination is a key word in mending this problem. Finding a way to coordinate programs within the network is one way to more efficiently distribute resources and time. Tying up or even farming out certain tasks may be another way to approach this problem.
4. There remains some redundancy in networking. There is a need to have more transparency and exchange among networks as to what the other is doing so that repetition is minimized and resources are maximized through cooperative endeavors.
5. A lack of coordination in campaigns also remains. This may be the result of “turfing” or political differences between groups.
6. It is obvious that publications are a main output of most networks. Whether in the form of newsletters, journals, or books, this modality is the output of choice. As such, some work has to be done to be more efficient with this method. There is a general distribution problem for publications of non-government organizations (NGOs). Their reach is limited and they tend to “preach to the converted.” Materials are only as good as their reach, and the alternative is to go mainstream.
The APCET Experience
Now, let me tell you the story of the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET) which began as the Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor. The voices raised in anger may have faded, and the diplomatic skirmishes and the media tit-for-tat are nothing more than a distant memory, perhaps mere footnotes in tomorrow’s history books. But the First Asia-Pacitit. Conference on East Timor (APCET 1) had made its impact, its lessons not easily forgotten.
The handling of the first APCET issue by both the Indonesian and Philippine governments showed vividly that the reality does not necessarily match the rhetoric. Indonesian strongman SuhartO refined to admit gross human rights violations in East Timor and showed nothing but contempt for his ASEAN neighbors despite a carefully cultivated veneer of democratic rule. For his part, Philippine President Fidel V. Ramos, himself -an ex-general like his Indonesian counterpart, tried to suppress the constitutional guarantees to free speech and free expression in an effort to scuttle APCET to appease the country’s southern neighbor.
After the first APCET, Indonesia’s temper tantrums were directed towards its other partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Malaysia and Thailand crumbled under intense Indonesian pressure to quash any discussion on East Timor in the region. In an unfortunate turn of events that kings into serious question the nature of ASEAN as an alliance, Southeast Asian governments caved in to Jakarta’s juggernaut in varying degrees, virtually making them silent conspirators to hie Indonesia’s dirty, bloody secret in East Timor.
But the truth that was East Timor was never again swept under the rug even under the pretext of ASEAN solidarity. For from APCET also emerged a victorious, broad, Asian-based people’s solidarity movement for East Timorese resistance and human rights.
East Timor was no longer to be confined to the halls of the United Nations nor whispered about in the corridors of power. It became a popular issue. Where before perhaps only the grim and determined political activists and grizzled diplomats may have heard of this tiny, but oil-rich island, today even Malaysian taxi drivers and Filipino cigarette vendors know about East Timor. At the height of the controversy, East Timor was prime time stuff on Philippine TV – as news and as subject of biting satire.
APCET brought into the mainstream the relevance of people-to-people solidarity particularly among the nations in the South. It also lent -credence to the growing importance of people’s diplomacy, diplomacy that is both mass-oriented and empowering.
It clearly showed that the interests of Southern peoples are interrelated and complementary. APCET was also a first experience of its kind in South-South solidarity. Never before have we been witness to a campaign-cum-solidarity effort initiated and sustained by South peoples for another South people. Conceived collectively by Asian human rights groups, international East Timorese solidarity networks, and the main independent East Timorese resistance groups, APCET was a watershed in Asian peoples’ solidarity.
Filipinos steeped in human rights struggle, political advocacy, and international people’s diplomacy were the handmaidens in the birthing of what would turn out to be a historic undertaking.
A Brief Background of East Timor
The Island of Timor used to be owned by two colonizers: the Dutch who held the western part, and the Portuguese who held the eastern part. After the Second World War, the Dutch withdrew from the Indonesian Islands, and the Republic of Indonesia was born, which incorporated Western Timor. East Timor remained a colony of Portugal.
In 1975, the Portuguese government, which was under left-wing control, relinquished all its colonies. Thus, East Timor became free, but it only enjoyed momentary days of independence as the Indonesian government forcibly and brutally annexed it. The main Timorese independence movement FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionario de Leste Timor Independent), which originally fought the Portuguese, now had to fight a bigger enemy. To suppress East Timor independence, the Indonesian army killed over 100,000 East Timorese in a population of 800,000.
The Timorese struggle generated widespread support from peoples all over the world especially in the West. Most of the world — as shown by consistent United Nations resolutions — supported their legitimate cause. But by the 1990s the struggle of the East Timorese had reached an impasse. The legendary FRETILIN leader, Xanana Gusmao, was arrested in 1992, and the East Timor issue was beginning to be forgotten.
Beginnings
In December 1992, around 500 international but mostly Asian NGO workers and activists gathered in Bangkok, Thailand for the second People’s Plan for the 21st Century (PP21) assembly. PP21 was held exactly one year after a fledgling democracy movement restored a civilian government in Thailand. The Thai people, particularly those who were in the forefront of the democracy movement, needed the reaffirmation of support from international and Asian partners to thwart any attempt of comeback by fascist or authoritarian elements in Bangkok.
Among the participants to PP21 were Filipino human rights advocates, solidarity and development workers, and Jose Ramos Horta of the East Tirnorese National Council of Maubere Resistance. Horta was among the resource speakers during the assembly. One of the various sub-conferences and workshops dealt with the situation in East Timor. A people’s tribunal was conducted and found Indonesia guilty of genocide in East Timor. That verdict was among the many resolutions made by the assembly and sub-conferences.
At that time, the Thai media paid scant attention to the tribunal proceedings and focused instead on the attempted demonstrations at the Burmese embassy and the anti-mass and commercialized tourism sub-conference – two of the more popular issues tackled at PP21.
The seeming disinterest in the East Timorese issue even among social activists became a concern for some delegates at the assembly. This matter was raised in informal sharing sessions and led to more formal brainstorming among some of the participants, particularly the Filipinos and the East Timorese who found a lot in common in their situation.
It was during these discussions that the idea dawned on holding a conference on East Timor and Indonesia within Southeast Asia. The Filipinos who met with the East Timorese participants would later form the nucleus of the Philippine Convenors Group of the Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET).
The plan was to organize a conference tackling the legal, political, and cultural aspects of the East Timorese resistance so as to provide the larger Asian-Pacific public a comprehensive view of the situation. In fact there were even ideas emanating from the East Timorese themselves to discuss their situation in the context of other self-determination struggles. The search for a possible venue in the region was resolved in favor of Manila.
Preparations
Manila it was then. But first we had to convene a broad coalition of human rights and progressive groups willing to host such a conference. At that time, the Philippine progressive community was starting to split due to spirited debates on strategy and tactics. Fortunately, there were no major problems in organizing a convenor’s group.
Apart from me, the Filipinos who attended the Bangkok meeting were Joel Rocamora and Renato “RC” Constantino, Jr., son of the distinguished Filipino nationalist historian Renato Constantino. RC was then a street parliamentarian and, in his own words, was an “illustrado, bleeding heart, do-gooder.” He was tapped to convene the group. RC and I did not belong to any political bloc, and we both enjoyed some measure of respect from almost all progressive groups, thus had the prestige to convene such a group.
The East Timor issue had general appeal and all political blocs could easily identify with it without any bickering over political line and tactics. They could easily set aside their differences and perhaps re-learn working together while dealing with East Timor.
A fairly professional secretariat that stood above the furious debate within the progressive movement was necessary to carry through the East Timor conference. The Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), an independent Filipino-based NGO working for South-South solidarity and internationalism, was unanimously elected to backstop the conference.
All major political groups attended the initial meetings for the conference even as ‘raging domestic concerns had to be confronted: oil price increases, persistent militarization in the countryside and of the civil bureaucracy, land reform, peace and order, and others.
Preparations began in January 1993. The conference, initially dubbed “International Conference on East Timor and Indonesia (ICETI)” was set for May 1993, but had to be postponed several times. Among the reasons were: lack of resources, the need to brush up on the brass tacks on the East Timor issue on the part of the convenors, and problems of availability of the key East Timorese personalities.
In the meantime, as the ICETI coordinator, I was invited along with Constantino to attend a symposium and course in Portugal on East Timor and Indonesia. Held in August 1993, it was considered an apt preparatory “exposure” and exercise for the key organizers of the conference. It was on this occasion that we met again with Horta and the other mainstream East Timorese resistance groups, particularly FRETILIN and the Union of Democratic Timorese (UDT). Despite their internal conflicts, the East Timorese were unified on the concept of a Manila conference.
Among the decisions agreed upon in Portugal was to scale down the conference. ICETI gave way to the “Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET).” Apart from the East Timorese, other international groups likewise signified their co-sponsorship of APCET. Among them were Parliamentarians for East Timor and the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor. The conference was finally set for May 1994.
Ominous Rumblings
By October 1993, the Philippine government got wind of the planned conference via a jittery report emanating from the Department of Foreign Affairs. The then Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had raised the issue with Filipino diplomats during talks between the Philippine government and the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which was being hosted by Jakarta. The Indonesians wanted the East Timor conference scrapped. In reaction, Philippine National Security Adviser Gen. Jose Almonte contacted Constantino who was elected APCET Filipino convenors chairman. Almonte had one request: Stop the conference.
The convenors politely refused, and Almonte would regularly get in touch with Constantino for updates about the project. Constantino provided Almonte with transparent information, for which Constantino got ribbed by his colleagues in the convenors groups about being Almonte’s newest asset. At the time, President Ramos badly needed an explanation to give Suharto about the conference as they were going to meet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) meeting in Seattle in November 1993.
I drafted a memorandum addressed to Almonte discussing the concept of the conference and explaining why the convenors could not accede to the government’s knee-jerk request to abort the conference. The Philippine government claimed that APCET was becoming a national interest issue as the Indonesians demanded to have the conference nipped in the bud.
Everything was above board, preparations were well underway, invitations were being finalized. The convenors’ group was expanding (one group, however, decided to withdraw in compliance with their own policy of not working with alleged Left renegades). Dates had been set, contracts drafted. Participants, guests, and speakers had booked their flights. Papers were being written, and people were being hired, or were volunteering their services for the conference.
The convenors decided not to make the government’s entreaties public. Even as we badly needed publicity for the conference and were wracking our brains on how to land APCET on the front pages, we kept Almonte’s implorations strictly to ourselves, at least for awhile. Friends in media said that at best, the conference would merit a bar or two with the attendance of some international bigwigs: French First Lady Danielle Mitterand, the Dalai Lama, Bishop Desmond Tutu, Portugal’s First Lady Maria Soares Barrosso.
Meanwhile, the organizers assured General Almonte that the conference would not be a rabble-musing party nor be patently one-sided. In fact, the organizers invited the diplomatic corps, including the Indonesian embassy, and even pro-Indonesian East Timorese to the conference. The government suggested different options: move the conference to another country; discuss human rights in general (Almonte even proposed that the human rights issue of the Philippines be given prominence), change the title, if not scrap the conference altogether. Almonte likewise provided names given by the Indonesians to attend the conference. Interestingly, two of the four names he produced had been either invited or had confirmed attendance to the conference.
Blackmail and Backdoor Diplomacy
As planning for the conference went underway, the Indonesians stepped up the pressure on the Philippine government within normal diplomatic channels. The Indonesians insinuated that if the Philippines failed to stop the conference, the fraternal relations between the two ASEAN partners would suffer. It tried to use the ongoing Jakarta talks between the Philippine government and the MNLF as a bargaining lever. When this failed, it brought up the Spratlys islands issue wherein the Philippines is a claimant. The Indonesians said they were ready to mediate the conflict with the other interested countries: Vietnam, China, Malaysia, and Brunei.
Indonesia also raised the issue of investments, noting that the East Asia Growth Area — of which the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia were partners — would be jeopardized because of APCET. Later, the Indonesians made overt threats that if the conference pushed through, they would consider it a “hostile act” that would jeopardize the on-going MNLF-GRP talks in Jakarta. This, despite the fact that APCET was a purely private initiative, and that plans had been made way back in 1992 long before the Jakarta talks.
The Indonesians insisted that the East Timor issue was their “internal affair.” The United Nations never recognized this, as it still considered Portugal the administering power of the territory.
Almonte then talked with the organizers and dangled the “national interest” card. He said the government was now asking APCET to reconsider because of this. In response, the Filipino convenors suggested to the Philippine government that it should instead propose to mediate in the conflict between Indonesia and East Timor in the same way that Indonesia was also mediating in the conflict between the Philippine government and the MNLF. The East Timorese were amenable to the idea, but Indonesia was adamant about its position.
Meanwhile, the APCET secretariat was shifting to high gear as confirmation of participation of various delegates and guests trickled in. The perpetual problem of logistics began to hound the organizers. Deposits had to be paid, contracts had to be inked. Up to the last minute, new groups signed up as convenors.
Upsetting the Generals
On 11 May 1994, newspapers bannered the story of an Indonesian embassy official in Manila denouncing the Philippine government’s ineptitude in stopping the East Timor Conference which was still a full two weeks away. The same item reported that Indonesia was not satisfied with the Philippine government’s explanation that it could not stop APCET, a privately-initiated conference. Then Philippine Vice-President Joseph Estrada came out with a public statement admonishing APCET organizers for being un-neighborly by not being sensitive to Indonesia’s sentiments. Two senators also joined the public castigation of APCET, one even warning that Manila might become the bastion of “lost causes” in the region if the conference was allowed to push through.
The Indonesians maintained their belligerence, rebuking the Manila government and exerting pressure on Ramos to cancel the conference. It was lost upon them that the Philippines is an independent country and not one of their provinces. Jakarta even took potshots at our own constitution and brushed aside the democratic values cherished by our people.
The Ramos government blinked. Ramos had previously maintained the position that it could not stop the conference but would remain a steadfast friend of Indonesia and, supportive of its position on East Timor. But it completely gave in to the Indonesian blackmail by calling into question the APCET organizers’ patriotism. The government started to pass on to APCET the heat from Jakarta. However, it did not know what policy to follow. It merely hoped that the APCET organizers would change their minds, pack up, and hold the conference somewhere else. Government apologists warned that Manila might become a bastion of subversion for the sputtering insurgencies in the Third World.
Media War
The APCET organizers were besieged with interviews and calls from the media. Foreign and local participants asked for advice. They were caught between the increasing tensions and were not sure if the conference would push through. The organizers then elected Constantino to be the sole spokesperson of APCET to have one single voice and to provide the focus on the issue. I was given the task to hold the fort and to supervise preparations for the conference.
The Indonesian embassy sought out the organizers and met with Constantino, offering to present their own perspectives about East Timor and asking again if the conference could be canceled. Constantino reiterated APCET’s invitation for the Indonesians to join the conference.
Meanwhile, the First Lady of France, Danielle Mitter and was the subject of press reports that she had decided to withdraw from the conference upon Indonesian appeals. The APCET organizers would learn of her decision only a few days before APCET’s opening day. The French First Lady would cite gross Indonesian pressure for her withdrawal. Indonesia had threatened to make things harder for Manila if she were to proceed with her keynote speech. She did not want to be, a party to this.
Intensifying the pressure further, Indonesia postponed indefinitely the Jakarta talks between the Philippines and the MNLF. Then it banned its 200-strong delegation from attending the East Asia Business Conference to be held in Davao City at the same time as the APCET conference. It also started to organize government pickets at the Philippine embassy in Jakarta as it encouraged the Filipino business community, there to appeal to the APCET organizers to cancel the confab.
As the Philippine government started to suffer diplomatic drubbing, Manila sent a high-powered delegation to Jakarta led by former foreign secretary Raul Manglapus to try to appease the Indonesians. Suharto did not even meet them.
Meanwhile, the Miss Universe pageant, which was going on in Manila at that time, was relegated to second lead by the media due to APCET. The Philippine government had wanted the pageant to refurbish the image of the country before the international community. Preparations had started almost three years before. But the APCET brouhaha stole the show, much to the consternation of tourism officials whose preparations all went to naught.
Failing to convince the APCET organizers, the government tried to convince the state-operated University of the Philippines (UP) to disallow the use of the university facilities for APCET. But the move backfired. The academic community rose up in arms against the central government’s blatant disregard for its independent charter. Academic freedom was now also being jeopardized. UP officials refused to budge, and turned down the request of the national government to cancel APCET’s reservations.
The Indonesians could not understand why a state university was being allowed to be used for an event they deemed unfriendly. After pulling out of the businessmen’s conference and postponing the Jakarta, talks, the Indonesian navy harassed and arrested Filipinos fishing in the seas that bordered the two countries.
Filipino fishing magnates called their own press conference denouncing APCET organizers and even questioned our sensitivity to their human rights. But a large federation of fisher folks vented their wrath on Indonesia and the Philippine government. It questioned the government’s policy of economic growth and appeasing Indonesia at the expense of democracy and the human rights of the small Filipinos.
National Security
Bent on stopping the conference,-President Ramos, in a style reminiscent of the Marcos years, dramatically signed a handwritten memorandum banning the attendance of foreigners in the international conference. This was on 21 May, or eight days before APCET. Ramos’s list included Horta and some others who had ironically already signified their non-participation in APCET.
We countered by releasing selected names of those who were coming to APCET, among them the Japanese Bishop Nobuo Soma and the Irish Nobel Peace Laureate Mairead McGuire. The organizers thought that the government would think twice before touching these prominent Personalities. But the government promptly put them on the blacklist.
When some of the foreign participants already in the country surfaced and appealed. to President Ramos to rescind his order, they were threatened with arrest and deportation. Then a local court hastily issued a restraining order on Constantino and myself to stop the holding of APCET on the scheduled dates and enjoining the university not to allow its facilities to be used. The magistrate, a former military judge who was also responsible for convicting Filipino patriot Ninoy Aquino to death, issued his order in favor of a petition filed by a shady organization called the Philippine-Indonesia Friendship Society.
The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a warning to all foreign diplomats in the Philippines to shy away from APCET and for all airlines not to ferry any foreign participant to Manila to attend APCET. But the APCET organizers defied the government’s illegal moves by proceeding with the conference. Foreign participants also defied the ,government ban.
When Nobel Peace Prize awardee Mairead McGuire arrived in Manila –1-45 attend APCET, she was promptly deported. Bishop Soma was denied carriage by a Pakistani plane that was to bring him to Manila from Japan. The government was committing one blunder after another. Its blacklist ballooned as the delegates arrived and the Indonesians kept supplying it with names. Among those banned were names the government had earlier given to APCET to invite. They were supposed to carry the Indonesian banner at APCET. A dead bishop was also banned. So were the French and Portuguese First Ladies who had already said they were not coming anyway. All told, eleven foreigners were deported from Manila. Four Sri Lankans, an Australian, two Portuguese, two Irish, and an American were among those “dearly deported.”
The media pulverized Ramos for the government’s “worst foreign policy disaster since World War II.” Citizens from all walks of life issued statements of support to APCET. Manila’s archbishop and leader of the Philippine Roman Catholic Church, Jaime Cardinal Sin, issued a letter expressing disappointment and apologizing for the actions of “his government.” Sin addressed his public letter to the East Timorese bishop, Felipe Carlos Ximenes Belo. Sin’s position helped galvanize public support for APCET, and the broad progressive movement that led the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship was once again united — even for a fleeting moment.
Braving court contempt and Possible arrests, the organizers stood firm and declared the court order illegal. Almost all lawyer groups in the country agreed. The President’s spokesman threatened to file treason charges, which was punishable by death in the country, against the APCET organizers. But they were ready to be arrested. Most of the foreign’ participants who had managed to get inside the country were also ready to be deported. They ignored the summons to appear at the immigration bureau which had revoked their visas. Instead, a battery of APCET lawyers trooped to the bureau to win a postponement of their hearings. Meanwhile, the dean of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines, together with other APCET principals not named in the court suit, went to the Supreme Court to try to lift the restraining order.
Triumph
Three hours before the opening session on 30 May, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s illegal order. But it maintained the right of President Ramos to ban foreigners from the international meet. APCET would be allowed as long as Filipinos were the only ones attending the international conference.
The organizers ignored what Ramos styled as his “Solomonic decision” and mapped out alternatives. If the foreign delegates already inside the country were prevented from attending the conference, the organizers planned to have them all converge outside the conference venue and hold some sort of a vigil. Then the Filipino delegates inside would come out of the hall and join them outside to report the proceedings. A cultural-cum-solidarity program would then ensue. Another idea was to have cut-outs or mannequins of the banned foreign speakers sit in their supposed places inside the hall.
It turned out that we did not have to resort to any of these measures. The conference opened amid intense media interest as the Damoclean sword of deportation hung over the foreign participants who had to be escorted in and out of the session hall by a phalanx of paralegals and a cordon of security personnel from the organizers’ ranks.
With the conference already starting, the government finally relented and dropped the deportation proceedings against the foreign delegates who agreed to leave the country within a week after the end of APCET. The Indonesians also signified that they were placated by the ban on foreign participation, even if a number of these foreign participants still managed to attend the entire conference without any hitch.
And so for six days, APCET allowed the voices of the silenced East Timorese people to finally reverberate in unison and proclaim to the whole world their desire to be free. At last, East Timor had broken through the shroud of darkness that had enveloped the nation for nearly two decades, bringing the hopes of its people for emancipation one step closer to realization.
At the conference, it was agreed that the participants would form an organization to support the East Timorese struggle for self-determination. The Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor became the Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor.
Epilogue
The East Timor issue continued to hug the headlines months after the conference ended in Manila. But the controversy did not end with the Manila conference. To ventilate the issue further, the Coalition mounted more conferences on East Timor even as the Indonesians tried to suppress these private efforts by pressuring the host country to scuttle the conference.
In 1996, two years after Manila, the second conference on East Timor (APCET 2) was held in Kuala Lumpur. The Malaysian government unleashed a mob of its youth arm to break up APCET 2. Our local Malaysian hosts and organizers were arrested and detained while all foreign delegates were deported. Undeterred, we again held APCET 3 in 1998 in Bangkok where we were subjected to “low-intensity harassment.” All these events require their own narratives. Suffice it to say that the coalition and network for East Timor’s self-determination further ballooned in the region.
And now, East Timor is free.
Other Solidarity Efforts
In 1995 we helped establish the Alternative ASEAN Network for Burma or ALTSEAN. Apart from East Timor, Burma was at that time the center of debate within ASEAN. Civil society organizations found that it was an issue that transcended borders which could galvanize human rights advocacy around the region. Most of the original East Timor coalition members were again tapped to form the core of this new formation. In Manila, the Free Burma Coalition (FBC) was organized to work on Burmese issues on the local front.
Since then, ALTSEAN – which has a secretariat based in Bangkok—has been in the forefront in the advocacy for Burma democracy in the region. FBC-Philippines and IID, meanwhile, have engaged the Philippine government on its policy with Burma. When Vice President and concurrent Foreign Secretary Teofisto Guingona went to Burma in April 2001, we wrung a commitment from him to see democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. He did take this up with the Burmese generals but was politely refused. He asked his hosts what was he going to report to the human rights organizations back home?
Perhaps because of our work in both the East Timor and Burma campaigns, we have been approached to engage in the issues of Mindanao, Aceh, and West Papua. We are trying our best to provide whatever we can to the campaign for human rights in these areas, even if our resources and efforts have been very minimal at this point. We could only stretch ourselves so much.
Perhaps that’s one further lesson. Trying not to overstretch ourselves. To focus on what is at hand, what we are best capable of doing, and passing on to others tasks best addressed by them. For networks and coalitions are but part of the larger network and coalition that is civil society.
And a final point. Our networks and coalitions should learn how to celebrate. Many of us have fallen by the side because of being burnt out. Because we feel that we have been doing the same things for eons and sometimes do not feel vindicated. It is also because a lot of us would rather go on overdrive rather than take a pause, a breather, a sabbatical.
We need to celebrate even our small victories. It is a dynamic world and struggle out there. So as we campaign and consolidate, engage and lobby, let us also carouse, revel, rejoice, frolic, and enjoy the beauty that still abounds around us. Doing so not only extols ourselves but more so honors our struggles.